lightning-bolts/01-messaging.md

BOLT #1: Base Protocol

Overview

This protocol assumes an underlying authenticated and ordered transport mechanism that takes care of framing individual messages. BOLT #8 specifies the canonical transport layer used in Lightning, though it can be replaced by any transport that fulfills the above guarantees.

The default TCP port is 9735. This corresponds to hexadecimal 0x2607: the Unicode code point for LIGHTNING.¹

All data fields are unsigned big-endian unless otherwise specified.

Table of Contents

• Connection Handling and Multiplexing
• Lightning Message Format
• Type-Length-Value Format
• Fundamental Types
• Setup Messages
  • The init Message
  • The error Message
• Control Messages
  • The ping and pong Messages
• Appendix A: BigSize Test Vectors
• Appendix B: Type-Length-Value Test Vectors
• Acknowledgments
• References
• Authors

Connection Handling and Multiplexing

Implementations MUST use a single connection per peer; channel messages (which include a channel ID) are multiplexed over this single connection.

Lightning Message Format

After decryption, all Lightning messages are of the form:

1. type: a 2-byte big-endian field indicating the type of message
2. payload: a variable-length payload that comprises the remainder of the message and that conforms to a format matching the type

The type field indicates how to interpret the payload field. The format for each individual type is defined by a specification in this repository. The type follows the it's ok to be odd rule, so nodes MAY send odd-numbered types without ascertaining that the recipient understands it.

A sending node:

• MUST NOT send an evenly-typed message not listed here without prior negotiation.

A receiving node:

• upon receiving a message of odd, unknown type:
  • MUST ignore the received message.
• upon receiving a message of even, unknown type:
  • MUST fail the channels.

The messages are grouped logically into four groups, ordered by the most significant bit that is set:

• Setup & Control (types 0-31): messages related to connection setup, control, supported features, and error reporting (described below)
• Channel (types 32-127): messages used to setup and tear down micropayment channels (described in BOLT #2)
• Commitment (types 128-255): messages related to updating the current commitment transaction, which includes adding, revoking, and settling HTLCs as well as updating fees and exchanging signatures (described in BOLT #2)
• Routing (types 256-511): messages containing node and channel announcements, as well as any active route exploration (described in BOLT #7)

The size of the message is required by the transport layer to fit into a 2-byte unsigned int; therefore, the maximum possible size is 65535 bytes.

A node:

• MUST ignore any additional data within a message beyond the length that it expects for that type.
• upon receiving a known message with insufficient length for the contents:
  • MUST fail the channels.
• that negotiates an option in this specification:
  • MUST include all the fields annotated with that option.

Rationale

By default SHA2 and Bitcoin public keys are both encoded as big endian, thus it would be unusual to use a different endian for other fields.

Length is limited to 65535 bytes by the cryptographic wrapping, and messages in the protocol are never more than that length anyway.

The it's ok to be odd rule allows for future optional extensions without negotiation or special coding in clients. The "ignore additional data" rule similarly allows for future expansion.

Implementations may prefer to have message data aligned on an 8-byte boundary (the largest natural alignment requirement of any type here); however, adding a 6-byte padding after the type field was considered wasteful: alignment may be achieved by decrypting the message into a buffer with 6-bytes of pre-padding.

Type-Length-Value Format

Throughout the protocol, a TLV (Type-Length-Value) format is used to allow for the backwards-compatible addition of new fields to existing message types.

A tlv_record represents a single field, encoded in the form:

• [varint: type]
• [varint: length]
• [length: value]

A varint is a variable-length, unsigned integer encoding using the BigSize format, which resembles the bitcoin CompactSize encoding but uses big-endian for multi-byte values rather than little-endian.

A tlv_stream is a series of (possibly zero) tlv_records, represented as the concatenation of the encoded tlv_records. When used to extend existing messages, a tlv_stream is typically placed after all currently defined fields.

The type is a varint encoded using the BigSize format. It functions as a message-specific, 64-bit identifier for the tlv_record determining how the contents of value should be decoded.

The length is a varint encoded using the BigSize format signaling the size of value in bytes.

The value depends entirely on the type, and should be encoded or decoded according to the message-specific format determined by type.

