tor/src/or/connection_or.c
Roger Dingledine 1b95bbdba6 New config option V2AuthoritativeDirectory that all directory
authorities should set. This will let future authorities choose 
not to serve V2 directory information.

Also, go through and revamp all the authdir_mode stuff so it tries
to do the right thing if you're an auth but not a V1 or V2 auth.


svn:r10092
2007-05-02 09:12:04 +00:00

816 lines
26 KiB
C

/* Copyright (c) 2001 Matej Pfajfar.
* Copyright (c) 2001-2004, Roger Dingledine.
* Copyright (c) 2004-2007, Roger Dingledine, Nick Mathewson. */
/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
/* $Id$ */
const char connection_or_c_id[] =
"$Id$";
/**
* \file connection_or.c
* \brief Functions to handle OR connections, TLS handshaking, and
* cells on the network.
**/
#include "or.h"
static int connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn);
static int connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn);
/**************************************************************/
/** Map from identity digest of connected OR or desired OR to a connection_t
* with that identity digest. If there is more than one such connection_t,
* they form a linked list, with next_with_same_id as the next pointer. */
static digestmap_t *orconn_identity_map = NULL;
/** If conn is listed in orconn_identity_map, remove it, and clear
* conn->identity_digest. Otherwise do nothing. */
void
connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(or_connection_t *conn)
{
or_connection_t *tmp;
tor_assert(conn);
if (!orconn_identity_map)
return;
tmp = digestmap_get(orconn_identity_map, conn->identity_digest);
if (!tmp) {
if (!tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest)) {
log_warn(LD_BUG, "Didn't find connection on identity map when "
"trying to remove it.");
}
return;
}
if (conn == tmp) {
if (conn->next_with_same_id)
digestmap_set(orconn_identity_map, conn->identity_digest,
conn->next_with_same_id);
else
digestmap_remove(orconn_identity_map, conn->identity_digest);
} else {
while (tmp->next_with_same_id) {
if (tmp->next_with_same_id == conn) {
tmp->next_with_same_id = conn->next_with_same_id;
break;
}
tmp = tmp->next_with_same_id;
}
}
memset(conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
conn->next_with_same_id = NULL;
}
/** Remove all entries from the identity-to-orconn map, and clear
* all identities in OR conns.*/
void
connection_or_clear_identity_map(void)
{
int i, n;
connection_t **carray;
get_connection_array(&carray,&n);
for (i = 0; i < n; ++i) {
connection_t* conn = carray[i];
if (conn->type == CONN_TYPE_OR) {
or_connection_t *or_conn = TO_OR_CONN(conn);
memset(or_conn->identity_digest, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
or_conn->next_with_same_id = NULL;
}
}
if (orconn_identity_map) {
digestmap_free(orconn_identity_map, NULL);
orconn_identity_map = NULL;
}
}
/** Change conn->identity_digest to digest, and add conn into
* orconn_digest_map. */
static void
connection_or_set_identity_digest(or_connection_t *conn, const char *digest)
{
or_connection_t *tmp;
tor_assert(conn);
tor_assert(digest);
if (!orconn_identity_map)
orconn_identity_map = digestmap_new();
if (!memcmp(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN))
return;
/* If the identity was set previously, remove the old mapping. */
if (! tor_digest_is_zero(conn->identity_digest))
connection_or_remove_from_identity_map(conn);
memcpy(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN);
/* If we're setting the ID to zero, don't add a mapping. */
if (tor_digest_is_zero(digest))
return;
tmp = digestmap_set(orconn_identity_map, digest, conn);
conn->next_with_same_id = tmp;
#if 1
/* Testing code to check for bugs in representation. */
for (; tmp; tmp = tmp->next_with_same_id) {
tor_assert(!memcmp(tmp->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
tor_assert(tmp != conn);
}
#endif
}
/** Pack the cell_t host-order structure <b>src</b> into network-order
* in the buffer <b>dest</b>. See tor-spec.txt for details about the
* wire format.
*/
void
cell_pack(packed_cell_t *dst, const cell_t *src)
{
char *dest = dst->body;
*(uint16_t*)dest = htons(src->circ_id);
*(uint8_t*)(dest+2) = src->command;
memcpy(dest+3, src->payload, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
}
/** Unpack the network-order buffer <b>src</b> into a host-order
* cell_t structure <b>dest</b>.
