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Make signing follow BIP340 exactly w.r.t. aux randomness
libsecp256k1's secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign only follows BIP340 exactly if an aux_rand32 argument is passed. When no randomness is used (as is the case in the current codebase here), there is no impact on security between not providing aux_rand32 at all, or providing an empty one. Yet, for repeatability/testability it is simpler to always use an all-zero one.
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4 changed files with 8 additions and 7 deletions
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@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ bool CKey::SignCompact(const uint256 &hash, std::vector<unsigned char>& vchSig)
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return true;
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}
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bool CKey::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256* merkle_root, const uint256* aux) const
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bool CKey::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256* merkle_root, const uint256& aux) const
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{
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assert(sig.size() == 64);
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secp256k1_keypair keypair;
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@ -288,7 +288,7 @@ bool CKey::SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint2
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uint256 tweak = XOnlyPubKey(pubkey_bytes).ComputeTapTweakHash(merkle_root->IsNull() ? nullptr : merkle_root);
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if (!secp256k1_keypair_xonly_tweak_add(GetVerifyContext(), &keypair, tweak.data())) return false;
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}
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bool ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(secp256k1_context_sign, sig.data(), hash.data(), &keypair, aux ? (unsigned char*)aux->data() : nullptr);
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bool ret = secp256k1_schnorrsig_sign(secp256k1_context_sign, sig.data(), hash.data(), &keypair, (unsigned char*)aux.data());
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if (ret) {
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// Additional verification step to prevent using a potentially corrupted signature
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secp256k1_xonly_pubkey pubkey_verify;
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@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ public:
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/**
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* Create a BIP-340 Schnorr signature, for the xonly-pubkey corresponding to *this,
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* optionally tweaked by *merkle_root. Additional nonce entropy can be provided through
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* optionally tweaked by *merkle_root. Additional nonce entropy is provided through
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* aux.
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*
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* merkle_root is used to optionally perform tweaking of the private key, as specified
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@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ public:
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* (this is used for key path spending, with specific
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* Merkle root of the script tree).
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*/
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bool SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256* merkle_root = nullptr, const uint256* aux = nullptr) const;
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bool SignSchnorr(const uint256& hash, Span<unsigned char> sig, const uint256* merkle_root, const uint256& aux) const;
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//! Derive BIP32 child key.
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bool Derive(CKey& keyChild, ChainCode &ccChild, unsigned int nChild, const ChainCode& cc) const;
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@ -81,7 +81,8 @@ bool MutableTransactionSignatureCreator::CreateSchnorrSig(const SigningProvider&
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uint256 hash;
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if (!SignatureHashSchnorr(hash, execdata, *txTo, nIn, nHashType, sigversion, *m_txdata, MissingDataBehavior::FAIL)) return false;
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sig.resize(64);
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if (!key.SignSchnorr(hash, sig, merkle_root, nullptr)) return false;
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// Use uint256{} as aux_rnd for now.
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if (!key.SignSchnorr(hash, sig, merkle_root, {})) return false;
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if (nHashType) sig.push_back(nHashType);
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return true;
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}
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@ -321,7 +321,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(bip340_test_vectors)
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key.Set(sec.begin(), sec.end(), true);
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XOnlyPubKey pubkey(key.GetPubKey());
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BOOST_CHECK(std::equal(pubkey.begin(), pubkey.end(), pub.begin(), pub.end()));
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bool ok = key.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, nullptr, &aux256);
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bool ok = key.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, nullptr, aux256);
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BOOST_CHECK(ok);
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BOOST_CHECK(std::vector<unsigned char>(sig64, sig64 + 64) == sig);
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// Verify those signatures for good measure.
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@ -337,7 +337,7 @@ BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE(bip340_test_vectors)
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BOOST_CHECK(tweaked);
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XOnlyPubKey tweaked_key = tweaked->first;
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aux256 = InsecureRand256();
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bool ok = key.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, &merkle_root, &aux256);
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bool ok = key.SignSchnorr(msg256, sig64, &merkle_root, aux256);
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BOOST_CHECK(ok);
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BOOST_CHECK(tweaked_key.VerifySchnorr(msg256, sig64));
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}
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