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212 lines
12 KiB
C++
212 lines
12 KiB
C++
// Copyright (c) 2020 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#ifndef BITCOIN_TXREQUEST_H
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#define BITCOIN_TXREQUEST_H
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#include <primitives/transaction.h>
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#include <net.h> // For NodeId
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#include <uint256.h>
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#include <chrono>
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#include <vector>
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#include <stdint.h>
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/** Data structure to keep track of, and schedule, transaction downloads from peers.
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*
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* === Specification ===
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*
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* We keep track of which peers have announced which transactions, and use that to determine which requests
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* should go to which peer, when, and in what order.
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*
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* The following information is tracked per peer/tx combination ("announcement"):
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* - Which peer announced it (through their NodeId)
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* - The txid or wtxid of the transaction (collectively called "txhash" in what follows)
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* - Whether it was a tx or wtx announcement (see BIP339).
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* - What the earliest permitted time is that that transaction can be requested from that peer (called "reqtime").
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* - Whether it's from a "preferred" peer or not. Which announcements get this flag is determined by the caller, but
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* this is designed for outbound peers, or other peers that we have a higher level of trust in. Even when the
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* peers' preferredness changes, the preferred flag of existing announcements from that peer won't change.
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* - Whether or not the transaction was requested already, and if so, when it times out (called "expiry").
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* - Whether or not the transaction request failed already (timed out, or invalid transaction or NOTFOUND was
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* received).
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*
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* Transaction requests are then assigned to peers, following these rules:
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*
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* - No transaction is requested as long as another request for the same txhash is outstanding (it needs to fail
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* first by passing expiry, or a NOTFOUND or invalid transaction has to be received for it).
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*
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* Rationale: to avoid wasting bandwidth on multiple copies of the same transaction. Note that this only works
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* per txhash, so if the same transaction is announced both through txid and wtxid, we have no means
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* to prevent fetching both (the caller can however mitigate this by delaying one, see further).
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*
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* - The same transaction is never requested twice from the same peer, unless the announcement was forgotten in
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* between, and re-announced. Announcements are forgotten only:
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* - If a peer goes offline, all its announcements are forgotten.
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* - If a transaction has been successfully received, or is otherwise no longer needed, the caller can call
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* ForgetTxHash, which removes all announcements across all peers with the specified txhash.
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* - If for a given txhash only already-failed announcements remain, they are all forgotten.
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*
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* Rationale: giving a peer multiple chances to announce a transaction would allow them to bias requests in their
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* favor, worsening transaction censoring attacks. The flip side is that as long as an attacker manages
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* to prevent us from receiving a transaction, failed announcements (including those from honest peers)
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* will linger longer, increasing memory usage somewhat. The impact of this is limited by imposing a
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* cap on the number of tracked announcements per peer. As failed requests in response to announcements
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* from honest peers should be rare, this almost solely hinders attackers.
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* Transaction censoring attacks can be done by announcing transactions quickly while not answering
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* requests for them. See https://allquantor.at/blockchainbib/pdf/miller2015topology.pdf for more
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* information.
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*
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* - Transactions are not requested from a peer until its reqtime has passed.
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*
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* Rationale: enable the calling code to define a delay for less-than-ideal peers, so that (presumed) better
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* peers have a chance to give their announcement first.
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*
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* - If multiple viable candidate peers exist according to the above rules, pick a peer as follows:
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*
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* - If any preferred peers are available, non-preferred peers are not considered for what follows.
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*
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* Rationale: preferred peers are more trusted by us, so are less likely to be under attacker control.
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*
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* - Pick a uniformly random peer among the candidates.
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*
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* Rationale: random assignments are hard to influence for attackers.
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*
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* Together these rules strike a balance between being fast in non-adverserial conditions and minimizing
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* susceptibility to censorship attacks. An attacker that races the network:
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* - Will be unsuccessful if all preferred connections are honest (and there is at least one preferred connection).
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* - If there are P preferred connections of which Ph>=1 are honest, the attacker can delay us from learning
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* about a transaction by k expiration periods, where k ~ 1 + NHG(N=P-1,K=P-Ph-1,r=1), which has mean
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* P/(Ph+1) (where NHG stands for Negative Hypergeometric distribution). The "1 +" is due to the fact that the
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* attacker can be the first to announce through a preferred connection in this scenario, which very likely means
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* they get the first request.
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* - If all P preferred connections are to the attacker, and there are NP non-preferred connections of which NPh>=1
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* are honest, where we assume that the attacker can disconnect and reconnect those connections, the distribution
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* becomes k ~ P + NB(p=1-NPh/NP,r=1) (where NB stands for Negative Binomial distribution), which has mean
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* P-1+NP/NPh.
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*
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* Complexity:
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* - Memory usage is proportional to the total number of tracked announcements (Size()) plus the number of
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* peers with a nonzero number of tracked announcements.
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* - CPU usage is generally logarithmic in the total number of tracked announcements, plus the number of
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* announcements affected by an operation (amortized O(1) per announcement).
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*/
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class TxRequestTracker {
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// Avoid littering this header file with implementation details.
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class Impl;
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const std::unique_ptr<Impl> m_impl;
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public:
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//! Construct a TxRequestTracker.
