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[doc] move comment about AlreadyHaveTx DoS score to the right place

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This comment isn't in the right place, as detection of a tx in
recent_rejects would cause the function to exit much earlier.
Move the comment to the right place and tweak the first sentence for
accuracy.
This commit is contained in:
glozow 2023-08-14 14:05:34 +01:00
parent 3b8c17838a
commit a3b55c94b9
1 changed files with 15 additions and 17 deletions
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32
src/net_processing.cpp
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@ -4135,6 +4135,21 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
RelayTransaction(tx.GetHash(), tx.GetWitnessHash());
}
}
// If a tx is detected by m_recent_rejects it is ignored. Because we haven't
// submitted the tx to our mempool, we won't have computed a DoS
// score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
// tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
// we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In
// other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
// submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
// due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
return;
}
@ -4255,23 +4270,6 @@ void PeerManagerImpl::ProcessMessage(CNode& pfrom, const std::string& msg_type,
}
}
// If a tx has been detected by m_recent_rejects, we will have reached
// this point and the tx will have been ignored. Because we haven't
// submitted the tx to our mempool, we won't have computed a DoS
// score for it or determined exactly why we consider it invalid.
//
// This means we won't penalize any peer subsequently relaying a DoSy
// tx (even if we penalized the first peer who gave it to us) because
// we have to account for m_recent_rejects showing false positives. In
// other words, we shouldn't penalize a peer if we aren't *sure* they
// submitted a DoSy tx.
//
// Note that m_recent_rejects doesn't just record DoSy or invalid
// transactions, but any tx not accepted by the mempool, which may be
// due to node policy (vs. consensus). So we can't blanket penalize a
// peer simply for relaying a tx that our m_recent_rejects has caught,
// regardless of false positives.
if (state.IsInvalid()) {
LogPrint(BCLog::MEMPOOLREJ, "%s (wtxid=%s) from peer=%d was not accepted: %s\n",
tx.GetHash().ToString(),