Merge bitcoin/bitcoin#30413: p2p: Lazy init some bloom filters; fuzz version handshake

afd237bb5d [fuzz] Harness for version handshake (dergoegge)
a90ab4aec9 scripted-diff: Rename lazily initialized bloom filters (dergoegge)
82de1bc478 [net processing] Lazily initialize m_recent_confirmed_transactions (dergoegge)
fa0c87f19c [net processing] Lazily initialize m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable (dergoegge)
662e8db2d3 [net processing] Lazily initialize m_recent_rejects (dergoegge)

Pull request description:

  This adds a fuzzing harness dedicated to the version handshake. To avoid determinism issues, the harness creates necessary components each iteration (addrman, peerman, etc). A harness like this would have easily caught https://bitcoincore.org/en/2024/07/03/disclose-timestamp-overflow/.

  As a performance optimization, this PR includes a change to `PeerManager` to lazily initialize various filters (to avoid large unnecessary memory allocations each iteration).

ACKs for top commit:
  brunoerg:
    ACK afd237bb5d
  marcofleon:
    Tested ACK afd237bb5d. I compared the coverage  of `net_processing` from this harness to the `process_message` and `process_messages` harnesses to see the differences. This target hits more specific parts of the version handshake. The stability looks good as well, at about 94%.
  glozow:
    utACK afd237bb5d lazy blooms look ok
  mzumsande:
    Code Review ACK afd237bb5d

Tree-SHA512: 62bba20aec0cd220e62368354891f9790b81ad75e8adf7b22a76a6d4663bd26aedc4cae8083658a75ea9043d60aad3f0e58ad36bd7bbbf93ff1d16e317bf15cc
This commit is contained in:
glozow 2024-08-01 09:33:44 +01:00
commit b8755164cf
No known key found for this signature in database
GPG Key ID: BA03F4DBE0C63FB4
6 changed files with 193 additions and 47 deletions

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@ -350,6 +350,7 @@ test_fuzz_fuzz_SOURCES = \
test/fuzz/netaddress.cpp \
test/fuzz/netbase_dns_lookup.cpp \
test/fuzz/node_eviction.cpp \
test/fuzz/p2p_handshake.cpp \
test/fuzz/p2p_transport_serialization.cpp \
test/fuzz/package_eval.cpp \
test/fuzz/parse_hd_keypath.cpp \