Requirements

The sending node:

• MUST order tlv_records in a tlv_stream by monotonically-increasing type.
• MUST minimally encode type and length.
• SHOULD NOT use redundant, variable-length encodings in a tlv_record.

The receiving node:

• if zero bytes remain before parsing a type:
  • MUST stop parsing the tlv_stream.
• if a type or length is not minimally encoded:
  • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
• if decoded types are not monotonically-increasing:
  • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
• if length exceeds the number of bytes remaining in the message:
  • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
• if type is known:
  • MUST decode the next length bytes using the known encoding for type.
  • if length is not exactly equal to that required for the known encoding for type:
    • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
  • if variable-length fields within the known encoding for type are not minimal:
    • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
• otherwise, if type is unknown:
  • if type is even:
    • MUST fail to parse the tlv_stream.
  • otherwise, if type is odd:
    • MUST discard the next length bytes.

Rationale

The primary advantage in using TLV is that a reader is able to ignore new fields that it does not understand, since each field carries the exact size of the encoded element. Without TLV, even if a node does not wish to use a particular field, the node is forced to add parsing logic for that field in order to determine the offset of any fields that follow.

The monotonicity constraint ensures that all types are unique and can appear at most once. Fields that map to complex objects, e.g. vectors, maps, or structs, should do so by defining the encoding such that the object is serialized within a single tlv_record. The uniqueness constraint, among other things, enables the following optimizations:

• canonical ordering is defined independent of the encoded values.
• canonical ordering can be known at compile-time, rather that being determined dynamically at the time of encoding.
• verifying canonical ordering requires less state and is less-expensive.
• variable-size fields can reserve their expected size up front, rather than appending elements sequentially and incurring double-and-copy overhead.

The use of a varint for type and length permits a space savings for small types or short values. This potentially leaves more space for application data over the wire or in an onion payload.

All types must appear in increasing order to create a canonical encoding of the underlying tlv_records. This is crucial when computing signatures over a tlv_stream, as it ensures verifiers will be able to recompute the same message digest as the signer. Note that the canonical ordering over the set of fields can be enforced even if the verifier does not understand what the fields contain.

Writers should avoid using redundant, variable-length encodings in a tlv_record since this results in encoding the length twice and complicates computing the outer length. As an example, when writing a variable length byte array, the value should contain only the raw bytes and forgo an additional internal length since the tlv_record already carries the number of bytes that follow. On the other hand, if a tlv_record contains multiple, variable-length elements then this would not be considered redundant, and is needed to allow the receiver to parse individual elements from value.

Fundamental Types

Various fundamental types are referred to in the message specifications:

• byte: an 8-bit byte
• u16: a 2 byte unsigned integer
• u32: a 4 byte unsigned integer
• u64: an 8 byte unsigned integer

Inside TLV records which contain a single value, leading zeros in integers can be omitted:

• tu16: a 0 to 2 byte unsigned integer
• tu32: a 0 to 4 byte unsigned integer
• tu64: a 0 to 8 byte unsigned integer

The following convenience types are also defined:

• chain_hash: a 32-byte chain identifier (see BOLT #0)
• channel_id: a 32-byte channel_id (see BOLT #2
• sha256: a 32-byte SHA2-256 hash
• signature: a 64-byte bitcoin Elliptic Curve signature
• point: a 33-byte Elliptic Curve point (compressed encoding as per SEC 1 standard)
• short_channel_id: an 8 byte value identifying a channel (see BOLT #7)

Setup Messages

The init Message

Once authentication is complete, the first message reveals the features supported or required by this node, even if this is a reconnection.

BOLT #9 specifies lists of global and local features. Each feature is generally represented in globalfeatures or localfeatures by 2 bits. The least-significant bit is numbered 0, which is even, and the next most significant bit is numbered 1, which is odd.

Both fields globalfeatures and localfeatures MUST be padded to bytes with 0s.

1. type: 16 (init)
2. data:
   • [u16:gflen]
   • [gflen*byte:globalfeatures]
   • [u16:lflen]
   • [lflen*byte:localfeatures]

The 2-byte gflen and lflen fields indicate the number of bytes in the immediately following field.

