lightning-bolts/05-onchain.md

BOLT #5: Recommendations for On-chain Transaction Handling

Abstract

Lightning allows for two parties (nodes A and B) to conduct transactions off-chain by giving each of them a cross-signed commitment transaction, which describes the current state of the channel (basically, the current balance). This commitment transaction is updated every time a new payment is made, and is spendable at all times.

There are three ways a channel can end:

1. The good way (mutual close): at some point nodes A and B agree to close the channel. They generate a closing transaction (which is similar to a commitment transaction without any pending payments) and publish it on the blockchain (see BOLT #2: Channel Close).
2. The bad way (unilateral close): something goes wrong, possibly without evil intent on either side. Perhaps one party crashed, for instance. One side publishes its latest commitment transaction.
3. The ugly way (revoked transaction close): one of the parties deliberately tries to cheat by publishing an outdated version of its commitment transaction (presumably one that was more in her favor).

Because Lightning is designed to be trustless, there is no risk of loss of funds in any of these three cases, provided that the situation is properly handled. The goal of this document is to explain exactly how a node should react to seeing any of these on-chain.

Table of Contents

• General Nomenclature
• Commitment Transaction
• Failing A Channel
• Mutual Close Handling
• Unilateral Close Handling: Our Own Commitment Transaction
  • HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Our Offers
  • HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Their Offers
• Unilateral Close Handling: Their Commitment Transaction
  • HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Our Offers
  • HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Their Offers
• Revoked Transaction Close Handling
  • Penalty Transactions Weight Calculation
• General Requirements
• Appendix A: Expected weights
  • Expected Weight of the to_local Penalty Transaction Witness
  • Expected Weight of the received_htlc Penalty Transaction Witness
  • Expected Weight of the accepted_htlc Penalty Transaction Witness
• Authors

General Nomenclature

We consider any unspent output to be unresolved, and resolve them as detailed in this document. Usually this means spending it with another resolving transaction. Sometimes it simply means noting the output for later wallet spending, in which case the transaction containing the output is considered to be its own resolving transaction.

Outputs that are resolved are considered irrevocably resolved once their resolving transaction is included in a block at least 100 deep on the most-work blockchain. 100 blocks is far greater than the longest known Bitcoin fork, and the same value used to wait for confirmations of miner's rewards (see Reference Implementation).

Requirements

Once a node has broadcast a funding transaction or sent a commitment signature for a commitment transaction that contains an HTLC output, it MUST monitor the blockchain for transactions that spend any output that is not irrevocably resolved, until all outputs are irrevocably resolved.

A node MUST resolve all outputs as specified below and MUST be prepared to resolve them multiple times in case of blockchain reorganizations.

A node SHOULD fail the channel if it is not already closed when it sees the funding transaction spent. A node MAY send a descriptive error packet in this case.

Invalid transactions SHOULD be ignored.

Rationale

Once a node has had some money at stake, monitoring is required to ensure the other side does not close unilaterally.

Invalid transactions (eg. bad signatures) can be generated by anyone, (and will be ignored by the blockchain anyway), so they should not trigger any action.

Commitment Transaction

Nodes A and B each hold a commitment transaction, each of which has four types of outputs:

1. A's main output: Zero or one outputs that pay to A's commitment key.
2. B's main output: Zero or one outputs that pay to B's commitment key.
3. A's offered HTLCs: Zero or more pending payments (HTLCs) to pay B in return for a payment preimage.
4. B's offered HTLCs: Zero or more pending payments (HTLCs) to pay A in return for a payment preimage.

As an incentive for nodes A and B to cooperate, an OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY relative timeout encumbers node A's outputs in A's commitment transaction, and node B's outputs in B's commitment transaction. If node A publishes its commitment transaction, it won't be able to get its funds immediately but node B will. As a consequence, node A and B's commitment transactions are not identical, but they are (usually) symmetrical.

See BOLT #3: Commitment Transaction for more details.

Failing A Channel

Various error cases involve closing a channel. This can be done in several ways; the most efficient is preferred. Note that there are requirements around sending the error message to the peer in BOLT #1: The error message.

