Instead of importing the keys from Keybase, we add all the signing keys
to the repository. In addition to having the key file present each key's
ID must also be added to the verification script. This acts as a double
check that the correct key is added and makes a key change more
explicit.
This removes a vulnerability brought up by @Kixunil where both the lnd
and lncli binaries are executed to obtain their version before they have
been verified against the release. A malicious binary could have already
compromised the user's system before any of the checks had been
performed.
This commit it split out from the doc changes so that it can easily be
cherry-picked to master/0.13.0.
The use of golang.org/x/crypto/ssh/terminal was marked as deprecated
since that code was moved to its own repo golang.org/x/term.
With this commit we use the new package name directly, which was already
pulled in under its new name anyway.
In this commit, a new method `cleanClosedChannels` is added and called
when a circuit map is created. This method will delete the payment
circuits and keystones for closed channels.
With the middleware handler in place, we now need to add a new gRPC
interceptor to the interceptor chain that will send messages to the
registered middlewares for each event that could be of interest to them.
With this commit we introduce the concept of RPC middleware: A mechanism
similar to the existing channel or HTLC interceptors but this time for
gRPC messages themselves.
An RPC middleware can register itself to the main RPC server to get
notified each time a new gRPC request comes in, a gRPC response is sent
back or a streaming RPC is connected. The middleware can
validate/inspect incoming requests and modify/overwrite outgoing
responses.
Since this also opens the door for malicious software to interfere with
lnd in a negative way, we bind everything to macaroons with custom
caveat conditions: A middleware declares upon registration which custom
caveat name it can handle. Only client requests that send a macaroon
with that custom caveat will then be given to the middleware for
inspection. The only exception is if the middleware instead registers
to use the read-only mode. In that mode it will be able to intercept
all requests/responses, even those not made with a special encumbered
macaroon. But the middleware won't be able to alter responses in the
read-only mode. Therefore requests with the default, unencumbered macaroons
can never be modified by any middleware.
The custom RPC middleware logic that we are going to add in the next
commits will need to log under their own sub logger so we add one with a
new subsystem name.
With the new condition and checker in place, we can give the end user
the ability to add such a custom caveat to a baked macaroon.
There won't be an RPC counterpart for this operation since all first party
caveats currently are only added on the client side.
Fixes#4383 by adding a new SafeCopyMacaroon function that correctly
clones all caveats and prevents modifications on the copy from affecting
the original.
The way the macaroon bakery library lnd uses works is that one has to
register a Checker method for each caveat name that should be supported.
Since we want to allow fully customizable custom caveats we add another
layer of naming to the caveat by splitting the condition of the "outer"
caveat into two pieces, the custom caveat name and the actual custom
caveat condition.
The custom Checker function only checks that the format is correct and
that there is a handler available for a custom condition. It does not
check the condition itself, however. If the passed in acceptor signals
acceptance of a custom caveat then the bakery accepts the macaroon as a
whole (given its signature, standard caveats and permissions are all
correct) and assumes that another component down the line will make sure
the actual custom condition of a caveat is valid.