*/
static void
cell_unpack(cell_t *dest, const char *src)
{
dest->circ_id = ntohs(*(uint16_t*)(src));
dest->command = *(uint8_t*)(src+2);
memcpy(dest->payload, src+3, CELL_PAYLOAD_SIZE);
}
int
connection_or_reached_eof(or_connection_t *conn)
{
log_info(LD_OR,"OR connection reached EOF. Closing.");
connection_mark_for_close(TO_CONN(conn));
return 0;
}
/** Read conn's inbuf. If the http response from the proxy is all
* here, make sure it's good news, and begin the tls handshake. If
* it's bad news, close the connection and return -1. Else return 0
* and hope for better luck next time.
*/
static int
connection_or_read_proxy_response(or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
char *headers;
char *reason=NULL;
int status_code;
time_t date_header;
connection_t *conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
switch (fetch_from_buf_http(conn->inbuf,
&headers, MAX_HEADERS_SIZE,
NULL, NULL, 10000, 0)) {
case -1: /* overflow */
log_warn(LD_PROTOCOL,
"Your https proxy sent back an oversized response. Closing.");
return -1;
case 0:
log_info(LD_OR,"https proxy response not all here yet. Waiting.");
return 0;
/* case 1, fall through */
}
if (parse_http_response(headers, &status_code, &date_header,
NULL, &reason) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_OR,
"Unparseable headers from proxy (connecting to '%s'). Closing.",
conn->address);
tor_free(headers);
return -1;
}
if (!reason) reason = tor_strdup("[no reason given]");
if (status_code == 200) {
log_info(LD_OR,
"HTTPS connect to '%s' successful! (200 %s) Starting TLS.",
conn->address, escaped(reason));
tor_free(reason);
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/* else, bad news on the status code */
log_warn(LD_OR,
"The https proxy sent back an unexpected status code %d (%s). "
"Closing.",
status_code, escaped(reason));
tor_free(reason);
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
}
/** Handle any new bytes that have come in on connection <b>conn</b>.
* If conn is in 'open' state, hand it to
* connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf()
* (else do nothing).
*/
int
connection_or_process_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
switch (conn->_base.state) {
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_READING:
return connection_or_read_proxy_response(conn);
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
return connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(conn);
default:
return 0; /* don't do anything */
}
}
/** When adding cells to an OR connection's outbuf, keep adding until the
* outbuf is at least this long, or we run out of cells. */
#define OR_CONN_HIGHWATER (32*1024)
/** Add cells to an OR connection's outbuf whenever the outbuf's data length
* drops below this size. */
#define OR_CONN_LOWWATER (16*1024)
/** Called whenever we have flushed some data on an or_conn: add more data
* from active circuits. */
int
connection_or_flushed_some(or_connection_t *conn)
{
size_t datalen = buf_datalen(conn->_base.outbuf);
/* If we're under the low water mark, add cells until we're just over the
* high water mark. */
if (datalen < OR_CONN_LOWWATER) {
int n = (OR_CONN_HIGHWATER - datalen + CELL_NETWORK_SIZE-1)
/ CELL_NETWORK_SIZE;
while (conn->active_circuits && n > 0) {
int flushed = connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit(conn, 1);
n -= flushed;
}
}
return 0;
}
/** Connection <b>conn</b> has finished writing and has no bytes left on
* its outbuf.
*
* Otherwise it's in state "open": stop writing and return.
*
* If <b>conn</b> is broken, mark it for close and return -1, else
* return 0.
*/
int
connection_or_finished_flushing(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn);
assert_connection_ok(TO_CONN(conn),0);
switch (conn->_base.state) {
case OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_FLUSHING:
log_debug(LD_OR,"finished sending CONNECT to proxy.");
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_READING;
connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
break;
case OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN:
connection_stop_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
break;
default:
log_err(LD_BUG,"Called in unexpected state %d.", conn->_base.state);
tor_fragile_assert();
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Connected handler for OR connections: begin the TLS handshake.