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@ -584,7 +584,7 @@ private:
* @param[in] maybe_add_extra_compact_tx Whether this tx should be added to vExtraTxnForCompact.
* Set to false if the tx has already been rejected before,
* e.g. is an orphan, to avoid adding duplicate entries.
* Updates m_txrequest, m_recent_rejects, m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable, m_orphanage, and vExtraTxnForCompact. */
* Updates m_txrequest, m_lazy_recent_rejects, m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable, m_orphanage, and vExtraTxnForCompact. */
void ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& tx, const TxValidationState& result,
bool maybe_add_extra_compact_tx)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(!m_peer_mutex, g_msgproc_mutex, m_tx_download_mutex);
@ -776,9 +776,9 @@ private:
/** Synchronizes tx download including TxRequestTracker, rejection filters, and TxOrphanage.
* Lock invariants:
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_orphanage.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_recent_rejects.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_recent_confirmed_transactions.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_lazy_recent_rejects.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
* - A txhash (txid or wtxid) in m_txrequest is not also in m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions.
* - Each data structure's limits hold (m_orphanage max size, m_txrequest per-peer limits, etc).
*/
Mutex m_tx_download_mutex ACQUIRED_BEFORE(m_mempool.cs);
@ -856,9 +856,9 @@ private:
/** Check whether we already have this gtxid in:
* - mempool
* - orphanage
* - m_recent_rejects
* - m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable (if include_reconsiderable = true)
* - m_recent_confirmed_transactions
* - m_lazy_recent_rejects
* - m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable (if include_reconsiderable = true)
* - m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions
* */
bool AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid, bool include_reconsiderable)
EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_tx_download_mutex);
@ -897,7 +897,18 @@ private:
*
* Memory used: 1.3 MB
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){120'000, 0.000'001};
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> m_lazy_recent_rejects GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){nullptr};
CRollingBloomFilter& RecentRejectsFilter() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_tx_download_mutex)
{
AssertLockHeld(m_tx_download_mutex);
if (!m_lazy_recent_rejects) {
m_lazy_recent_rejects = std::make_unique<CRollingBloomFilter>(120'000, 0.000'001);
}
return *m_lazy_recent_rejects;
}
/**
* Filter for:
@ -905,7 +916,7 @@ private:
* eligible for reconsideration if submitted with other transactions.
* (2) packages (see GetPackageHash) we have already rejected before and should not retry.
*
* Similar to m_recent_rejects, this filter is used to save bandwidth when e.g. all of our peers
* Similar to m_lazy_recent_rejects, this filter is used to save bandwidth when e.g. all of our peers
* have larger mempools and thus lower minimum feerates than us.
*
* When a transaction's error is TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE (in a package or by
@ -917,9 +928,20 @@ private:
*
* Reset this filter when the chain tip changes.
*
* Parameters are picked to be the same as m_recent_rejects, with the same rationale.
* Parameters are picked to be the same as m_lazy_recent_rejects, with the same rationale.
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){120'000, 0.000'001};
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){nullptr};
CRollingBloomFilter& RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_tx_download_mutex)
{
AssertLockHeld(m_tx_download_mutex);
if (!m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable) {
m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable = std::make_unique<CRollingBloomFilter>(120'000, 0.000'001);
}
return *m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable;
}
/*
* Filter for transactions that have been recently confirmed.
@ -936,7 +958,18 @@ private:
* transaction per day that would be inadvertently ignored (which is the
* same probability that we have in the reject filter).
*/
CRollingBloomFilter m_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){48'000, 0.000'001};
std::unique_ptr<CRollingBloomFilter> m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions GUARDED_BY(m_tx_download_mutex){nullptr};
CRollingBloomFilter& RecentConfirmedTransactionsFilter() EXCLUSIVE_LOCKS_REQUIRED(m_tx_download_mutex)
{
AssertLockHeld(m_tx_download_mutex);
if (!m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions) {
m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions = std::make_unique<CRollingBloomFilter>(48'000, 0.000'001);
}
return *m_lazy_recent_confirmed_transactions;
}
/**
* For sending `inv`s to inbound peers, we use a single (exponentially
@ -2080,8 +2113,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ActiveTipChange(const CBlockIndex& new_tip, bool is_ibd)
// If the chain tip has changed, previously rejected transactions might now be valid, e.g. due
// to a timelock. Reset the rejection filters to give those transactions another chance if we
// see them again.
m_recent_rejects.reset();
m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.reset();
RecentRejectsFilter().reset();
RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().reset();
}
}
@ -2119,9 +2152,9 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::BlockConnected(
m_orphanage.EraseForBlock(*pblock);
for (const auto& ptx : pblock->vtx) {
m_recent_confirmed_transactions.insert(ptx->GetHash().ToUint256());
RecentConfirmedTransactionsFilter().insert(ptx->GetHash().ToUint256());
if (ptx->HasWitness()) {
m_recent_confirmed_transactions.insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
RecentConfirmedTransactionsFilter().insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
}
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetHash());
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetWitnessHash());
@ -2139,7 +2172,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::BlockDisconnected(const std::shared_ptr<const CBlock> &blo
// presumably the most common case of relaying a confirmed transaction
// should be just after a new block containing it is found.
LOCK(m_tx_download_mutex);
m_recent_confirmed_transactions.reset();
RecentConfirmedTransactionsFilter().reset();
}
/**
@ -2300,11 +2333,11 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveTx(const GenTxid& gtxid, bool include_reconside
if (m_orphanage.HaveTx(Wtxid::FromUint256(hash))) return true;
}
if (include_reconsiderable && m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(hash)) return true;
if (include_reconsiderable && RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(hash)) return true;
if (m_recent_confirmed_transactions.contains(hash)) return true;
if (RecentConfirmedTransactionsFilter().contains(hash)) return true;
return m_recent_rejects.contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid);
return RecentRejectsFilter().contains(hash) || m_mempool.exists(gtxid);
}
bool PeerManagerImpl::AlreadyHaveBlock(const uint256& block_hash)
@ -3192,12 +3225,12 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& ptx
// for concerns around weakening security of unupgraded nodes
// if we start doing this too early.
if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_RECONSIDERABLE) {
// If the result is TX_RECONSIDERABLE, add it to m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable
// If the result is TX_RECONSIDERABLE, add it to m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable
// because we should not download or submit this transaction by itself again, but may
// submit it as part of a package later.
m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
} else {
m_recent_rejects.insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
RecentRejectsFilter().insert(ptx->GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
}