Requirements

The sending node:

• MUST send init as the first Lightning message for any connection.
• MUST set feature bits as defined in BOLT #9.
• MUST set any undefined feature bits to 0.
• SHOULD use the minimum lengths required to represent the feature fields.

The receiving node:

• MUST wait to receive init before sending any other messages.
• MUST respond to known feature bits as specified in BOLT #9.
• upon receiving unknown odd feature bits that are non-zero:
  • MUST ignore the bit.
• upon receiving unknown even feature bits that are non-zero:
  • MUST fail the connection.

Rationale

This semantic allows both future incompatible changes and future backward compatible changes. Bits should generally be assigned in pairs, in order that optional features may later become compulsory.

Nodes wait for receipt of the other's features to simplify error diagnosis when features are incompatible.

The feature masks are split into local features (which only affect the protocol between these two nodes) and global features (which can affect HTLCs and are thus also advertised to other nodes).

The error Message

For simplicity of diagnosis, it's often useful to tell a peer that something is incorrect.

1. type: 17 (error)
2. data:
   • [channel_id:channel_id]
   • [u16:len]
   • [len*byte:data]

The 2-byte len field indicates the number of bytes in the immediately following field.

Requirements

The channel is referred to by channel_id, unless channel_id is 0 (i.e. all bytes are 0), in which case it refers to all channels.

The funding node:

• for all error messages sent before (and including) the funding_created message:
  • MUST use temporary_channel_id in lieu of channel_id.

The fundee node:

• for all error messages sent before (and not including) the funding_signed message:
  • MUST use temporary_channel_id in lieu of channel_id.

A sending node:

• when sending error:
  • MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message.
• SHOULD send error for protocol violations or internal errors that make channels unusable or that make further communication unusable.
• SHOULD send error with the unknown channel_id in reply to messages of type 32-255 related to unknown channels.
• MAY send an empty data field.
• when failure was caused by an invalid signature check:
  • SHOULD include the raw, hex-encoded transaction in reply to a funding_created, funding_signed, closing_signed, or commitment_signed message.
• when channel_id is 0:
  • MUST fail all channels with the receiving node.
  • MUST close the connection.
• MUST set len equal to the length of data.

The receiving node:

• upon receiving error:
  • MUST fail the channel referred to by the error message, if that channel is with the sending node.
• if no existing channel is referred to by the message:
  • MUST ignore the message.
• MUST truncate len to the remainder of the packet (if it's larger).
• if data is not composed solely of printable ASCII characters (For reference: the printable character set includes byte values 32 through 126, inclusive):
  • SHOULD NOT print out data verbatim.

Rationale

There are unrecoverable errors that require an abort of conversations; if the connection is simply dropped, then the peer may retry the connection. It's also useful to describe protocol violations for diagnosis, as this indicates that one peer has a bug.

It may be wise not to distinguish errors in production settings, lest it leak information — hence, the optional data field.

Control Messages

The ping and pong Messages

In order to allow for the existence of long-lived TCP connections, at times it may be required that both ends keep alive the TCP connection at the application level. Such messages also allow obfuscation of traffic patterns.

1. type: 18 (ping)
2. data:
   • [u16:num_pong_bytes]
   • [u16:byteslen]
   • [byteslen*byte:ignored]

The pong message is to be sent whenever a ping message is received. It serves as a reply and also serves to keep the connection alive, while explicitly notifying the other end that the receiver is still active. Within the received ping message, the sender will specify the number of bytes to be included within the data payload of the pong message.

1. type: 19 (pong)
2. data:
   • [u16:byteslen]
   • [byteslen*byte:ignored]

Requirements

A node sending a ping message:

• SHOULD set ignored to 0s.
• MUST NOT set ignored to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory.
• if it doesn't receive a corresponding pong:
  • MAY terminate the network connection,
    • and MUST NOT fail the channels in this case.
• SHOULD NOT send ping messages more often than once every 30 seconds.

A node sending a pong message:

• SHOULD set ignored to 0s.
• MUST NOT set ignored to sensitive data such as secrets or portions of initialized memory.

