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Add fuzz test for AEADChacha20Poly1305
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2 changed files with 104 additions and 0 deletions
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@ -309,6 +309,7 @@ test_fuzz_fuzz_SOURCES = \
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test/fuzz/crypto_aes256.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_aes256.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_aes256cbc.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_aes256cbc.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20poly1305.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_common.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_common.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_diff_fuzz_chacha20.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_diff_fuzz_chacha20.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_hkdf_hmac_sha256_l32.cpp \
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test/fuzz/crypto_hkdf_hmac_sha256_l32.cpp \
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103
src/test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20poly1305.cpp
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103
src/test/fuzz/crypto_chacha20poly1305.cpp
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// Copyright (c) 2020-2021 The Bitcoin Core developers
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// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
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// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
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#include <crypto/chacha20poly1305.h>
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#include <random.h>
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#include <span.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/fuzz.h>
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#include <test/fuzz/util.h>
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#include <cstddef>
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#include <cstdint>
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#include <vector>
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FUZZ_TARGET(crypto_aeadchacha20poly1305)
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{
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FuzzedDataProvider provider{buffer.data(), buffer.size()};
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auto key = provider.ConsumeBytes<std::byte>(32);
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key.resize(32);
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AEADChaCha20Poly1305 aead(key);
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// Initialize RNG deterministically, to generate contents and AAD. We assume that there are no
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// (potentially buggy) edge cases triggered by specific values of contents/AAD, so we can avoid
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// reading the actual data for those from the fuzzer input (which would need large amounts of
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// data).
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InsecureRandomContext rng(provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint64_t>());
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LIMITED_WHILE(provider.ConsumeBool(), 10000)
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{
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// Mode:
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// - Bit 0: whether to use single-plain Encrypt/Decrypt; otherwise use a split at prefix.
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// - Bit 2: whether this ciphertext will be corrupted (making it the last sent one)
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// - Bit 3-4: controls the maximum aad length (max 511 bytes)
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// - Bit 5-7: controls the maximum content length (max 16383 bytes, for performance reasons)
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unsigned mode = provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint8_t>();
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bool use_splits = mode & 1;
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bool damage = mode & 4;
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unsigned aad_length_bits = 3 * ((mode >> 3) & 3);
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unsigned aad_length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << aad_length_bits) - 1);
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unsigned length_bits = 2 * ((mode >> 5) & 7);
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unsigned length = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (1 << length_bits) - 1);
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// Generate aad and content.
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auto aad = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(aad_length);
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auto plain = rng.randbytes<std::byte>(length);
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std::vector<std::byte> cipher(length + AEADChaCha20Poly1305::EXPANSION);
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// Generate nonce
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AEADChaCha20Poly1305::Nonce96 nonce = {(uint32_t)rng(), rng()};
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if (use_splits && length > 0) {
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size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
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aead.Encrypt(Span{plain}.first(split_index), Span{plain}.subspan(split_index), aad, nonce, cipher);
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} else {
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aead.Encrypt(plain, aad, nonce, cipher);
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}
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// Test Keystream output
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std::vector<std::byte> keystream(length);
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aead.Keystream(nonce, keystream);
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for (size_t i = 0; i < length; ++i) {
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assert((plain[i] ^ keystream[i]) == cipher[i]);
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}
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std::vector<std::byte> decrypted_contents(length);
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bool ok{false};
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// damage the key
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unsigned key_position = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, 31);
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std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (key_position & 7))};
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std::vector<std::byte> bad_key = key;
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bad_key[key_position] ^= damage_val;
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AEADChaCha20Poly1305 bad_aead(bad_key);
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ok = bad_aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, decrypted_contents);
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assert(!ok);
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// Optionally damage 1 bit in either the cipher (corresponding to a change in transit)
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// or the aad (to make sure that decryption will fail if the AAD mismatches).
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if (damage) {
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unsigned damage_bit = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<unsigned>(0, (cipher.size() + aad.size()) * 8U - 1U);
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unsigned damage_pos = damage_bit >> 3;
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std::byte damage_val{(uint8_t)(1U << (damage_bit & 7))};
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if (damage_pos >= cipher.size()) {
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aad[damage_pos - cipher.size()] ^= damage_val;
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} else {
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cipher[damage_pos] ^= damage_val;
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}
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}
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if (use_splits && length > 0) {
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size_t split_index = provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<size_t>(1, length);
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ok = aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, Span{decrypted_contents}.first(split_index), Span{decrypted_contents}.subspan(split_index));
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} else {
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ok = aead.Decrypt(cipher, aad, nonce, decrypted_contents);
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}
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// Decryption *must* fail if the packet was damaged, and succeed if it wasn't.
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assert(!ok == damage);
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if (!ok) break;
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assert(decrypted_contents == plain);
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}
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}
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