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetWitnessHash());
// If the transaction failed for TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD,
@ -3211,7 +3244,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessInvalidTx(NodeId nodeid, const CTransactionRef& ptx
// We only add the txid if it differs from the wtxid, to avoid wasting entries in the
// rolling bloom filter.
if (state.GetResult() == TxValidationResult::TX_INPUTS_NOT_STANDARD && ptx->HasWitness()) {
m_recent_rejects.insert(ptx->GetHash().ToUint256());
RecentRejectsFilter().insert(ptx->GetHash().ToUint256());
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(ptx->GetHash());
}
if (maybe_add_extra_compact_tx && RecursiveDynamicUsage(*ptx) < 100000) {
@ -3266,7 +3299,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessPackageResult(const PackageToValidate& package_to_v
const auto& senders = package_to_validate.m_senders;
if (package_result.m_state.IsInvalid()) {
m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.insert(GetPackageHash(package));
RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().insert(GetPackageHash(package));
}
// We currently only expect to process 1-parent-1-child packages. Remove if this changes.
if (!Assume(package.size() == 2)) return;
@ -3320,7 +3353,7 @@ std::optional<PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate> PeerManagerImpl::Find1P1CPacka
const auto& parent_wtxid{ptx->GetWitnessHash()};
Assume(m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(parent_wtxid.ToUint256()));
Assume(RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(parent_wtxid.ToUint256()));
// Prefer children from this peer. This helps prevent censorship attempts in which an attacker
// sends lots of fake children for the parent, and we (unluckily) keep selecting the fake
@ -3332,7 +3365,7 @@ std::optional<PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate> PeerManagerImpl::Find1P1CPacka
// most recent) one efficiently.
for (const auto& child : cpfp_candidates_same_peer) {
Package maybe_cpfp_package{ptx, child};
if (!m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
if (!RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
return PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate{ptx, child, nodeid, nodeid};
}
}
@ -3356,10 +3389,10 @@ std::optional<PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate> PeerManagerImpl::Find1P1CPacka
for (const auto index : tx_indices) {
// If we already tried a package and failed for any reason, the combined hash was
// cached in m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
// cached in m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
const auto [child_tx, child_sender] = cpfp_candidates_different_peer.at(index);
Package maybe_cpfp_package{ptx, child_tx};
if (!m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
if (!RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(GetPackageHash(maybe_cpfp_package))) {
return PeerManagerImpl::PackageToValidate{ptx, child_tx, nodeid, child_sender};
}
}
@ -4551,8 +4584,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
}
}
if (m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(wtxid)) {
// When a transaction is already in m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable, we shouldn't submit
if (RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(wtxid)) {
// When a transaction is already in m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable, we shouldn't submit
// it by itself again. However, look for a matching child in the orphanage, as it is
// possible that they succeed as a package.
LogPrint(BCLog::TXPACKAGES, "found tx %s (wtxid=%s) in reconsiderable rejects, looking for child in orphanage\n",
@ -4564,20 +4597,20 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
ProcessPackageResult(package_to_validate.value(), package_result);
}
}
// If a tx is detected by m_recent_rejects it is ignored. Because we haven't
// If a tx is detected by m_lazy_recent_rejects it is ignored. Because we haven't
// submitted the tx to our mempool, we won't have computed a DoS
// score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
// tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
// we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In
// we have to account for m_lazy_recent_rejects showing false positives. In
// other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
// submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// Note that m_lazy_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
// due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught,
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_lazy_recent_rejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
return;
}
@ -4604,16 +4637,16 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
std::sort(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end());
unique_parents.erase(std::unique(unique_parents.begin(), unique_parents.end()), unique_parents.end());
// Distinguish between parents in m_recent_rejects and m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
// We can tolerate having up to 1 parent in m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable since we
// submit 1p1c packages. However, fail immediately if any are in m_recent_rejects.
// Distinguish between parents in m_lazy_recent_rejects and m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.
// We can tolerate having up to 1 parent in m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable since we
// submit 1p1c packages. However, fail immediately if any are in m_lazy_recent_rejects.
std::optional<uint256> rejected_parent_reconsiderable;
for (const uint256& parent_txid : unique_parents) {
if (m_recent_rejects.contains(parent_txid)) {
if (RecentRejectsFilter().contains(parent_txid)) {
fRejectedParents = true;
break;
} else if (m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable.contains(parent_txid) && !m_mempool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(parent_txid))) {
// More than 1 parent in m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: 1p1c will not be
} else if (RecentRejectsReconsiderableFilter().contains(parent_txid) && !m_mempool.exists(GenTxid::Txid(parent_txid))) {
// More than 1 parent in m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: 1p1c will not be
// sufficient to accept this package, so just give up here.
if (rejected_parent_reconsiderable.has_value()) {
fRejectedParents = true;
@ -4633,7 +4666,7 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
// protocol for getting all unconfirmed parents.
const auto gtxid{GenTxid::Txid(parent_txid)};
AddKnownTx(*peer, parent_txid);
// Exclude m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: the missing parent may have been
// Exclude m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: the missing parent may have been
// previously rejected for being too low feerate. This orphan might CPFP it.
if (!AlreadyHaveTx(gtxid, /*include_reconsiderable=*/false)) AddTxAnnouncement(pfrom, gtxid, current_time);
}
@ -4658,8 +4691,8 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
// regardless of what witness is provided, we will not accept
// this, so we don't need to allow for redownload of this txid
// from any of our non-wtxidrelay peers.
m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetHash().ToUint256());
m_recent_rejects.insert(tx.GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
RecentRejectsFilter().insert(tx.GetHash().ToUint256());
RecentRejectsFilter().insert(tx.GetWitnessHash().ToUint256());
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetHash());
m_txrequest.ForgetTxHash(tx.GetWitnessHash());
}
@ -6306,7 +6339,7 @@ bool PeerManagerImpl::SendMessages(CNode* pto)
entry.second.GetHash().ToString(), entry.first);
}
for (const GenTxid& gtxid : requestable) {
// Exclude m_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: we may be requesting a missing parent
// Exclude m_lazy_recent_rejects_reconsiderable: we may be requesting a missing parent
// that was previously rejected for being too low feerate.
if (!AlreadyHaveTx(gtxid, /*include_reconsiderable=*/false)) {
LogPrint(BCLog::NET, "Requesting %s %s peer=%d\n", gtxid.IsWtxid() ? "wtx" : "tx",