A node receiving a ping message:

• SHOULD fail the channels if it has received significantly in excess of one ping per 30 seconds.
• if num_pong_bytes is less than 65532:
  • MUST respond by sending a pong message, with byteslen equal to num_pong_bytes.
• otherwise (num_pong_bytes is not less than 65532):
  • MUST ignore the ping.

A node receiving a pong message:

• if byteslen does not correspond to any ping's num_pong_bytes value it has sent:
  • MAY fail the channels.

Rationale

The largest possible message is 65535 bytes; thus, the maximum sensible byteslen is 65531 — in order to account for the type field (pong) and the byteslen itself. This allows a convenient cutoff for num_pong_bytes to indicate that no reply should be sent.

Connections between nodes within the network may be long lived, as payment channels have an indefinite lifetime. However, it's likely that no new data will be exchanged for a significant portion of a connection's lifetime. Also, on several platforms it's possible that Lightning clients will be put to sleep without prior warning. Hence, a distinct ping message is used, in order to probe for the liveness of the connection on the other side, as well as to keep the established connection active.

Additionally, the ability for a sender to request that the receiver send a response with a particular number of bytes enables nodes on the network to create synthetic traffic. Such traffic can be used to partially defend against packet and timing analysis — as nodes can fake the traffic patterns of typical exchanges without applying any true updates to their respective channels.

When combined with the onion routing protocol defined in BOLT #4, careful statistically driven synthetic traffic can serve to further bolster the privacy of participants within the network.

Limited precautions are recommended against ping flooding, however some latitude is given because of network delays. Note that there are other methods of incoming traffic flooding (e.g. sending odd unknown message types, or padding every message maximally).

Finally, the usage of periodic ping messages serves to promote frequent key rotations as specified within BOLT #8.

Appendix A: BigSize Test Vectors

The following test vectors can be used to assert the correctness of a BigSize implementation used in the TLV format. The format is identical to the CompactSize encoding used in bitcoin, but replaces the little-endian encoding of multi-byte values with big-endian.

Values encoded with BigSize will produce an encoding of either 1, 3, 5, or 9 bytes depending on the size of the integer. The encoding is a piece-wise function that takes a uint64 value x and produces:

        uint8(x)                if x < 0xfd
        0xfd + be16(uint16(x))  if x < 0x10000
        0xfe + be32(uint32(x))  if x < 0x100000000
        0xff + be64(x)          otherwise.

Here + denotes concatenation and be16, be32, and be64 produce a big-endian encoding of the input for 16, 32, and 64-bit integers, respectively.

A value is said to be minimally encoded if it could have been encoded using a smaller representation. For example, a BigSize encoding that occupies 5 bytes but whose value is less than 0x10000 is not minimally encoded. All values decoded with BigSize should be checked to ensure they are minimally encoded.

BigSize Decoding Tests

The following is an example of how to execute the BigSize decoding tests.

func testReadVarInt(t *testing.T, test varIntTest) {
        var buf [8]byte 
        r := bytes.NewReader(test.Bytes)
        val, err := tlv.ReadVarInt(r, &buf)
        if err != nil && err.Error() != test.ExpErr {
                t.Fatalf("expected decoding error: %v, got: %v",
                        test.ExpErr, err)
        }

        // If we expected a decoding error, there's no point checking the value.
        if test.ExpErr != "" {
                return
        }

        if val != test.Value {
                t.Fatalf("expected value: %d, got %d", test.Value, val)
        }
}

A correct implementation should pass against these test vectors:

[
    {
        "name": "zero",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "00"
    },
    {
        "name": "one byte high",
        "value": 252,
        "bytes": "fc"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte low",
        "value": 253,
        "bytes": "fd00fd"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte high",
        "value": 65535,
        "bytes": "fdffff"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte low",
        "value": 65536,
        "bytes": "fe00010000"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte high",
        "value": 4294967295,
        "bytes": "feffffffff"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte low",
        "value": 4294967296,
        "bytes": "ff0000000100000000"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte high",
        "value": 18446744073709551615,
        "bytes": "ffffffffffffffffff"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte not canonical",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "fd00fc",
        "exp_error": "decoded varint is not canonical"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte not canonical",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "fe0000ffff",
        "exp_error": "decoded varint is not canonical"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte not canonical",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "ff00000000ffffffff",
        "exp_error": "decoded varint is not canonical"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte short read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "fd00",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte short read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "feffff",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte short read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "ffffffffff",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "one byte no read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "",
        "exp_error": "EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte no read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "fd",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte no read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "fe",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte no read",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "ff",
        "exp_error": "unexpected EOF"
    }
]