Requirements

• If no local commitment transaction ever contained a to_local or HTLC output, the node MAY simply forget the channel.
• Otherwise, if the current commitment transaction does not contain to_local or HTLC outputs, a node MAY simply wait and rely on the other node to close, but MUST not forget the channel.
• Otherwise, if the node has received a valid closing_signed message with high enough fee level, it SHOULD use that to perform a mutual close.
• Otherwise, it MUST use the last commitment transaction for which it has a signature to perform unilateral close.

Rationale

Since dust_limit_satoshis is supposed to prevent uneconomic output creation (which would be left unspent forever in the blockchain), we insist on spending the commitment transaction outputs.

In the early stages of a channel, it's common for one side to have little or no money in the channel; with nothing to lose, there's no reason to consume resources monitoring the channel state.

There's a bias towards using mutual close over unilateral, because outputs are unencumbered by a delay and are directly spendable by wallets, and because fees tend to be less exaggerated than commitment transactions: thus the only reason not to use the signature from closing_signed would be if the fee offered was too small for it to be processed.

Mutual Close Handling

A mutual close transaction resolves the funding transaction output.

A node doesn't need to do anything else as it has already agreed to the output, which is sent to its specified scriptpubkey (see BOLT #2: Closing initiation: shutdown).

Unilateral Close Handling: Our Own Commitment Transaction

There are two unilateral cases to consider: in this case, a node sees its own commitment transaction.

Our own commitment transaction resolves the funding transaction output.

A node can't claim funds from the outputs of its own unilateral close until the OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY delay has passed (as specified by the other node's to_self_delay field). Where this applies, it's noted below.

Requirements

When a node sees its own commitment transaction:

1. to_local output: A node SHOULD spend this output to a convenient address. A node MUST wait until the OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY delay has passed (as specified by the other node's to_self_delay field) before spending the output. If the output is spent (as recommended), the output is resolved by the spending transaction, otherwise it is considered resolved by the commitment transaction itself.
2. to_remote output: No action required, this output is considered resolved by the commitment transaction itself.
3. HTLCs offered by this node: See "HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Our Offers" below.
4. HTLCs offered by the other node: See "HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Their Offers" below.

Rationale

Spending the to_local output avoids having to remember the complicated witness script associated with that particular channel for later spending.

The to_remote output is entirely the business of the other node, and can be ignored.

HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Our Offers

Each HTLC output can only be spent by us, the offerer, using the HTLC-timeout transaction after it's timed out, or by them, the recipient, if they have the payment preimage.

There can be HTLCs which are not represented by an output: either because they were trimmed as dust, or because it's only been partially committed.

The HTLC has timed out once the depth of the latest block is equal or greater than the HTLC cltv_expiry.

Requirements

If the commitment transaction HTLC output is spent using the payment preimage, the output is considered irrevocably resolved, and the node MUST extract the payment preimage from the transaction input witness.

If the commitment transaction HTLC output has timed out and not been resolved, the node MUST resolve the output by spending it using the HTLC-timeout transaction, MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any) once the resolving transaction has reached reasonable depth, and MUST resolve the output of that HTLC-timeout transaction.

A node SHOULD resolve that HTLC-timeout transaction by spending it to a convenient address. If the output is spent (as recommended), the output is resolved by the spending transaction, otherwise it is considered resolved by the commitment transaction itself.

A node MUST wait until the OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY delay has passed (as specified by the other node's open_channel to_self_delay field) before spending that HTLC-timeout output.

For any committed HTLC that does not have an output in this commitment transaction, the node MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any) once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth, and MAY fail it sooner if no valid commitment transaction contains an output corresponding to the HTLC.

Rationale

The payment preimage either serves to prove payment (when the offering node originated the payment) or to redeem the corresponding incoming HTLC from another peer (when the offering node is forwarding the payment). Once a node has extracted the payment, it no longer cares about the fate of the HTLC-spending transaction itself.

In cases where both resolutions are possible (e.g., when a node receives payment success after timeout), either interpretation is acceptable; it is the responsibility of the recipient to spend it before this occurs.

We need to use our HTLC-timeout transaction to time out the HTLC to prevent them fulfilling it and claiming the funds, and before we can back-fail any corresponding incoming HTLC, using update_fail_htlc (presumably with reason permanent_channel_failure) as detailed in BOLT 02. If the incoming HTLC is on-chain too, we simply wait for it to timeout: there's no way to signal early failure.