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@ -0,0 +1,107 @@
// Copyright (c) 2020-present The Bitcoin Core developers
// Distributed under the MIT software license, see the accompanying
// file COPYING or http://www.opensource.org/licenses/mit-license.php.
#include <addrman.h>
#include <consensus/consensus.h>
#include <net.h>
#include <net_processing.h>
#include <node/warnings.h>
#include <protocol.h>
#include <script/script.h>
#include <sync.h>
#include <test/fuzz/FuzzedDataProvider.h>
#include <test/fuzz/fuzz.h>
#include <test/fuzz/util.h>
#include <test/fuzz/util/net.h>
#include <test/util/mining.h>
#include <test/util/net.h>
#include <test/util/setup_common.h>
#include <test/util/validation.h>
#include <util/time.h>
#include <validationinterface.h>
#include <ios>
#include <string>
#include <utility>
#include <vector>
namespace {
const TestingSetup* g_setup;
void initialize()
{
static const auto testing_setup = MakeNoLogFileContext<const TestingSetup>(
/*chain_type=*/ChainType::REGTEST);
g_setup = testing_setup.get();
}
} // namespace
FUZZ_TARGET(p2p_handshake, .init = ::initialize)
{
FuzzedDataProvider fuzzed_data_provider(buffer.data(), buffer.size());
ConnmanTestMsg& connman = static_cast<ConnmanTestMsg&>(*g_setup->m_node.connman);
auto& chainman = static_cast<TestChainstateManager&>(*g_setup->m_node.chainman);
SetMockTime(1610000000); // any time to successfully reset ibd
chainman.ResetIbd();
node::Warnings warnings{};
NetGroupManager netgroupman{{}};
AddrMan addrman{netgroupman, /*deterministic=*/true, 0};
auto peerman = PeerManager::make(connman, addrman,
/*banman=*/nullptr, chainman,
*g_setup->m_node.mempool, warnings,
PeerManager::Options{
.reconcile_txs = true,
.deterministic_rng = true,
});
connman.SetMsgProc(peerman.get());
LOCK(NetEventsInterface::g_msgproc_mutex);
std::vector<CNode*> peers;
const auto num_peers_to_add = fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange(1, 3);
for (int i = 0; i < num_peers_to_add; ++i) {
peers.push_back(ConsumeNodeAsUniquePtr(fuzzed_data_provider, i).release());
connman.AddTestNode(*peers.back());
peerman->InitializeNode(
*peers.back(),
static_cast<ServiceFlags>(fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegral<uint64_t>()));
}
LIMITED_WHILE(fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeBool(), 100)
{
CNode& connection = *PickValue(fuzzed_data_provider, peers);
if (connection.fDisconnect || connection.fSuccessfullyConnected) {
// Skip if the the connection was disconnected or if the version
// handshake was already completed.
continue;
}
SetMockTime(GetTime() +
fuzzed_data_provider.ConsumeIntegralInRange<int64_t>(
-std::chrono::seconds{10min}.count(), // Allow mocktime to go backwards slightly
std::chrono::seconds{TIMEOUT_INTERVAL}.count()));
CSerializedNetMsg net_msg;
net_msg.m_type = PickValue(fuzzed_data_provider, ALL_NET_MESSAGE_TYPES);
net_msg.data = ConsumeRandomLengthByteVector(fuzzed_data_provider, MAX_PROTOCOL_MESSAGE_LENGTH);
connman.FlushSendBuffer(connection);
(void)connman.ReceiveMsgFrom(connection, std::move(net_msg));
bool more_work{true};
while (more_work) {
connection.fPauseSend = false;
try {
more_work = connman.ProcessMessagesOnce(connection);
} catch (const std::ios_base::failure&) {
}
peerman->SendMessages(&connection);
}
}
g_setup->m_node.connman->StopNodes();
}

