mirror of
https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin.git
synced 2025-03-12 02:07:39 +01:00
This commit fixes some slightly unexpected behaviour when: - there is already transaction in the mempool (the "mempool tx") - BroadcastTransaction() is called for a transaction with the same txid as the mempool transaction but a different witness (the "new tx") Prior to this commit, if BroadcastTransaction() is called with relay=true, then it'll call RelayTransaction() using the txid/wtxid of the new tx, not the txid/wtxid of the mempool tx. For wtxid relay peers, in SendMessages(), the wtxid of the new tx will be taken from setInventoryTxToSend, but will then be filtered out from the vector of wtxids to announce, since m_mempool.info() won't find the transaction (the mempool contains the mempool tx, which has a different wtxid from the new tx). Fix this by calling RelayTransaction() with the wtxid of the mempool transaction in this case.
119 lines
5 KiB
C++
119 lines
5 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2010 Satoshi Nakamoto
|
|
// Copyright (c) 2009-2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
|
|
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
|
|
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
|
|
|
|
#include <consensus/validation.h>
|
|
#include <net.h>
|
|
#include <net_processing.h>
|
|
#include <node/context.h>
|
|
#include <validation.h>
|
|
#include <validationinterface.h>
|
|
#include <node/transaction.h>
|
|
|
|
#include <future>
|
|
|
|
static TransactionError HandleATMPError(const TxValidationState& state, std::string& err_string_out)
|
|
{
|
|
err_string_out = state.ToString();
|
|
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
|
|
if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_MISSING_INPUTS) {
|
|
return TransactionError::MISSING_INPUTS;
|
|
}
|
|
return TransactionError::MEMPOOL_REJECTED;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return TransactionError::MEMPOOL_ERROR;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
TransactionError BroadcastTransaction(NodeContext& node, const CTransactionRef tx, std::string& err_string, const CAmount& max_tx_fee, bool relay, bool wait_callback)
|
|
{
|
|
// BroadcastTransaction can be called by either sendrawtransaction RPC or wallet RPCs.
|
|
// node.peerman is assigned both before chain clients and before RPC server is accepting calls,
|
|
// and reset after chain clients and RPC sever are stopped. node.peerman should never be null here.
|
|
assert(node.peerman);
|
|
assert(node.mempool);
|
|
std::promise<void> promise;
|
|
uint256 txid = tx->GetHash();
|
|
uint256 wtxid = tx->GetWitnessHash();
|
|
bool callback_set = false;
|
|
|
|
{ // cs_main scope
|
|
assert(node.chainman);
|
|
LOCK(cs_main);
|
|
// If the transaction is already confirmed in the chain, don't do anything
|
|
// and return early.
|
|
CCoinsViewCache &view = node.chainman->ActiveChainstate().CoinsTip();
|
|
for (size_t o = 0; o < tx->vout.size(); o++) {
|
|
const Coin& existingCoin = view.AccessCoin(COutPoint(txid, o));
|
|
// IsSpent doesn't mean the coin is spent, it means the output doesn't exist.
|
|
// So if the output does exist, then this transaction exists in the chain.
|
|
if (!existingCoin.IsSpent()) return TransactionError::ALREADY_IN_CHAIN;
|
|
}
|
|
if (auto mempool_tx = node.mempool->get(txid); mempool_tx) {
|
|
// There's already a transaction in the mempool with this txid. Don't
|
|
// try to submit this transaction to the mempool (since it'll be
|
|
// rejected as a TX_CONFLICT), but do attempt to reannounce the mempool
|
|
// transaction if relay=true.
|
|
//
|
|
// The mempool transaction may have the same or different witness (and
|
|
// wtxid) as this transaction. Use the mempool's wtxid for reannouncement.
|
|
wtxid = mempool_tx->GetWitnessHash();
|
|
} else {
|
|
// Transaction is not already in the mempool.
|
|
if (max_tx_fee > 0) {
|
|
// First, call ATMP with test_accept and check the fee. If ATMP
|
|
// fails here, return error immediately.
|
|
const MempoolAcceptResult result = AcceptToMemoryPool(node.chainman->ActiveChainstate(), *node.mempool, tx, false /* bypass_limits */,
|
|
true /* test_accept */);
|
|
if (result.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
|
return HandleATMPError(result.m_state, err_string);
|
|
} else if (result.m_base_fees.value() > max_tx_fee) {
|
|
return TransactionError::MAX_FEE_EXCEEDED;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
// Try to submit the transaction to the mempool.
|
|
const MempoolAcceptResult result = AcceptToMemoryPool(node.chainman->ActiveChainstate(), *node.mempool, tx, false /* bypass_limits */,
|
|
false /* test_accept */);
|
|
if (result.m_result_type != MempoolAcceptResult::ResultType::VALID) {
|
|
return HandleATMPError(result.m_state, err_string);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Transaction was accepted to the mempool.
|
|
|
|
if (relay) {
|
|
// the mempool tracks locally submitted transactions to make a
|
|
// best-effort of initial broadcast
|
|
node.mempool->AddUnbroadcastTx(txid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (wait_callback) {
|
|
// For transactions broadcast from outside the wallet, make sure
|
|
// that the wallet has been notified of the transaction before
|
|
// continuing.
|
|
//
|
|
// This prevents a race where a user might call sendrawtransaction
|
|
// with a transaction to/from their wallet, immediately call some
|
|
// wallet RPC, and get a stale result because callbacks have not
|
|
// yet been processed.
|
|
CallFunctionInValidationInterfaceQueue([&promise] {
|
|
promise.set_value();
|
|
});
|
|
callback_set = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
} // cs_main
|
|
|
|
if (callback_set) {
|
|
// Wait until Validation Interface clients have been notified of the
|
|
// transaction entering the mempool.
|
|
promise.get_future().wait();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if (relay) {
|
|
node.peerman->RelayTransaction(txid, wtxid);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return TransactionError::OK;
|
|
}
|