If an HTLC is too small to appear in any commitment transaction, it can be safely failed immediately. Otherwise, if a HTLC isn't in our commitment transaction a node needs to make sure that a blockchain reorganization or race does not switch to a commitment transaction which does contain it before the node fails it, hence the wait. The requirement that the incoming HTLC be failed before its own timeout still applies as an upper bound.

HTLC Output Handling: Our Commitment, Their Offers

Each HTLC output can only be spent by us, the recipient, using the HTLC-success transaction, which we can only populate if we have the payment preimage. If we don't have the preimage (and don't discover it), it's the offerer's responsibility to spend the HTLC output once it's timed out.

There are actually several possible cases for an offered HTLC:

1. The offerer is not irrevocably committed to it. The recipient won't normally know the preimage here, since it won't forward HTLCs until they're fully committed. So using the preimage would reveal that this recipient is the final hop, so it's best to allow the HTLC to time out in this case.
2. The offerer is irrevocably committed to the offered HTLC, but the recipient hasn't yet committed to an outgoing HTLC. In this case the recipient can either forward or timeout.
3. The recipient has committed to an outgoing HTLC for the offered one. In this case the recipient has to use the preimage if it receives it from the outgoing HTLC, otherwise it will lose funds by making an outgoing payment without redeeming the incoming one.

Requirements

If the node receives (or already knows) a payment preimage for an unresolved HTLC output it was offered for which it has committed to an outgoing HTLC, it MUST resolve the output by spending it using the HTLC-success transaction, and MUST resolve the output of that HTLC-success transaction. Otherwise, if the other node is not irrevocably committed to the HTLC, it MUST NOT resolve the output by spending it.

A node SHOULD resolve that HTLC-success transaction output by spending it to a convenient address. If the output is spent (as recommended), the output is resolved by the spending transaction, otherwise it is considered resolved by the commitment transaction itself.

A node MUST wait until the OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY delay has passed (as specified by the other node's open_channel to_self_delay field) before spending that HTLC-success transaction output.

If not otherwise resolved, once the HTLC output has expired, it is considered irrevocably resolved.

Unilateral Close Handling: Other Node's Commitment Transaction

The other node's commitment transaction resolves the funding transaction output.

There are no delays constraining behavior here, so it's simpler than when dealing with one's own commitment transaction.

Requirements

When a node sees a commitment transaction from the other node:

1. to_remote: No action is required; this is a simple P2WPKH output to us. This output is considered resolved by the commitment transaction itself.
2. to_local:: No action required; this is a payment to them. This output is considered resolved by the commitment transaction.
3. HTLCs offered by this node: See "HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Our Offers" below.
4. HTLCs offered by the other node: See "HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Their Offers" below.

A node MUST handle the broadcast of any valid commitment transaction from the other node in this way; if it is unable to do so it MUST warn about lost funds.

Rationale

Note that there can be more than one valid, unrevoked commitment transaction after a signature has been received via commitment_signed and before the corresponding revoke_and_ack. Either commitment can serve as the other node's commitment transaction, hence the requirement to handle both.

In the case of data loss, a node can reach a state where it doesn't recognize all of the other node's commitment transaction HTLC outputs. It can tell this has happened because the commitment number will be greater than expected, and because it has signed the transaction. If both nodes support option-data-loss-protect the node will know the peer's per_commitment_point and thus be able to derive its own remotekey for the transaction and salvage its own funds (but not the HTLCs).

HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Our Offers

Each HTLC output can only be spent by us, the offerer, after it's timed out, or by them, the recipient, if they have the payment preimage.

The HTLC output has timed out once the depth of the latest block is equal or greater than the HTLC cltv_expiry.

There can be HTLCs which are not represented by an output: either because they were trimmed as dust, or in the case where the other node has two valid commitment transactions, and the HTLCs differ in each.

Requirements

If the commitment transaction HTLC output is spent using the payment preimage, the output is considered irrevocably resolved, and the node MUST extract the payment preimage from the HTLC-success transaction input witness.

If the commitment transaction HTLC output has timed out and not been resolved, the node MUST resolve the output by spending it to a convenient address.

For any committed HTLC that does not have an output in this commitment transaction, the node MUST fail the corresponding incoming HTLC (if any) once the commitment transaction has reached reasonable depth, and MAY fail it sooner if no valid commitment transaction contains an output corresponding to the HTLC.

