It's trivial to make types->lengths, but not so much the other way.
The types I used here are the ones I found useful in implementation, and
I think add some clarity, though we can certainly argue about them.
There's no normative changes to the spec in here.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Editing the previous mess was horrific. I gave up and rewrote using a
generator.
Changes to output:
1. subtypes and tlvs now handled.
2. The output format now has explicit prefixes, so readers don't have
to rely on number of fields to interpret data.
3. Each field is split into type and count; count is empty if there's
no '*x'.
4. TLV stream typenames are repeated; TLV record type names are not
necessarily unique.
5. The unused offset field is removed.
6. No arguments taken: everything is always printed, and you can grep if you
only want some.
[ Fixup by <niftynei@gmail.com> ]
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
When the notation of the noise protocol framework is being introduced the terms `ck` and `k` are being explained but `e` and `s` are only referred to was public keys. I fixed that by stating what they stand for and noting that `s` is usually the the `nodeid` in the context of the Lightning Network protocol.
Saying "the risk is only to the node *accepting* the HTLC" is confusing
because merely accepting an HTLC is risk-free. The risk comes from
accepting *responsibility to route the payment*, i.e. offering an HTLC
of your own in the next channel on the path, where a too-small
difference in the HTLC values could end up with you cheated out of a
payment.
This revised paragraph hopefully makes that clearer.
Uses more specific and consistent language ("the"/"that" instead of "an"
where possible). Also helps avoid confusion with unrelated HTLCs that
serve other payments but are shared by the same two nodes.
914ebab908 effectively deprecated this, but
left it for "reject if more than 2x expected amount" case.
Leaving it for gross overpayment still leaves an attack on the current
network in practice (all implementations I know of reject grossly excessive
payments), and removing it causes our code to nicely break when regenerating,
since that error code is now not defined anywhere.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We express it has how the outputs are ordered, but the only way you can
detect that is by the htlc_signatures order, which is the part which really
matters.
I finally reproduced this, BTW, which is why I'm digging it up!
Closes: #448
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Because the errors are separate, if an intermediate node sees a
payment hash for relay and has several guesses as to the
destination of the payment, they can check their guesses by sending
HTLCs with the same payment hashes first and seeing the error sent
back.
By adding the htlc_msat that the final node received to
unknown_or_incorrect_payment_details, origin nodes can still
identify bad value-relaying peers.