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@ -34,6 +34,11 @@ class Span;
struct ConnmanTestMsg : public CConnman {
using CConnman::CConnman;
void SetMsgProc(NetEventsInterface* msgproc)
{
m_msgproc = msgproc;
}
void SetPeerConnectTimeout(std::chrono::seconds timeout)
{
m_peer_connect_timeout = timeout;

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@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ class MempoolCoinbaseTest(BitcoinTestFramework):
self.log.info("Generate a block")
last_block = self.generate(self.nodes[0], 1)
# generate() implicitly syncs blocks, so that peer 1 gets the block before timelock_tx
# Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in m_recent_rejects
# Otherwise, peer 1 would put the timelock_tx in m_lazy_recent_rejects
self.log.info("The time-locked transaction can now be spent")
timelock_tx_id = self.nodes[0].sendrawtransaction(timelock_tx)

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@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ class P2PPermissionsTests(BitcoinTestFramework):
tx.vout[0].nValue += 1
txid = tx.rehash()
# Send the transaction twice. The first time, it'll be rejected by ATMP because it conflicts
# with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the m_recent_rejects filter.
# with a mempool transaction. The second time, it'll be in the m_lazy_recent_rejects filter.
p2p_rebroadcast_wallet.send_txs_and_test(
[tx],
self.nodes[1],