We create a logging object when we connect, then carry it through. If
it comes from the database, we just use the peerid as the log prefix.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
It's a data-leak to send ack before we have verified identity of peer.
Plus, we can't send it until we know which peer it is, anyway!
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Update libsecp256k1 has a normalize function, which allows us to test
if the signature was in low-S form.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
Add Makefile target update-secp256k1, and run it.
The only API change is that len is now an IN-OUT parameter to serialization
functions.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
We use libsecp256k1 to convert signatures to DER; we were creating a
temporary one, but we really should be handing the one we have in dstate
through. This does that, everywhere.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
As per lightning-rfc commit 8ee09e749990a11fa53bea03d5961cfde4be4616,
we remove the acks from the protocol now they're no longer needed (and
all the infrastructure).
We also place the commit number in the commit_info where it logically
belongs, removing it from the peer struct.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
For the change to asynchronous updates as specified by BOLT #2, we
need to know when the other side acknowledged a packet. This creates
a simple callback mechanism for it.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
This uses libsodium (we could use openssl, but the required primitives
are only in 1.1.0 which is still in alpha).
It doesn't handle reconnections yet, either.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
After useful feedback from Anthony Towns and Mats Jerratsch (of
thunder.network fame), this is the third version of inter-node crypto.
1) First, each side sends a 33-byte session pubkey. This is a
bitcoin-style compressed EC key, unique for each session.
2) ECDH is used to derive a shared secret. From this we generate
the following transmission encoding parameters for each side:
Session AES-128 key: SHA256(shared-secret || my-sessionpubkey || 0)
Session HMAC key: SHA256(shared-secret || my-sessionpubkey || 1)
IV for AES: SHA256(shared-secret || my-sessionpubkey || 2)
3) All packets from then on are encrypted of form:
/* HMAC, covering totlen and data */
struct sha256 hmac;
/* Total data transmitted (including this). */
le64 totlen;
/* Encrypted contents, rounded up to 16 byte boundary. */
u8 data[];
4) The first packet is an Authenticate protobuf, containing this node's
pubkey, and a bitcoin-style EC signature of the other side's session
pubkey.
5) Unknown protobuf fields are handled in the protocol as follows
(including in the initial Authenticate packet):
1) Odd numbered fields are optional, and backwards compatible.
2) Even numbered fields are required; abort if you get one.
Currently both sides just send an error packet "hello" after the
handshake, and make sure they receive the same.
Signed-off-by: Rusty Russell <rusty@rustcorp.com.au>
