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Seems obvious, but the spec should spell it out! Closes: #418 Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
288 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
288 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# BOLT #1: Base Protocol
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## Overview
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This protocol assumes an underlying authenticated and ordered transport mechanism that takes care of framing individual messages.
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[BOLT #8](08-transport.md) specifies the canonical transport layer used in Lightning, though it can be replaced by any transport that fulfills the above guarantees.
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The default TCP port is 9735. This corresponds to hexadecimal `0x2607`: the Unicode code point for LIGHTNING.<sup>[1](#reference-1)</sup>
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All data fields are unsigned big-endian unless otherwise specified.
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## Table of Contents
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* [Connection Handling and Multiplexing](#connection-handling-and-multiplexing)
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* [Lightning Message Format](#lightning-message-format)
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* [Setup Messages](#setup-messages)
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* [The `init` Message](#the-init-message)
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* [The `error` Message](#the-error-message)
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* [Control Messages](#control-messages)
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* [The `ping` and `pong` Messages](#the-ping-and-pong-messages)
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* [Acknowledgments](#acknowledgments)
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* [References](#references)
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* [Authors](#authors)
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## Connection Handling and Multiplexing
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Implementations MUST use a single connection per peer; channel messages (which include a channel ID) are multiplexed over this single connection.
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## Lightning Message Format
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After decryption, all Lightning messages are of the form:
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1. `type`: a 2-byte big-endian field indicating the type of message
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2. `payload`: a variable-length payload that comprises the remainder of
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the message and that conforms to a format matching the `type`
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The `type` field indicates how to interpret the `payload` field.
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The format for each individual type is defined by a specification in this repository.
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The type follows the _it's ok to be odd_ rule, so nodes MAY send _odd_-numbered types without ascertaining that the recipient understands it.
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A sending node:
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- MUST NOT send an evenly-typed message not listed here without prior negotiation.
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A receiving node:
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- upon receiving a message of _odd_, unknown type:
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- MUST ignore the received message.
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- upon receiving a message of _even_, unknown type:
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- MUST fail the channels.
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The messages are grouped logically into four groups, ordered by the most significant bit that is set:
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- Setup & Control (types `0`-`31`): messages related to connection setup, control, supported features, and error reporting (described below)
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- Channel (types `32`-`127`): messages used to setup and tear down micropayment channels (described in [BOLT #2](02-peer-protocol.md))
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- Commitment (types `128`-`255`): messages related to updating the current commitment transaction, which includes adding, revoking, and settling HTLCs as well as updating fees and exchanging signatures (described in [BOLT #2](02-peer-protocol.md))
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- Routing (types `256`-`511`): messages containing node and channel announcements, as well as any active route exploration (described in [BOLT #7](07-routing-gossip.md))
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The size of the message is required by the transport layer to fit into a 2-byte unsigned int; therefore, the maximum possible size is 65535 bytes.
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A node:
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- MUST ignore any additional data within a message beyond the length that it expects for that type.
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- upon receiving a known message with insufficient length for the contents:
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- MUST fail the channels.
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- that understands an option in this specification:
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- MUST include all the fields annotated with that option.
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### Rationale
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By default `SHA2` and Bitcoin public keys are both encoded as
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big endian, thus it would be unusual to use a different endian for
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other fields.
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Length is limited to 65535 bytes by the cryptographic wrapping, and
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messages in the protocol are never more than that length anyway.
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The _it's ok to be odd_ rule allows for future optional extensions
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without negotiation or special coding in clients. The "ignore
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additional data" rule similarly allows for future expansion.
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Implementations may prefer to have message data aligned on an 8-byte
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boundary (the largest natural alignment requirement of any type here);
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however, adding a 6-byte padding after the type field was considered
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wasteful: alignment may be achieved by decrypting the message into
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a buffer with 6-bytes of pre-padding.
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## Setup Messages
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### The `init` Message
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Once authentication is complete, the first message reveals the features supported or required by this node, even if this is a reconnection.
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[BOLT #9](09-features.md) specifies lists of global and local features. Each feature is generally represented in `globalfeatures` or `localfeatures` by 2 bits. The least-significant bit is numbered 0, which is _even_, and the next most significant bit is numbered 1, which is _odd_.
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Both fields `globalfeatures` and `localfeatures` MUST be padded to bytes with 0s.
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1. type: 16 (`init`)
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2. data:
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* [`2`:`gflen`]
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* [`gflen`:`globalfeatures`]
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* [`2`:`lflen`]
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* [`lflen`:`localfeatures`]
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The 2-byte `gflen` and `lflen` fields indicate the number of bytes in the immediately following field.
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#### Requirements
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The sending node:
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- MUST send `init` as the first Lightning message for any connection.
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- MUST set feature bits as defined in [BOLT #9](09-features.md).
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- MUST set any undefined feature bits to 0.
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- SHOULD use the minimum lengths required to represent the feature fields.
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The receiving node:
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- MUST wait to receive `init` before sending any other messages.
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- MUST respond to known feature bits as specified in [BOLT #9](09-features.md).
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- upon receiving unknown _odd_ feature bits that are non-zero:
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- MUST ignore the bit.
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- upon receiving unknown _even_ feature bits that are non-zero:
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- MUST fail the connection.
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#### Rationale
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This semantic allows both future incompatible changes and future backward compatible changes. Bits should generally be assigned in pairs, in order that optional features may later become compulsory.
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Nodes wait for receipt of the other's features to simplify error
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diagnosis when features are incompatible.
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The feature masks are split into local features (which only affect the
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protocol between these two nodes) and global features (which can affect
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HTLCs and are thus also advertised to other nodes).
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### The `error` Message
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For simplicity of diagnosis, it's often useful to tell a peer that something is incorrect.