Rationale

If the commitment transaction is theirs, the only way to spend the HTLC output using a payment preimage is for them to use the HTLC-success transaction.

The payment preimage either serves to prove payment (when the offering node originated the payment) or to redeem the corresponding incoming HTLC from another peer (when the offering node is forwarding the payment). Once a node has extracted the payment, it no longer cares about the fate of the HTLC-spending transaction itself.

In cases where both resolutions are possible (e.g., when a node receives payment success after timeout), either interpretation is acceptable; it is the responsibility of the recipient to spend it before this occurs.

We need to spend the HTLC output once it has timed out to prevent them using the HTLC-success transaction, and before we can back-fail any corresponding incoming HTLC, using update_fail_htlc (presumably with reason permanent_channel_failure) as detailed in BOLT 02. If the incoming HTLC is on-chain too, we simply wait for it to timeout: there's no way to signal early failure.

If an HTLC is too small to appear in any commitment transaction, it can be safely failed immediately. Otherwise, if a HTLC isn't in our commitment transaction a node needs to make sure that a blockchain reorganization or race does not switch to a commitment transaction which does contain it before the node fails it, hence the wait. The requirement that the incoming HTLC be failed before its own timeout still applies as an upper bound.

HTLC Output Handling: Their Commitment, Their Offers

Each HTLC output can only be spent by us, the recipient, using the payment preimage. If we don't have the preimage (and don't discover it), it's the offerer's responsibility to spend the HTLC output once it's timed out.

We can only spend their HTLC outputs if we have the payment preimage. If we don't have the preimage (and don't discover it), it's their responsibility to spend the HTLC output once it's timed out.

There are actually several possible cases for an offered HTLC:

1. The offerer is not irrevocably committed to it. The recipient won't normally know the preimage here, since it won't forward HTLCs until they're fully committed. So using the preimage would reveal that this recipient is the final hop, so it's best to allow the HTLC to time out in this case.
2. The offerer is irrevocably committed to the offered HTLC, but the recipient hasn't yet committed to an outgoing HTLC. In this case the recipient can either forward or timeout.
3. The recipient has committed to an outgoing HTLC for the offered one. In this case the recipient has to use the preimage if it receives it from the outgoing HTLC, otherwise it will lose funds by making an outgoing payment without redeeming the incoming one.

Requirements

If the node receives (or already knows) a payment preimage for an unresolved HTLC output it was offered for which it has committed to an outgoing HTLC, it MUST resolve the output by spending it to a convenient address. Otherwise, if the other node is not irrevocably committed to the HTLC, it MUST NOT resolve the output by spending it.

If not otherwise resolved, once the HTLC output has expired, it is considered irrevocably resolved.

Revoked Transaction Close Handling

If a node tries to broadcast old state, the other node can use the revocation key to claim all the funds.

Requirements

A node MUST NOT broadcast a commitment transaction for which it has exposed the revocation key.

If a node sees a commitment transaction for which it has a revocation key, that resolves the funding transaction output.

A node MUST resolve all unresolved outputs as follows:

1. A's main output: No action is required; this is a simple P2WPKH output. This output is considered resolved by the commitment transaction.
2. B's main output: The node MUST resolve this by spending using the revocation key.
3. A's offered HTLCs: The node MUST resolve this in one of three ways by spending:

• the commitment tx using the payment revocation
• the commitment tx using the payment preimage if known
• the HTLC-timeout tx if B publishes them

4. B's offered HTLCs: The node MUST resolve this in one of two ways by spending:

• the commitment tx using the payment revocation
• the commitment tx once the HTLC timeout has passed.

5. B's HTLC-timeout transaction: The node MUST resolve this by spending using the revocation key.
6. B's HTLC-success transaction: The node MUST resolve this by spending using the revocation key. The node SHOULD extract the payment preimage from the transaction input witness if not already known.

The node MAY use a single transaction to resolve all the outputs, but MUST handle its transactions being invalidated by HTLC transactions.

Rationale

A single transaction that resolves all the outputs will be under the standard size limit thanks to the 483 HTLC-per-party limit (see BOLT #2).

