During a `channel_reestablish` now we send a warning message when we receive a old commitment transaction from the peer.
In addition, this commit include the update of functional test to make sure that the receiver will generate warn messages.
Signed-off-by: Vincenzo Palazzo <vincenzopalazzodev@gmail.com>
Use the `counterparty_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` value, and not the
`holder_max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` value when creating the
`htlc_maximum_msat` value for `ChannelUpdate` messages.
BOLT 7 specifies that the field MUST be less than or equal to
`max_htlc_value_in_flight_msat` received from the peer, which we
currently are not guaranteed to adhere to by using the holder value.
Add a config field
`ChannelHandshakeConfig::max_inbound_htlc_value_in_flight_percent_of_channel`
which sets the percentage of the channel value we cap the total value of
outstanding inbound HTLCs to.
This field can be set to a value between 1-100, where the value
corresponds to the percent of the channel value in whole percentages.
Note that:
* If configured to another value than the default value 10, any new
channels created with the non default value will cause versions of LDK
prior to 0.0.104 to refuse to read the `ChannelManager`.
* This caps the total value for inbound HTLCs in-flight only, and
there's currently no way to configure the cap for the total value of
outbound HTLCs in-flight.
* The requirements for your node being online to ensure the safety of
HTLC-encumbered funds are different from the non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
This makes this an important knob to restrict exposure to loss due to
being offline for too long. See
`ChannelHandshakeConfig::our_to_self_delay` and
`ChannelConfig::cltv_expiry_delta` for more information.
Default value: 10.
Minimum value: 1, any values less than 1 will be treated as 1 instead.
Maximum value: 100, any values larger than 100 will be treated as 100
instead.
In 2826af75a5 we fixed a fuzz crash
in which the total reserve values in a channel were greater than
the funding amount, checked when an incoming channel is accepted.
This, however, did not fix the same issue for outbound channels,
where a peer can accept a channel with a nonsense reserve value in
the `accept_channel` message. The `full_stack_target` fuzzer
eventually found its way into the same issue, which this resolves.
Thanks (again) to Chaincode Labs for providing the fuzzing
resources which found this bug!
We only use it to check the amount when processing MPP parts, but
store the full object (including new payment metadata) in it.
Because we now store the amount in the parent structure, there is
no need for it at all in the `OnionPayload`. Sadly, for
serialization compatibility, we need it to continue to exist, at
least temporarily, but we can avoid populating the new fields in
that case.
...instead of accessing it via the `OnionPayload::Invoice` form.
This may be useful if we add MPP keysend support, but is directly
useful to allow us to drop `FinalOnionHopData` from `OnionPayload`.
Currently, if a channel's funding is locked in and then later
reorg'd back to half of the channel's minimum-depth we will
immediately force-close the channel. However, this can happen at
the fork-point while processing a reorg, and generally reorgs do
not reduce the block height at all, making this a rather useless
endeavor.
Ideally we'd never auto-force-close channels at all due to a reorg,
instead simply marking it as inactive until the funding
transaction is re-confirmed (or allowing the user to attempt to
force-close or force-closing once we're confident we have
completed reorg processing if we're at risk of losing funds
already received in the channel).
Sadly, we currently do not support changing a channel's SCID and
updating our SCID maps, so we cannot yet remove the automated
force-close logic. Still, there is no reason to do it until a
funding transaction has been removed from the chain.
This implements that change - only force-closeing once a channel's
funding transaction has been reorg'd out (still potentially at a
reorg's fork point). This continues to imply a 1-confirmation
channel will always be force-closed after a reorg of the funding
transaction, and will imply a similar behavior with 0-conf
channels.
The `full_stack_target` fuzzer managed to find a subtraction
underflow in the new `Channel::get_htlc_maximum` function where we
subtract both sides' reserve values from the channel funding. Such
a channel is obviously completely useless, so we should reject it
during opening instead of integer-underflowing later.
Thanks to Chaincode Labs for providing the fuzzing resources which
found this bug!
When we receive multiple HTLCs which claim to be a part of the same
MPP but which are inconsistent for some reason, we should fail the
inconsistent HTLCs but keep the first HTLCs up until the first
inconsistency.
This works, but it turns out there was no test coverage, so we add
some here.
The `chain::Listen` interface provides a block-connection-based
alternative to the `chain::Confirm` interface, which supports
providing transaction data at a time separate from the block
connection time.
For users who are downloading the full headers tree (e.g. from a
node over the Bitcoin P2P protocol) but who are not downloading
full blocks (e.g. because they're using BIP 157/158 filtering)
there is no API that matches exactly their event stream -
`chain::Listen` requries full blocks for each block,
`chain::Confirm` requires breaking each connection event into two
calls.
Given its incredibly trivial to take a `TransactionData` in
addition to a `Block` in `chain::Listen` we do so here, adding a
default-implementation `block_connected` which simply creates the
`TransactionData`, which ultimately all of the `chain::Listen`
implementations currently do anyway.
Closes#1128.
The main loop of the background processor has this line:
`peer_manager.process_events(); // Note that this may block on ChannelManager's locking`
which does, indeed, sometimes block waiting on the `ChannelManager`
to finish whatever its doing. Specifically, its the only place in
the background processor loop that we block waiting on the
`ChannelManager`, so if the `ChannelManager` is relatively busy, we
may end up being blocked there most of the time.
This should be fine, except today we had a user who's node was
particularly slow in processing some channel updates, resulting in
the background processor being blocked there (as expected). Then,
when the channel updates were completed (and persisted) the next
thing the background processor did was hand the user events to
process, creating yet more channel updates. Ultimately, the users'
node crashed before finishing the event processing. This left us
with an updated monitor on disk and an outdated manager, and they
lost the channel on startup.
Here we simply move the above quoted line to after the normal event
processing, ensuring the next thing we do after blocking on
`ChannelManager` locks is persist the manager, prior to event
handling.
MAX_FUNDING_SATOSHIS will no longer be accurately named once wumbo is merged.
Also, we'll want to check that wumbo channels don't exceed the total bitcoin supply