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explicit TxRequestTracker(bool deterministic = false);
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~TxRequestTracker();
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// Conceptually, the data structure consists of a collection of "announcements", one for each peer/txhash
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// combination:
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//
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// - CANDIDATE announcements represent transactions that were announced by a peer, and that become available for
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// download after their reqtime has passed.
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//
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// - REQUESTED announcements represent transactions that have been requested, and which we're awaiting a
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// response for from that peer. Their expiry value determines when the request times out.
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//
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// - COMPLETED announcements represent transactions that have been requested from a peer, and a NOTFOUND or a
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// transaction was received in response (valid or not), or they timed out. They're only kept around to
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// prevent requesting them again. If only COMPLETED announcements for a given txhash remain (so no CANDIDATE
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// or REQUESTED ones), all of them are deleted (this is an invariant, and maintained by all operations below).
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//
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// The operations below manipulate the data structure.
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/** Adds a new CANDIDATE announcement.
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*
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* Does nothing if one already exists for that (txhash, peer) combination (whether it's CANDIDATE, REQUESTED, or
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* COMPLETED). Note that the txid/wtxid property is ignored for determining uniqueness, so if an announcement
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* is added for a wtxid H, while one for txid H from the same peer already exists, it will be ignored. This is
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* harmless as the txhashes being equal implies it is a non-segwit transaction, so it doesn't matter how it is
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* fetched. The new announcement is given the specified preferred and reqtime values, and takes its is_wtxid
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* from the specified gtxid.
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*/
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void ReceivedInv(NodeId peer, const GenTxid& gtxid, bool preferred,
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std::chrono::microseconds reqtime);
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/** Deletes all announcements for a given peer.
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*
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* It should be called when a peer goes offline.
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*/
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void DisconnectedPeer(NodeId peer);
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/** Deletes all announcements for a given txhash (both txid and wtxid ones).
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*
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* This should be called when a transaction is no longer needed. The caller should ensure that new announcements
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* for the same txhash will not trigger new ReceivedInv calls, at least in the short term after this call.
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*/
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void ForgetTxHash(const uint256& txhash);
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/** Find the txids to request now from peer.
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*
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* It does the following:
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* - Convert all REQUESTED announcements (for all txhashes/peers) with (expiry <= now) to COMPLETED ones.
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* These are returned in expired, if non-nullptr.
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* - Requestable announcements are selected: CANDIDATE announcements from the specified peer with
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* (reqtime <= now) for which no existing REQUESTED announcement with the same txhash from a different peer
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* exists, and for which the specified peer is the best choice among all (reqtime <= now) CANDIDATE
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* announcements with the same txhash (subject to preferredness rules, and tiebreaking using a deterministic
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* salted hash of peer and txhash).
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* - The selected announcements are converted to GenTxids using their is_wtxid flag, and returned in
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* announcement order (even if multiple were added at the same time, or when the clock went backwards while
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* they were being added). This is done to minimize disruption from dependent transactions being requested
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* out of order: if multiple dependent transactions are announced simultaneously by one peer, and end up
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* being requested from them, the requests will happen in announcement order.
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*/
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std::vector<GenTxid> GetRequestable(NodeId peer, std::chrono::microseconds now,
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std::vector<std::pair<NodeId, GenTxid>>* expired = nullptr);
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/** Marks a transaction as requested, with a specified expiry.
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*
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* If no CANDIDATE announcement for the provided peer and txhash exists, this call has no effect. Otherwise:
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* - That announcement is converted to REQUESTED.
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* - If any other REQUESTED announcement for the same txhash already existed, it means an unexpected request
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* was made (GetRequestable will never advise doing so). In this case it is converted to COMPLETED, as we're
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* no longer waiting for a response to it.
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*/
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void RequestedTx(NodeId peer, const uint256& txhash, std::chrono::microseconds expiry);
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/** Converts a CANDIDATE or REQUESTED announcement to a COMPLETED one. If no such announcement exists for the
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* provided peer and txhash, nothing happens.
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*
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* It should be called whenever a transaction or NOTFOUND was received from a peer. When the transaction is
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* not needed entirely anymore, ForgetTxhash should be called instead of, or in addition to, this call.
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*/
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void ReceivedResponse(NodeId peer, const uint256& txhash);
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// The operations below inspect the data structure.
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/** Count how many REQUESTED announcements a peer has. */
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size_t CountInFlight(NodeId peer) const;
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/** Count how many CANDIDATE announcements a peer has. */
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size_t CountCandidates(NodeId peer) const;
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/** Count how many announcements a peer has (REQUESTED, CANDIDATE, and COMPLETED combined). */
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size_t Count(NodeId peer) const;
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/** Count how many announcements are being tracked in total across all peers and transaction hashes. */
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size_t Size() const;
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/** Access to the internal priority computation (testing only) */
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uint64_t ComputePriority(const uint256& txhash, NodeId peer, bool preferred) const;
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/** Run internal consistency check (testing only). */
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void SanityCheck() const;
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/** Run a time-dependent internal consistency check (testing only).
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*
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* This can only be called immediately after GetRequestable, with the same 'now' parameter.
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*/
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void PostGetRequestableSanityCheck(std::chrono::microseconds now) const;
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};
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#endif // BITCOIN_TXREQUEST_H
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