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libhsmd: handle_sign_commitment_tx

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Decker 2021-04-22 13:26:47 +02:00 committed by Rusty Russell
parent 4764ebd879
commit e643594104
2 changed files with 57 additions and 58 deletions
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58
hsmd/hsmd.c
View File

@ -732,60 +732,6 @@ static struct io_plan *init_hsm(struct io_conn *conn,
&bolt12)));
}
/*~ This is another lightningd-only interface; signing a commit transaction.
* This is dangerous, since if we sign a revoked commitment tx we'll lose
* funds, thus it's only available to lightningd.
*
*
* Oh look, another FIXME! */
/* FIXME: Ensure HSM never does this twice for same dbid! */
static struct io_plan *handle_sign_commitment_tx(struct io_conn *conn,
struct client *c,
const u8 *msg_in)
{
struct pubkey remote_funding_pubkey, local_funding_pubkey;
struct node_id peer_id;
u64 dbid;
struct secret channel_seed;
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
struct secrets secrets;
const u8 *funding_wscript;
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_commitment_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
&peer_id, &dbid,
&tx,
&remote_funding_pubkey))
return bad_req(conn, c, msg_in);
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
/* Basic sanity checks. */
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have 1 input");
if (tx->wtx->num_outputs == 0)
return bad_req_fmt(conn, c, msg_in, "tx must have > 0 outputs");
get_channel_seed(&peer_id, dbid, &channel_seed);
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed,
&local_funding_pubkey, NULL, &secrets, NULL);
/*~ Bitcoin signatures cover the (part of) the script they're
* executing; the rules are a bit complex in general, but for
* Segregated Witness it's simply the current script. */
funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
&local_funding_pubkey,
&remote_funding_pubkey);
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
&secrets.funding_privkey,
&local_funding_pubkey,
SIGHASH_ALL,
&sig);
return req_reply(conn, c,
take(towire_hsmd_sign_commitment_tx_reply(NULL, &sig)));
}
/*~ This covers several cases where onchaind is creating a transaction which
* sends funds to our internal wallet. */
/* FIXME: Derive output address for this client, and check it here! */
@ -1075,15 +1021,13 @@ static struct io_plan *handle_client(struct io_conn *conn, struct client *c)
case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD:
return pass_client_hsmfd(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
return handle_sign_commitment_tx(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
return handle_sign_delayed_payment_to_us(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
return handle_sign_remote_htlc_to_us(conn, c, c->msg_in);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_COMMITMENT_TX:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TX:

57
hsmd/libhsmd.c
View File

@ -1151,6 +1151,60 @@ static u8 *handle_sign_penalty_to_us(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
SIGHASH_ALL);
}
/*~ This is another lightningd-only interface; signing a commit transaction.
* This is dangerous, since if we sign a revoked commitment tx we'll lose
* funds, thus it's only available to lightningd.
*
*
* Oh look, another FIXME! */
/* FIXME: Ensure HSM never does this twice for same dbid! */
static u8 *handle_sign_commitment_tx(struct hsmd_client *c, const u8 *msg_in)
{
struct pubkey remote_funding_pubkey, local_funding_pubkey;
struct node_id peer_id;
u64 dbid;
struct secret channel_seed;
struct bitcoin_tx *tx;
struct bitcoin_signature sig;
struct secrets secrets;
const u8 *funding_wscript;
if (!fromwire_hsmd_sign_commitment_tx(tmpctx, msg_in,
&peer_id, &dbid,
&tx,
&remote_funding_pubkey))
return hsmd_status_malformed_request(c, msg_in);
tx->chainparams = c->chainparams;
/* Basic sanity checks. */
if (tx->wtx->num_inputs != 1)
return hsmd_status_bad_request(c, msg_in,
"tx must have 1 input");
if (tx->wtx->num_outputs == 0)
return hsmd_status_bad_request_fmt(c, msg_in,
"tx must have > 0 outputs");
get_channel_seed(&peer_id, dbid, &channel_seed);
derive_basepoints(&channel_seed,
&local_funding_pubkey, NULL, &secrets, NULL);
/*~ Bitcoin signatures cover the (part of) the script they're
* executing; the rules are a bit complex in general, but for
* Segregated Witness it's simply the current script. */
funding_wscript = bitcoin_redeem_2of2(tmpctx,
&local_funding_pubkey,
&remote_funding_pubkey);
sign_tx_input(tx, 0, NULL, funding_wscript,
&secrets.funding_privkey,
&local_funding_pubkey,
SIGHASH_ALL,
&sig);
return towire_hsmd_sign_commitment_tx_reply(NULL, &sig);
}
u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
const u8 *msg)
{
@ -1177,7 +1231,6 @@ u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
switch (t) {
case WIRE_HSMD_INIT:
case WIRE_HSMD_CLIENT_HSMFD:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_DELAYED_PAYMENT_TO_US:
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_REMOTE_HTLC_TO_US:
/* Not implemented yet. Should not have been passed here yet. */
@ -1217,6 +1270,8 @@ u8 *hsmd_handle_client_message(const tal_t *ctx, struct hsmd_client *client,
return handle_sign_remote_commitment_tx(client, msg);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_PENALTY_TO_US:
return handle_sign_penalty_to_us(client, msg);
case WIRE_HSMD_SIGN_COMMITMENT_TX:
return handle_sign_commitment_tx(client, msg);
case WIRE_HSMD_DEV_MEMLEAK:
case WIRE_HSMD_ECDH_RESP: