1. Only one per-hop thing, called `per-hop`, or `hops_data` when in aggregate.
2. Move HMAC to the end of stuff it covers, both of the packet itself, and the per-hop.
3. Use `channel-id` instead of RIPEMD(nodepubkey).
4. Use 4 byte amounts.
5. This is all for realm "0", we can have future realms. We also have 16
bytes of unused padding.
6. No longer need the `gamma` key, but document the `_um_` key used for
errors.
7. Use normal 32-byte HMAC, not truncated 20-bytes, which more than eats
up the room we saved.
The result is that the onion is now 1366 not 1254 bytes, but simpler.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We didn't note the actual requirements: we MUST reject replays we have forwarded
or paid to avoid replay attacks. The details are difficult however; we have
to clean them out at some stage, and restrict the size somehow. Suggest some
ways we could do that.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This is particularly important if people start overpaying: a hop
may try to deduct 1 extra millisatoshi, which would be rejected by the
next unless the next is the final hop, enabling detection.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Not doing this check means an inconsistency in behaviour, which could
theoretically allow a hop to probe: if the next hop is the last, it might
not care, but if it's not it will return an error.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The idea of the "SHOULD fail if amount is too much" was courtesy against
overpaying, but that's a bad idea of you value privacy and some vendor has
well-known prices. Allow a factor of two, at least.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This reduces failure codes to 2 bytes, places them into data itself.
Now we can use the same parsing code for them as we use for normal packets.
BOLT 2 is adjusted to match, and order of args changed to restore sha256
alignment to a nice 8 bytes.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
The previous test vectors were using the btcec variant corresponding
to RFC5903 Section 9, only using the X-coord of the result of the
scalar multiplication, whereas libsecp256k1 uses the compressed
serialization format, which includes the sign bit.
For now I just generated the wrapping direction since the unwrapping
relies on the steps in reverse. It's a 5-hop onion packet, padded to
the standard 20 hop size. Associated data and per-hop-payloads are
filled with dummy values, not the format described in the bolt.
Christian points out that we lost our fixed sizedness when we included
more information in failure messages. Add some padding to get that
back; by my calculations that gives us room for 30 bytes of expansion
before we'll see some odd-length packets again.
We can actually stash a message in here (hence contents unspecified),
but we shouldn't need to if our codes work.
Reported-by: Christian Decker <decker.christian@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
I looked through the error cases in our current prototype, and this
seems to cover most of them. I classed them using bits, which
indicate how the origin should respond.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'fixes__renumber_failure_codes_for_consistency.patch':
FIXES: renumber failure codes for consistency.
Done as separate patch for now because it merely adds noise.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'fix__`failure-code`_and_`additional`_are_literal_field_names,_be_consistent.patch':
FIX: `failure-code` and `additional` are literal field names, be consistent.
Also, put HMAC fail before keyparse fail, since that's the first check.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Header from folded patch 'bolt_2__add_another_method_of_failing_htlcs.patch':
Added an `additional` field to the return message, so that we can
include any protocol level message to inform the sender about the
cause of the failure. This could for example be a `channel_update` if
the channel has become unusable. The message is no longer fixed size,
as hopefully the failure is a rare event, in which case timing
analysis becomes easy anyway.
Closes#53
If a node is being malicious, we get an error from the next hop either
way. But if we've simply advertised a new cltv-expiry-delta, we
want to send our own error.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
They're not reliable, so we can't count on them. We also don't have a place
for forwarding them in BOLT 2's update_fulfill_htlc.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
FIPS 198 is based on RFC 2104, but further restricts the hashing
functions to the SHA-family, so this is a bit redundant, but my hope
is to avoid confusion about whether there is a difference.
Thanks @rustyrussell for pointing this one out.