Note that if a single transaction is used it may be invalidated as node B broadcasts HTLC-timeout and HTLC-success transactions, but the requirement of persistence, until all outputs are irrevocably resolved, should cover this. [FIXME: May have to divide and conquer here, since they may be able to delay us long enough to avoid successful penalty spend? ]

Penalty Transactions Weight Calculation

There are three different scripts for penalty transactions, with the following witnesses weight (details of the computation are in Appendix A):

to_local_penalty_witness: 160 bytes
offered_htlc_penalty_witness: 243 bytes
accepted_htlc_penalty_witness: 249 bytes

The penalty txinput itself takes 41 bytes, which has a weight of 164, making the weight of each input:

to_local_penalty_input_weight: 324 bytes
offered_htlc_penalty_input_weight: 407 bytes
accepted_htlc_penalty_input_weight: 413 bytes

The rest of the penalty transaction takes 4+1+1+8+1+34+4=53 bytes of non-witness data, assuming that it has a pay-to-witness-script-hash (the largest standard output script), in addition to a 2-byte witness header.

In addition to outputs being swept under as penalty, the node MAY also sweep the to_remote output of the commitment transaction (e.g. to reduce the total amount paid in fees). Doing so requires the inclusion of a p2wpkh witness and additional txinput, resulting in an additional 108 + 164 = 272 bytes.

In a worst case scenario, a node holds only incoming HTLCs, and the HTLC-timeout transactions are not published, which forces the node to spend from the commitment transaction.

With a maximum standard weight of 400000, the maximum number of HTLCs that can be swept in a single transaction:

max_num_htlcs = (400000 - 324 - 272 - 4*53 - 2) / 413 = 966

This allows 483 HTLCs in each direction (with both to_local and to_remote outputs) to still be resolved in a single penalty transaction. Note that even if the to_remote output is not swept, the resulting max_num_htlcs is 967, which yields the same unidirectional limit of 483 HTLCs.

General Requirements

A node SHOULD report an error to the operator if it sees a transaction spend the funding transaction output which does not fall into one of these categories (mutual close, unilateral close, or revoked transaction close). Such a transaction implies its private key has leaked, and funds may be lost.

A node MAY simply watch the contents of the most-work chain for transactions, or MAY watch for (valid) broadcast transactions a.k.a mempool. Considering mempool transactions should cause lower latency for HTLC redemption, but on-chain HTLCs should be such an unusual case that speed cannot be considered critical.

Appendix A: Expected weights

Expected Weight of the to_local Penalty Transaction Witness

As described in BOLT #3, the witness for this transaction is:

<sig> 1 { OP_IF <key> OP_ELSE to_self_delay OP_CSV OP_DROP <key> OP_ENDIF OP_CHECKSIG }

The expected weight is calculated as follows:

to_local_script: 83 bytes
    - OP_IF: 1 byte
        - OP_DATA: 1 byte (revocationkey length)
        - revocationkey: 33 bytes
        - OP_CHECKSIG: 1 byte
    - OP_ELSE: 1 byte
        - OP_DATA: 1 byte (localkey length)
        - localkey: 33 bytes
        - OP_CHECKSIG_VERIFY: 1 byte
        - OP_DATA: 1 byte (delay length)
        - delay: 8 bytes
        - OP_CHECKSEQUENCEVERIFY: 1 byte
    - OP_ENDIF: 1 byte

to_local_penalty_witness: 160 bytes
    - number_of_witness_elements: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig_length: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig: 73 bytes
    - one_length: 1 byte
    - witness_script_length: 1 byte
    - witness_script (to_local_script)

Expected Weight of the offered_htlc Penalty Transaction Witness

The expected weight is calculated as follows (some calculations have already been made in BOLT #3):

offered_htlc_script: 133 bytes
	
offered_htlc_penalty_witness: 243 bytes
    - number_of_witness_elements: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig_length: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig: 73 bytes
    - revocation_key_length: 1 byte
    - revocation_key: 33 bytes
    - witness_script_length: 1 byte
    - witness_script (offered_htlc_script)

Expected Weight of the accepted_htlc Penalty Transaction Witness

The expected weight is calculated as follows (some calculations have already been made in BOLT #3):

accepted_htlc_script: 139 bytes
	
accepted_htlc_penalty_witness: 249 bytes
    - number_of_witness_elements: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig_length: 1 byte
    - revocation_sig: 73 bytes
    - revocation_key_length: 1 byte
    - revocation_key: 33 bytes
    - witness_script_length: 1 byte
    - witness_script (accepted_htlc_script)

Authors

FIXME

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