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1. type: 17 (`error`)
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2. data:
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* [`32`:`channel_id`]
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* [`2`:`len`]
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* [`len`:`data`]
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The 2-byte `len` field indicates the number of bytes in the immediately following field.
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#### Requirements
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The channel is referred to by `channel_id`, unless `channel_id` is 0 (i.e. all bytes are 0), in which case it refers to all channels.
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The funding node:
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- for all error messages sent before (and including) the `funding_created` message:
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- MUST use `temporary_channel_id` in lieu of `channel_id`.
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The fundee node:
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- for all error messages sent before (and not including) the `funding_signed` message:
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- MUST use `temporary_channel_id` in lieu of `channel_id`.
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A sending node:
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- when sending `error`:
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- MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message.
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- SHOULD send `error` for protocol violations or internal errors that make channels unusable or that make further communication unusable.
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- MAY send an empty `data` field.
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- when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
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- SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a `funding_created`, `funding_signed`, `closing_signed`, or `commitment_signed` message.
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- when `channel_id` is 0:
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- MUST fail all channels with the receiving node.
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- MUST close the connection.
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- MUST set `len` equal to the length of `data`.
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The receiving node:
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- upon receiving `error`:
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- MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message, if that channel is with the sending node.
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- if no existing channel is referred to by the message:
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- MUST ignore the message.
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- MUST truncate `len` to the remainder of the packet (if it's larger).
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- if `data` is not composed solely of printable ASCII characters (For reference: the printable character set includes byte values 32 through 126, inclusive):
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- SHOULD NOT print out `data` verbatim.
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#### Rationale
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There are unrecoverable errors that require an abort of conversations;
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if the connection is simply dropped, then the peer may retry the
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connection. It's also useful to describe protocol violations for
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diagnosis, as this indicates that one peer has a bug.
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It may be wise not to distinguish errors in production settings, lest
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it leak information — hence, the optional `data` field.
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## Control Messages
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### The `ping` and `pong` Messages
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In order to allow for the existence of long-lived TCP connections, at
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times it may be required that both ends keep alive the TCP connection at the
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application level. Such messages also allow obfuscation of traffic patterns.
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1. type: 18 (`ping`)
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2. data:
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* [`2`:`num_pong_bytes`]
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* [`2`:`byteslen`]
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* [`byteslen`:`ignored`]
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The `pong` message is to be sent whenever a `ping` message is received. It
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serves as a reply and also serves to keep the connection alive, while
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explicitly notifying the other end that the receiver is still active. Within
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the received `ping` message, the sender will specify the number of bytes to be
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included within the data payload of the `pong` message.
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1. type: 19 (`pong`)
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2. data:
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* [`2`:`byteslen`]
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* [`byteslen`:`ignored`]
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#### Requirements
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A node sending a `ping` message:
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- SHOULD set `ignored` to 0s.
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- MUST NOT set `ignored` to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized
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memory.
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- if it doesn't receive a corresponding `pong`:
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- MAY terminate the network connection,
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- and MUST NOT fail the channels in this case.
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- SHOULD NOT send `ping` messages more often than once every 30 seconds.
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A node sending a `pong` message:
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- SHOULD set `ignored` to 0s.
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- MUST NOT set `ignored` to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized
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memory.
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A node receiving a `ping` message:
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- SHOULD fail the channels if it has received significantly in excess of one `ping` per 30 seconds.
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- if `num_pong_bytes` is less than 65532:
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- MUST respond by sending a `pong` message, with `byteslen` equal to `num_pong_bytes`.
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- otherwise (`num_pong_bytes` is **not** less than 65532):
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- MUST ignore the `ping`.
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A node receiving a `pong` message:
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- if `byteslen` does not correspond to any `ping`'s `num_pong_bytes` value it has sent:
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- MAY fail the channels.
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### Rationale
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The largest possible message is 65535 bytes; thus, the maximum sensible `byteslen`
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is 65531 — in order to account for the type field (`pong`) and the `byteslen` itself. This allows
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a convenient cutoff for `num_pong_bytes` to indicate that no reply should be sent.
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Connections between nodes within the network may be long lived, as payment
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channels have an indefinite lifetime. However, it's likely that
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no new data will be
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exchanged for a
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significant portion of a connection's lifetime. Also, on several platforms it's possible that Lightning
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clients will be put to sleep without prior warning. Hence, a
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distinct `ping` message is used, in order to probe for the liveness of the connection on
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the other side, as well as to keep the established connection active.
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Additionally, the ability for a sender to request that the receiver send a
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response with a particular number of bytes enables nodes on the network to
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create _synthetic_ traffic. Such traffic can be used to partially defend
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against packet and timing analysis — as nodes can fake the traffic patterns of
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typical exchanges without applying any true updates to their respective
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channels.
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When combined with the onion routing protocol defined in
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[BOLT #4](04-onion-routing.md),
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careful statistically driven synthetic traffic can serve to further bolster the
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privacy of participants within the network.
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Limited precautions are recommended against `ping` flooding, however some
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latitude is given because of network delays. Note that there are other methods
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of incoming traffic flooding (e.g. sending _odd_ unknown message types, or padding
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every message maximally).
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Finally, the usage of periodic `ping` messages serves to promote frequent key
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rotations as specified within [BOLT #8](08-transport.md).
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## Acknowledgments
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[ TODO: (roasbeef); fin ]
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## References
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1. <a id="reference-2">http://www.unicode.org/charts/PDF/U2600.pdf</a>
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## Authors
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[ FIXME: Insert Author List ]
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![Creative Commons License](https://i.creativecommons.org/l/by/4.0/88x31.png "License CC-BY")
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<br>
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This work is licensed under a [Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License](http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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