BigSize Encoding Tests

The following is an example of how to execute the BigSize encoding tests.

func testWriteVarInt(t *testing.T, test varIntTest) {
        var (
                w   bytes.Buffer
                buf [8]byte
        )
        err := tlv.WriteVarInt(&w, test.Value, &buf)
        if err != nil {
                t.Fatalf("unable to encode %d as varint: %v",
                        test.Value, err)
        }

        if bytes.Compare(w.Bytes(), test.Bytes) != 0 {
                t.Fatalf("expected bytes: %v, got %v",
                        test.Bytes, w.Bytes())
        }
}

A correct implementation should pass against the following test vectors:

[
    {
        "name": "zero",
        "value": 0,
        "bytes": "00"
    },
    {
        "name": "one byte high",
        "value": 252,
        "bytes": "fc"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte low",
        "value": 253,
        "bytes": "fd00fd"
    },
    {
        "name": "two byte high",
        "value": 65535,
        "bytes": "fdffff"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte low",
        "value": 65536,
        "bytes": "fe00010000"
    },
    {
        "name": "four byte high",
        "value": 4294967295,
        "bytes": "feffffffff"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte low",
        "value": 4294967296,
        "bytes": "ff0000000100000000"
    },
    {
        "name": "eight byte high",
        "value": 18446744073709551615,
        "bytes": "ffffffffffffffffff"
    }
]

Appendix B: Type-Length-Value Test Vectors

The following tests assume that two separate TLV namespaces exist: n1 and n2.

The n1 namespace supports the following TLV types:

1. tlvs: n1
2. types:
   1. type: 1 (tlv1)
   2. data:
   • [tu64:amount_msat]
   1. type: 2 (tlv2)
   2. data:
   • [short_channel_id:scid]
   1. type: 3 (tlv3)
   2. data:
   • [point:node_id]
   • [u64:amount_msat_1]
   • [u64:amount_msat_2]
   1. type: 254 (tlv4)
   2. data:
   • [u16:cltv_delta]

The n2 namespace supports the following TLV types:

1. tlvs: n2
2. types:
   1. type: 0 (tlv1)
   2. data:
   • [tu64:amount_msat]
   1. type: 11 (tlv2)
   2. data:
   • [tu32:cltv_expiry]

TLV Decoding Failures

The following TLV streams in any namespace should trigger a decoding failure:

1. Invalid stream: 0xfd

2. Reason: type truncated

3. Invalid stream: 0xfd01

4. Reason: type truncated

5. Invalid stream: 0xfd0001 00

6. Reason: not minimally encoded type

7. Invalid stream: 0xfd0101

8. Reason: missing length

9. Invalid stream: 0x0f fd

10. Reason: (length truncated)

11. Invalid stream: 0x0f fd26

12. Reason: (length truncated)

13. Invalid stream: 0x0f fd2602

14. Reason: missing value

15. Invalid stream: 0x0f fd0001 00

16. Reason: not minimally encoded length

17. Invalid stream: 0x0f fd0201 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000

18. Reason: value truncated

The following TLV streams in either namespace should trigger a decoding failure:

1. Invalid stream: 0x12 00

2. Reason: unknown even type.

3. Invalid stream: 0xfd0102 00

4. Reason: unknown even type.

5. Invalid stream: 0xfe01000002 00

6. Reason: unknown even type.

7. Invalid stream: 0xff0100000000000002 00

8. Reason: unknown even type.

The following TLV streams in namespace n1 should trigger a decoding failure:

1. Invalid stream: 0x01 09 ffffffffffffffffff

2. Reason: greater than encoding length for n1s tlv1.

3. Invalid stream: 0x01 01 00

4. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

5. Invalid stream: 0x01 02 0001

6. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

7. Invalid stream: 0x01 03 000100

8. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

9. Invalid stream: 0x01 04 00010000

10. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

11. Invalid stream: 0x01 05 0001000000

12. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

13. Invalid stream: 0x01 06 000100000000

14. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

15. Invalid stream: 0x01 07 00010000000000

16. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

17. Invalid stream: 0x01 08 0001000000000000

18. Reason: encoding for n1s tlv1s amount_msat is not minimal

19. Invalid stream: 0x02 07 01010101010101

20. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv2.

