When users do async monitor updating, it may not be the case that
all pending monitors will complete updating at once. Thus, we
should fuzz monitor updates completing out of order, which we do
here.
A previous commit introduced the `time` feature to gate the use of
`SystemTime` dependent APIs in `EsploraSyncClient`. It however omitted
doing the same for the Electrum side of things. Here, we address this
oversight.
If we receive an `OpenChannel` message without a `channel_type`
with `manually_accept_inbound_channels` set, we will `unwrap()`
`None`.
This is uncommon these days as most nodes support `channel_type`,
but sadly is rather trivial for a peer to hit for those with manual
channel acceptance enabled.
Reported in and fixes#2804. Luckily, the updated
`full_stack_target` has no issue reaching this issue quickly.
The bindings generator struggles a bit with the references in enum
variant fields in `CandidateRouteHop`. While we could probably fix
this, its much eaiser (and less risky) to inline the enum variant
fields from `CandidateRouteHop` into structs. This also lets us
make some of the fields non-public, which seems better at least for
the opaque `hint_idx` in the blinded paths.
In e06484b0f4, we added specific
handling for outbound-channel initial monitor updates failing -
in such a case we have a counterparty who tried to open a second
channel with the same funding info we just gave them, causing us
to force-close our outbound channel as it shows up as
duplicate-funding. Its largely harmless as it leads to a spurious
force-closure of a channel with a peer doing something absurd,
however it causes the `full_stack_target` fuzzer to fail.
Sadly, in 574c77e7bc, as we were
dropping handling of `PermanentFailure` handling for updates, we
accidentally dropped handling for initial updates as well.
Here we fix the issue (again) and add a test.
We'd previously assumed that LDK would receive
`funding_transaction_generated` prior to our peer learning the txid
and panicked if the peer tried to open a redundant channel to us
with the same funding outpoint.
While this assumption is generally safe, some users may have
out-of-band protocols where they notify their LSP about a funding
outpoint first, or this may be violated in the future with
collaborative transaction construction protocols, i.e. the upcoming
dual-funding protocol.
Currently the channel shutdown sequence has a number of steps which
all the shutdown callsites have to call. Because many shutdown
cases are rare error cases, its relatively easy to miss a call and
leave users without `Event`s or miss some important cleanup.
One of those steps, calling `issue_channel_close_events`, is rather
easy to remove, as it only generates two events, which can simply
be moved to another shutdown step.
Here we remove `issue_channel_close_events` by moving
`ChannelClosed` event generation into `finish_force_close_channel`.
Currently the channel shutdown sequence has a number of steps which
all the shutdown callsites have to call. Because many shutdown
cases are rare error cases, its relatively easy to miss a call and
leave users without `Event`s or miss some important cleanup.
One of those steps, calling `issue_channel_close_events`, is rather
easy to remove, as it only generates two events, which can simply
be moved to another shutdown step.
Here we move the first of the two events, `DiscardFunding`, into
`finish_force_close_channel`.
If we promote our channel to `AwaitingChannelReady` after adding
funding info, but still have `MONITOR_UPDATE_IN_PROGRESS` set, we
haven't broadcasted the funding transaction yet and thus should
return values from `unbroadcasted_funding[_txid]` and generate a
`DiscardFunding` event.
If a peer provides a feerate which nears `u32::MAX`, we may
overflow calculating the dust buffer feerate, leading to spuriously
keeping non-anchor channels open when they should be force-closed.
If we try to open a channel with a peer that is disconnected (but
with which we have some other channels), we'll end up with an
unfunded channel which will lead to a panic when the peer
reconnects. Here we drop this debug assertion without bother to add
a new test, given this behavior will change in a PR very soon.
When contest delays are >= 0x8000, script pushes require an extra
byte to avoid being interpreted as a negative int. Thus, for
channels with CSV delays longer than ~7.5 months we may generate
transactions with slightly too little fee. This isn't really a huge
deal, but we should prefer to be conservative here, and slightly
too high fee in the general case is better than slightly too little
fee in other cases.
When we or our counterparty are updating the fees on the channel,
we currently check that the resulting balance is sufficient not
only to meet the reserve threshold, but also not push it below
dust. This isn't required in the BOLTs and may lead to spurious
force-closures (which would be a bit safer, but reserve should
always exceed the dust threshold).
Worse, the current logic is broken - it compares the output value
in *billionths of satoshis* to the dust limit in satoshis. Thus,
the code is borderline dead anyway, but can overflow for channels
with several million Bitcoin, causing the fuzzer to get mad (and
lead to spurious force-closures for few-billion-dollar channels).
If we get a `Feature` object which has excess zero bytes, we
shouldn't consider it a different `Feature` from another with the
same bits set, but no excess zero bytes. Here we fix both the
`Hash` and `PartialEq` implementation for `Features` to ignore
excess zero bytes.
62f8669654 added two
`htlc_maximum_msat.unwrap_or`s, but used a default value of 0,
spuriously causing all HTLCs to fail if we don't have an htlc
maximum value. This should be mostly harmless, but we should fix it
anyway.
In 4b5db8c3ce, `channelmanager::PendingHTLCRouting` was made
public, exposing a `FinalOnionHopData` field to the world. However,
`FinalOnionHopData` was left crate-private, making the enum
impossible to construct.
There isn't a strong reason for this (even though the
`FinalOnionHopData` API is somewhat confusing, being separated from
the rest of the onion structs), so we expose it here.
Since `lightning-invoice` now depends on the `bitcoin` crate
directly, also depending on the `bitcoin_hashes` crate is redundant
and just means we confuse users by setting the `std` flag only on
`bitcoin`. Thus, we drop the explicit dependency here and replace
it with `bitcoin::hashes`.
When we make the `PrivateRoute` inner `RouteHint` `pub`, we failed
to note that the `PrivateRoute::new` constructor actually verifies
a length invariant. Thus, we un-export the inner field and force
users to go back through the `new` fn.
To avoid exposing a node's identity in a blinded path, only create
one-hop blinded paths if the node has been announced, and thus has
public channels. Otherwise, there is no way to route a payment to the
node, exposing its identity needlessly.
When constructing blinded payment paths for Bolt12Invoice, delegate to
Router::create_blinded_payment_paths which may produce multi-hop blinded
paths. Fallback to one-hop blinded paths if the Router fails or returns
no paths.
The Router trait is used to find a Route for paying a node. Expand the
interface with a create_blinded_payment paths method for creating such
paths to a recipient node.
Provide an implementation for DefaultRouter that creates two-hop
blinded paths where the recipient's peers serve as the introduction
nodes.
