When we reestablish there are generally always 4 conditions for
both local and remote commitment transactions:
* we're stale and have possibly lost data
* we're ahead and the peer has lost data
* we're caught up
* we're nearly caught up and need to retransmit one update.
In especially the local commitment case we had a mess of different
comparisons, which is improved here. Further, the error messages
are clarified and include more information.
The data loss protect test was panicking in a message assertion
which should be passing, but because the test was marked only
`#[should_panic]` it was being treated as a successful outcome.
Instead, we use `catch_unwind` on exactly the line we expect to
panic to ensure we are hitting the right one.
By default, LDK will generate the initial temporary channel ID for you.
However, in certain cases, it's desirable to have a temporary channel ID
specified by the caller in case of any pre-negotiation that needs to
happen between peers prior to the channel open message. For example, LND
has a `FundingShim` API that allows for advanced funding flows based on
the temporary channel ID of the channel.
This patch adds support for optionally specifying the temporary channel
ID of the channel through the `create_channel` API.
Adds a `get_signer` method to the context so that a test can get ahold of the
channel signer. Adds a `set_available` method on the `TestChannelSigner` to
allow a test to enable and disable the signer: when disabled some of the
signer's methods will return `Err` which will typically activate the error
handling case. Adds a `set_channel_signer_available` function on the test
`Node` class to make it easy to enable and disable a specific signer.
Adds a new `async_signer_tests` module:
* Check for asynchronous handling of `funding_created` and `funding_signed`.
* Check that we correctly resume processing after awaiting an asynchronous
signature for a `commitment_signed` event.
* Verify correct handling during peer disconnect.
* Verify correct handling for inbound zero-conf.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending which required the signature later,
rather than force-closing the channel (which probably won't even
work if the signer is missing).
This commit adds retrying of inbound funding_created signing
failures, regenerating the `FundingSigned` message, attempting to
re-sign, and sending it to our peers if we succeed.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending which required the signature later,
rather than force-closing the channel (which probably won't even
work if the signer is missing).
This commit adds retrying of outbound funding_created signing
failures, regenerating the `FundingCreated` message, attempting to
re-sign, and sending it to our peers if we succeed.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending which required the signature later,
rather than force-closing the channel (which probably won't even
work if the signer is missing).
This commit adds initial retrying of failures, specifically
regenerating commitment updates, attempting to re-sign the
`CommitmentSigned` message, and sending it to our peers if we
succed.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending which required the signature later,
rather than force-closing the channel (which probably won't even
work if the signer is missing).
Here we add initial handling of sign_counterparty_commitment
failing during inbound channel funding, setting a flag in
`ChannelContext` which indicates we should retry sending the
`funding_signed` later. We don't yet add any ability to do that
retry.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending which required the signature later,
rather than force-closing the channel (which probably won't even
work if the signer is missing).
Here we add initial handling of sign_counterparty_commitment
failing during outbound channel funding, setting a new flag in
`ChannelContext` which indicates we should retry sending the
`funding_created` later. We don't yet add any ability to do that
retry.
If sign_counterparty_commitment fails (i.e. because the signer is
temporarily disconnected), this really indicates that we should
retry the message sending later, rather than force-closing the
channel (which probably won't even work if the signer is missing).
Here we add initial handling of sign_counterparty_commitment
failing during normal channel operation, setting a new flag in
`ChannelContext` which indicates we should retry sending the
commitment update later. We don't yet add any ability to do that
retry.
Bindings aren't currently able to handle a struct with a generic
which is actually exposed - we map all structs concretely to a
single type, whereas having fluctuating types on a struct requires
mapping the inner field to a trait first.
Since this isn't super practical, we make `PendingOnionMessage` a
tuple in bindings, rather than a struct.
Because the bindings changes now require further changes to our
type definitions, avoiding building the `Simple*` type aliases
entirely makes the patchset there simpler.
In 26c1639ab6 we switched to using
`Default::default()` to initialize `()` for scoring parameters in
tests. A number of `()`s slipped back in recently, which we replace
here.
`sign_holder_commitment_and_htlcs` never really made sense. Unlike
`sign_counterparty_commitment`, the signatures for holder HTLC
transactions may be required much later than the commitment
transaction's. While it was nice for us to only reach the signer once to
obtain all holder signatures, it's not really ideal anymore as we want
our signatures to be random and not reused.
We no longer return all holder HTLC signatures and instead defer to
obtaining them via `EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction`.
We want to ensure we use fresh random signatures to prevent certain
classes of transaction replacement attacks at the bitcoin P2P layer.
This was already covered for commitment transactions and zero fee holder
HTLC transactions, but was missing for holder HTLC transactions on
non-anchors channels.
We can easily do this by reusing the existing
`EcdsaChannelSigner::sign_holder_htlc_transaction` method and
circumventing the existing `holder_htlc_sigs/prev_holder_htlc_sigs`
caches, which will be removed in a later commit anyway.
If the user declines to specify a `max_total_routing_fee_msat` in
the new BOLT12 payment methods, rather than defaulting to no limit
on the fee we pay at all, we should default to our "usual default",
ie the one calculated in
`RouteParameters::from_payment_params_and_value`.
We do this here, as well as documenting the behavior on the payment
methods.
Anchor outputs channels are no longer susceptible to fee spikes as they
now mostly target the dynamic minimum mempool fee and can contribute the
remainder of fees when closing.
We should make sure the funding amount of a channel can cover all its
associated costs, including the value of anchor outputs, to make sure
that it is actually usable once "opened".
This could lead us to sending/forwarding HTLCs that would put us below
our reserve, forcing our counterparty to close the channel on us due to
an invalid update.
Define the BOLT 12 message flow in ChannelManager's
OffersMessageHandler implementation.
- An invoice_request message results in responding with an invoice
message if it can be verified that the request is for a valid offer.
- An invoice is paid if it can be verified to have originated from a
sent invoice_request or a refund.
- An invoice_error is sent in some failure cases.
- Initial messages enqueued for sending are released to OnionMessenger
Add a utility to ChannelManager for creating a Bolt12Invoice for a
Refund such that the ChannelManager can recognize the PaymentHash and
reconstruct the PaymentPreimage from the PaymentSecret, the latter of
which is contained in a BlindedPath within the invoice.
Add a utility to ChannelManager for sending an InvoiceRequest for an
Offer such that derived keys are used for the payer id. This allows for
stateless verification of any Invoice messages before it is paid.
Also tracks future payments using the given PaymentId such that the
corresponding Invoice is paid only once.
