1. Reorder the PoW fields in the 'Filter' proto by field index, instead
of contextually.
2. Deduplicate expression for 'pow' & replace if-block with boolean op
to simplify 'FilterManager::isProofOfWorkValid'.
3. Avoid slightly confusing use of null char as a separator to prevent
hashing collisions in 'EquihashProofOfWorkService::getChallenge'. Use
comma separator and escape the 'itemId' & 'ownerId' arguments instead.
(based on PR #5858 review comments)
When doing a resync from genesis the number of blocks is limited to 6000
so that requires lots of requests and with that increases risk of broken
connections. Giving more tolerance for retries avoids that the user has
to restart the app.
When syncing from genesis the number of blocks are limited so we get the
`onParseBlockCompleteAfterBatchProcessing` called each time when the received
blocks are processed, and as we are not at wallet height we repeat requesting
blocks. But the new check for the BTC recipient triggers a resync from resource call.
We add now a check that we do this check only once the wallet is synced and our
block height from dao state matches wallet blockheight.
- At genesis we use the genesis height for request (not height+1)
- If wallet is not synced yet we do not call onParseBlockChainComplete (as it was before)
We added 1 as with the lite monitor mode we persist the most recent block,
thus we request with the start height for the next block.
But that cause a problem at a DAO full mode which has lite monitor mode set
as then the block parsing would not be triggered.
We refactor it so that we take the chainHeight from the dao state
directly and add 1 at the requests.
We add a check if we are at chain tip, and if so we skip requests
and call the onParseBlockChainComplete directly.
Add a check of 'scriptTypeId' field, against the output of the spending
tx, to the 'RawTransactionInput::validate' method. Also make the seller
as well as the buyer validate each raw BSQ/BTC input received from the
peer. This prevents either peer from claiming that any of their
non-segwit inputs are segwit in order to underpay the tx fee.
Prevent the seller from stealing the combined tx fee as change by lying
about the value of one or more of his BTC inputs, which are passed to
the buyer as raw inputs in the 'BsqSwapFinalizeTxRequest' message.
To this end, add a 'RawTransactionInput::validate' method to check the
'value' field against the output value of the respective spending tx and
run it on every seller input in 'ProcessBsqSwapFinalizeTxRequest', so
that the buyer is no longer just trusting those numbers.
Additionally, check that the spending txIds from the raw BTC inputs
supplied by the seller actually match those of his signed inputs in the
accompanying partially signed tx, thus tying the raw input values to the
seller's tx.
When doing a resync from genesis the number of blocks is limited to 6000
so that requires lots of requests and with that increases risk of broken
connections. Giving more tolerance for retries avoids that the user has
to restart the app.
When syncing from genesis the number of blocks are limited so we get the
`onParseBlockCompleteAfterBatchProcessing` called each time when the received
blocks are processed, and as we are not at wallet height we repeat requesting
blocks. But the new check for the BTC recipient triggers a resync from resource call.
We add now a check that we do this check only once the wallet is synced and our
block height from dao state matches wallet blockheight.
- At genesis we use the genesis height for request (not height+1)
- If wallet is not synced yet we do not call onParseBlockChainComplete (as it was before)
Add a check of 'scriptTypeId' field, against the output of the spending
tx, to the 'RawTransactionInput::validate' method. Also make the seller
as well as the buyer validate each raw BSQ/BTC input received from the
peer. This prevents either peer from claiming that any of their
non-segwit inputs are segwit in order to underpay the tx fee.
The editoffer validation bug fixes:
- A trigger-price edit forced offer.price-margin=0.00.
This needs to be checked in new apitest case asserts.
- An activate state (only) edit forced offer.isUseMarketBasedPrice=true.
The CLI does not have the offer instance, and cannot know the correct
value of the isUseMarketBasedPrice param sent in the editoffer request.
The daemon has to figure this out. If the editType parameter value
sent to daemon is ACTIVATION_STATE_ONLY, use the current offer.isUseMarketBasedPrice.
The refactoring includes more useful and readable information in core's EditOfferValidator
and MutableOfferPayloadFields toString methods, for debugging with the daemon log. And some
adjustments for allowing edits to XMR offers.
Prevent the seller from stealing the combined tx fee as change by lying
about the value of one or more of his BTC inputs, which are passed to
the buyer as raw inputs in the 'BsqSwapFinalizeTxRequest' message.
To this end, add a 'RawTransactionInput::validate' method to check the
'value' field against the output value of the respective spending tx and
run it on every seller input in 'ProcessBsqSwapFinalizeTxRequest', so
that the buyer is no longer just trusting those numbers.
Additionally, check that the spending txIds from the raw BTC inputs
supplied by the seller actually match those of his signed inputs in the
accompanying partially signed tx, thus tying the raw input values to the
seller's tx.
**Unconfirmed** BSQ swap seems like something failed. **Processing** is used by some wallets for unconfirmed transactions and has no negative implications.
We added 1 as with the lite monitor mode we persist the most recent block,
thus we request with the start height for the next block.
But that cause a problem at a DAO full mode which has lite monitor mode set
as then the block parsing would not be triggered.
We refactor it so that we take the chainHeight from the dao state
directly and add 1 at the requests.
We add a check if we are at chain tip, and if so we skip requests
and call the onParseBlockChainComplete directly.
There are some use cases where the CLI needs to know what kind of offer
is being acted on before the request is made, For example:
There are differences between a BsqSwap 'takeoffer'request, and a v1
'takeoffer' request.
A BsqSwap offer cannot be edited by an 'editoffer' request, and an
attempt should be blocked by the CLI.
- Append isMyOffer GetOfferCategoryRequest rpc msg def.
- Adjust daemon.grpc services for new boolean GetOfferCategoryRequest param.
- Adjust core.api for new boolean GetOfferCategoryRequest param.
- Add validation check in core.api EditOfferValidator to block attempt to
edit a BsqSwap offer.
- Refactor CoreOffersService get*offer(id) methods to optionally throw
excpetions.
Remove all the 'challengeValidation', 'difficultyValidation' and
'testDifficulty' BiPredicate method params from 'HashCashService' &
'ProofOfWorkService', to simplify the API. These were originally
included to aid testing, but turned out to be unnecessary.
Patches committed on behalf of @chimp1984.
Change the type of the 'difficulty' field in the Filter & ProofOfWork
proto objects from int32/bytes to double and make it use a linear scale,
in place of the original logarithmic scale which counts the (effective)
number of required zeros.
This allows fine-grained difficulty control for Equihash, though for
Hashcash it simply rounds up to the nearest power of 2 internally.
NOTE: This is a breaking change to PoW & filter serialisation (unlike
the earlier PR commits), as the proto field version nums aren't updated.
