We had a scheme where lightningd itself would put a per-node secret in
the blinded path, then we'd tell the caller when it was used. Then it
simply checks the alias to determine if the correct path was used.
But this doesn't work when we start to offer multiple blinded paths.
So go for a far simpler scheme, where the secret is generated (and
stored) by the caller, and hand it back to them.
We keep the split "with secret" or "without secret" API, since I'm
sure callers who don't care about the secret won't check that it
doesn't exist! And without that, someone can use a blinded path for a
different message and get a response which may reveal the node.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It was very tied to x-only keys; we could support it in a backwards
compatibility mode for a while, but getting refunds or proving old
pre-finalization invoices is not worth spending time on.
Changelog-EXPERIMENTAL: offers: old `payer_key` proofs won't work.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is the one place where we hand point32 over the wire internally, so
remove it.
This is also our first hsm version change!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We will now simply reject old-style ones as invalid. Turns out the
only trace we could find is a channel between two nodes unconnected to
the rest of the network.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Changelog-Changed: Protocol: We now require all channel_update messages include htlc_maximum_msat (as per latest BOLTs)
And turn "" includes into full-path (which makes it easier to put
config.h first, and finds some cases check-includes.sh missed
previously).
config.h sets _GNU_SOURCE which really needs to be done before any
'#includes': we mainly got away with it with glibc, but other platforms
like Alpine may have stricter requirements.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We put this in reply paths, so we can tell if they are used. This lets us
avoid responding unless the correct reply path is used.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Before:
Ten builds, laptop -j5, no ccache:
```
real 0m36.686000-38.956000(38.608+/-0.65)s
user 2m32.864000-42.253000(40.7545+/-2.7)s
sys 0m16.618000-18.316000(17.8531+/-0.48)s
```
Ten builds, laptop -j5, ccache (warm):
```
real 0m8.212000-8.577000(8.39989+/-0.13)s
user 0m12.731000-13.212000(12.9751+/-0.17)s
sys 0m3.697000-3.902000(3.83722+/-0.064)s
```
After:
Ten builds, laptop -j5, no ccache: 8% faster
```
real 0m33.802000-35.773000(35.468+/-0.54)s
user 2m19.073000-27.754000(26.2542+/-2.3)s
sys 0m15.784000-17.173000(16.7165+/-0.37)s
```
Ten builds, laptop -j5, ccache (warm): 1% faster
```
real 0m8.200000-8.485000(8.30138+/-0.097)s
user 0m12.485000-13.100000(12.7344+/-0.19)s
sys 0m3.702000-3.889000(3.78787+/-0.056)s
```
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This touches a lot of text, mainly to change "if `option_anchor_outputs`"
to "if `option_anchors`"
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I wante to hide it inside the library, but it is good to have a single
place to verify that the client was permitted to send a message we are
handling, so make it officially part of the interface by prefixing it.
