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libhsmd: Migrate bolt12 initialization into hsmd_init

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This commit is contained in:
Christian Decker 2021-04-22 15:30:36 +02:00 committed by Rusty Russell
parent d30392c432
commit c9e9581b35
2 changed files with 20 additions and 63 deletions
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63
hsmd/hsmd.c
View File

@ -292,46 +292,6 @@ static struct io_plan *req_reply(struct io_conn *conn,
return io_write_wire(conn, msg_out, client_read_next, c);
}
/*~ This returns the secret and/or public key for this node. */
static void node_key(struct privkey *node_privkey, struct pubkey *node_id)
{
u32 salt = 0;
struct privkey unused_s;
struct pubkey unused_k;
/* If caller specifies NULL, they don't want the results. */
if (node_privkey == NULL)
node_privkey = &unused_s;
if (node_id == NULL)
node_id = &unused_k;
/*~ So, there is apparently a 1 in 2^127 chance that a random value is
* not a valid private key, so this never actually loops. */
do {
/*~ ccan/crypto/hkdf_sha256 implements RFC5869 "Hardened Key
* Derivation Functions". That means that if a derived key
* leaks somehow, the other keys are not compromised. */
hkdf_sha256(node_privkey, sizeof(*node_privkey),
&salt, sizeof(salt),
&secretstuff.hsm_secret,
sizeof(secretstuff.hsm_secret),
"nodeid", 6);
salt++;
} while (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
node_privkey->secret.data));
#if DEVELOPER
/* In DEVELOPER mode, we can override with --dev-force-privkey */
if (dev_force_privkey) {
*node_privkey = *dev_force_privkey;
if (!secp256k1_ec_pubkey_create(secp256k1_ctx, &node_id->pubkey,
node_privkey->secret.data))
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Failed to derive pubkey for dev_force_privkey");
}
#endif
}
/*~ This encrypts the content of the secretstuff and stores it in hsm_secret,
* this is called instead of create_hsm() if `lightningd` is started with
* --encrypted-hsm.
@ -485,8 +445,6 @@ static void load_hsm(const struct secret *encryption_key)
"no plaintext nor encrypted"
" seed.");
close(fd);
hsmd_init(secretstuff.hsm_secret, bip32_key_version);
}
/*~ This is the response to lightningd's HSM_INIT request, which is the first
@ -495,9 +453,6 @@ static struct io_plan *init_hsm(struct io_conn *conn,
struct client *c,
const u8 *msg_in)
{
struct node_id node_id;
struct pubkey key;
struct pubkey32 bolt12;
struct privkey *privkey;
struct secret *seed;
struct secrets *secrets;
@ -541,24 +496,8 @@ static struct io_plan *init_hsm(struct io_conn *conn,
if (hsm_encryption_key)
discard_key(take(hsm_encryption_key));
/*~ We tell lightning our node id and (public) bip32 seed. */
node_key(NULL, &key);
node_id_from_pubkey(&node_id, &key);
/* We also give it the base key for bolt12 payerids */
if (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_ctx, &bolt12.pubkey, NULL,
&secretstuff.bolt12) != 1)
status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could derive bolt12 public key.");
/*~ Note: marshalling a bip32 tree only marshals the public side,
* not the secrets! So we're not actually handing them out here!
*/
return req_reply(conn, c,
take(towire_hsmd_init_reply(NULL, &node_id,
&secretstuff.bip32,
&bolt12)));
hsmd_init(secretstuff.hsm_secret, bip32_key_version));
}
/*~ Since we process requests then service them in strict order, and because

20
hsmd/libhsmd.c
View File

@ -1409,8 +1409,11 @@ u8 *hsmd_init(struct secret hsm_secret,
struct bip32_key_version bip32_key_version)
{
u8 bip32_seed[BIP32_ENTROPY_LEN_256];
struct pubkey key;
struct pubkey32 bolt12;
u32 salt = 0;
struct ext_key master_extkey, child_extkey;
struct node_id node_id;
/*~ Don't swap this. */
sodium_mlock(secretstuff.hsm_secret.data,
@ -1520,5 +1523,20 @@ u8 *hsmd_init(struct secret hsm_secret,
* upset if we get a non-init message. */
initialized = true;
return NULL; /* TODO Fill in once we finish migrating. */
/*~ We tell lightning our node id and (public) bip32 seed. */
node_key(NULL, &key);
node_id_from_pubkey(&node_id, &key);
/* We also give it the base key for bolt12 payerids */
if (secp256k1_keypair_xonly_pub(secp256k1_ctx, &bolt12.pubkey, NULL,
&secretstuff.bolt12) != 1)
hsmd_status_failed(STATUS_FAIL_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Could derive bolt12 public key.");
/*~ Note: marshalling a bip32 tree only marshals the public side,
* not the secrets! So we're not actually handing them out here!
*/
return take(towire_hsmd_init_reply(
NULL, &node_id, &secretstuff.bip32,
&bolt12));
}