21. Invalid stream: 0x02 09 010101010101010101

22. Reason: greater than encoding length for n1s tlv2.

23. Invalid stream: 0x03 21 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb

24. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv3.

25. Invalid stream: 0x03 29 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb0000000000000001

26. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv3.

27. Invalid stream: 0x03 30 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb000000000000000100000000000001

28. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv3.

29. Invalid stream: 0x03 31 043da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb00000000000000010000000000000002

30. Reason: n1s node_id is not a valid point.

31. Invalid stream: 0x03 32 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb0000000000000001000000000000000001

32. Reason: greater than encoding length for n1s tlv3.

33. Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 00

34. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv4.

35. Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 01 01

36. Reason: less than encoding length for n1s tlv4.

37. Invalid stream: 0xfd00fe 03 010101

38. Reason: greater than encoding length for n1s tlv4.

39. Invalid stream: 0x00 00

40. Reason: unknown even field for n1s namespace.

TLV Decoding Successes

The following TLV streams in either namespace should correctly decode, and be ignored:

1. Valid stream: 0x

2. Explanation: empty message

3. Valid stream: 0x21 00

4. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

5. Valid stream: 0xfd0201 00

6. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

7. Valid stream: 0xfd00fd 00

8. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

9. Valid stream: 0xfd00ff 00

10. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

11. Valid stream: 0xfe02000001 00

12. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

13. Valid stream: 0xff0200000000000001 00

14. Explanation: Unknown odd type.

The following TLV streams in n1 namespace should correctly decode, with the values given here:

1. Valid stream: 0x01 00

2. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=0

3. Valid stream: 0x01 01 01

4. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=1

5. Valid stream: 0x01 02 0100

6. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=256

7. Valid stream: 0x01 03 010000

8. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=65536

9. Valid stream: 0x01 04 01000000

10. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=16777216

11. Valid stream: 0x01 05 0100000000

12. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=4294967296

13. Valid stream: 0x01 06 010000000000

14. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=1099511627776

15. Valid stream: 0x01 07 01000000000000

16. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=281474976710656

17. Valid stream: 0x01 08 0100000000000000

18. Values: tlv1 amount_msat=72057594037927936

19. Valid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000226

20. Values: tlv2 scid=0x0x550

21. Valid stream: 0x03 31 023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb00000000000000010000000000000002

22. Values: tlv3 node_id=023da092f6980e58d2c037173180e9a465476026ee50f96695963e8efe436f54eb amount_msat_1=1 amount_msat_2=2

23. Valid stream: 0xfd00fe 02 0226

24. Values: tlv4 cltv_delta=550

TLV Stream Decoding Failure

Any appending of an invalid stream to a valid stream should trigger a decoding failure.

Any appending of a higher-numbered valid stream to a lower-numbered valid stream should not trigger a decoding failure.

In addition, the following TLV streams in namespace n1 should trigger a decoding failure:

1. Invalid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000226 01 01 2a

2. Reason: valid TLV records but invalid ordering

3. Invalid stream: 0x02 08 0000000000000231 02 08 0000000000000451

4. Reason: duplicate TLV type

5. Invalid stream: 0x1f 00 0f 01 2a

6. Reason: valid (ignored) TLV records but invalid ordering

7. Invalid stream: 0x1f 00 1f 01 2a

8. Reason: duplicate TLV type (ignored)

The following TLV stream in namespace n2 should trigger a decoding failure:

1. Invalid stream: 0xffffffffffffffffff 00 00 00
2. Reason: valid TLV records but invalid ordering

Acknowledgments

[ TODO: (roasbeef); fin ]

References

1. http://www.unicode.org/charts/PDF/U2600.pdf

Authors

[ FIXME: Insert Author List ]

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.