A client node might choose not to handle `Event::BumptTransaction`
events and leave bumping / Anchor output spending to a trusted
counterparty.
However, `Event::BumptTransaction` currently doesn't offer any clear
indication what channel and/or counterparty it is referring to. In order
to allow filtering these events, we here expose the `channel_id` and
`counterparty_node_id` fields.
We use these params for our HubPreferentialScorer and without these
utility functions then we have to manually do this and calculate which
is the source and which is the target node.
We generally allow routing nodes to forward less than the expected HTLC
amount, if the receiver knowingly accepts this and claims the
underpaying HTLC (see `ChannelConfig::accept_underpaying_htlcs`). This
use case is in particular useful for the LSPS2/JIT channel setting where
the intial underpaying HTLC pays for the channel open.
While we previously exposed the withheld amount as
`PaymentClaimable::counterparty_skimmed_fee_msat` on the receiver side,
we did not individually provide it on the forwarding node's side.
Here, we therefore expose this additionally withheld amount via
`PaymentForwarded::skimmed_fee_msat`.
To avoid confusion and for accuracy going forward, we remove this method
as it is inconsistent with channel IDs generated during V2 channel
establishment. If one wants to create a V1, funding outpoint-based
channel ID, then `ChannelId::v1_from_funding_outpoint` should be used
instead.
A large portion of the library has always made the assumption that having
the funding outpoint will always allow us to generate the channel ID.
This will not be the case anymore and we need to pass the channel ID along
where appropriate. All channels that could have been persisted up to this
point could only have used V1 establishment, so if some structures don't
store a channel ID for them they can safely fall back to the funding
outpoint-based version.
Peer::their_node_id is set to Some during the handshake process.
However, df3ab2ee27 accesses the field
unconditionally, causing a panic. This may be triggered if a gossip
message is received mid-handshake from another peer or if the user calls
broadcast_node_announcement during this time. The latter tends to be
executed on a timer.
Ensure that Peer::their_node_id is only accessed once the handshake is
complete.
When handling calls to `batch_funding_transaction_generated` which
were missing outputs for one of the batch channels, we'd previously
deadlock when trying to clean up the now-closed channels. This
fixes that and adds a new test case for it.
Found by the full_stack_target fuzzer.
When converting from CounterpartyForwardingInfo to PaymentRelay, the
cltv_expiry_delta is copied. Then, when forming a blinded payment path,
the value is mutated so that esoteric values don't reveal information
about the path. However, the value was only used in computing
PaymentConstraints and wasn't actually updated in PaymentRelay. Move the
logic for modifying the cltv_expiry_delta to the conversion code to
avoid this inconsistency.