*/
int
connection_or_finished_connecting(or_connection_t *or_conn)
{
connection_t *conn;
tor_assert(or_conn);
conn = TO_CONN(or_conn);
tor_assert(conn->state == OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING);
log_debug(LD_OR,"OR connect() to router at %s:%u finished.",
conn->address,conn->port);
if (get_options()->HttpsProxy) {
char buf[1024];
char addrbuf[INET_NTOA_BUF_LEN];
struct in_addr in;
char *base64_authenticator=NULL;
const char *authenticator = get_options()->HttpsProxyAuthenticator;
in.s_addr = htonl(conn->addr);
tor_inet_ntoa(&in, addrbuf, sizeof(addrbuf));
if (authenticator) {
base64_authenticator = alloc_http_authenticator(authenticator);
if (!base64_authenticator)
log_warn(LD_OR, "Encoding https authenticator failed");
}
if (base64_authenticator) {
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.1\r\n"
"Proxy-Authorization: Basic %s\r\n\r\n", addrbuf,
conn->port, base64_authenticator);
tor_free(base64_authenticator);
} else {
tor_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "CONNECT %s:%d HTTP/1.0\r\n\r\n",
addrbuf, conn->port);
}
connection_write_to_buf(buf, strlen(buf), conn);
conn->state = OR_CONN_STATE_PROXY_FLUSHING;
return 0;
}
if (connection_tls_start_handshake(or_conn, 0) < 0) {
/* TLS handshaking error of some kind. */
connection_mark_for_close(conn);
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** If we don't necessarily know the router we're connecting to, but we
* have an addr/port/id_digest, then fill in as much as we can. Start
* by checking to see if this describes a router we know. */
static void
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(or_connection_t *conn,
uint32_t addr, uint16_t port,
const char *id_digest,
int started_here)
{
or_options_t *options = get_options();
routerinfo_t *r = router_get_by_digest(id_digest);
conn->bandwidthrate = (int)options->BandwidthRate;
conn->read_bucket = conn->bandwidthburst = (int)options->BandwidthBurst;
connection_or_set_identity_digest(conn, id_digest);
conn->_base.addr = addr;
conn->_base.port = port;
if (r) {
if (!started_here) {
/* Override the addr/port, so our log messages will make sense.
* This is dangerous, since if we ever try looking up a conn by
* its actual addr/port, we won't remember. Careful! */
conn->_base.addr = r->addr;
conn->_base.port = r->or_port;
}
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(r->nickname);
tor_free(conn->_base.address);
conn->_base.address = tor_strdup(r->address);
} else {
const char *n;
/* If we're an authoritative directory server, we may know a
* nickname for this router. */
n = dirserv_get_nickname_by_digest(id_digest);
if (n) {
conn->nickname = tor_strdup(n);
} else {
conn->nickname = tor_malloc(HEX_DIGEST_LEN+2);
conn->nickname[0] = '$';
base16_encode(conn->nickname+1, HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1,
conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN);
}
tor_free(conn->_base.address);
conn->_base.address = tor_dup_addr(addr);
}
}
/** Return the best connection of type OR with the
* digest <b>digest</b> that we have, or NULL if we have none.
*
* 1) Don't return it if it's marked for close.
* 2) If there are any open conns, ignore non-open conns.
* 3) If there are any non-obsolete conns, ignore obsolete conns.
* 4) Then if there are any non-empty conns, ignore empty conns.
* 5) Of the remaining conns, prefer newer conns.
*/
or_connection_t *
connection_or_get_by_identity_digest(const char *digest)
{
int newer;
or_connection_t *conn, *best=NULL;
if (!orconn_identity_map)
return NULL;
conn = digestmap_get(orconn_identity_map, digest);
for (; conn; conn = conn->next_with_same_id) {
tor_assert(conn->_base.magic == OR_CONNECTION_MAGIC);
tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
tor_assert(!memcmp(conn->identity_digest, digest, DIGEST_LEN));
if (conn->_base.marked_for_close)
continue;
if (!best) {
best = conn; /* whatever it is, it's better than nothing. */
continue;
}
if (best->_base.state == OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN &&
conn->_base.state != OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN)
continue; /* avoid non-open conns if we can */
newer = best->_base.timestamp_created < conn->_base.timestamp_created;
if (!best->_base.or_is_obsolete && conn->_base.or_is_obsolete)
continue; /* We never prefer obsolete over non-obsolete connections. */
if (
/* We prefer non-obsolete connections: */
(best->_base.or_is_obsolete && !conn->_base.or_is_obsolete) ||
/* If both have circuits we prefer the newer: */
(best->n_circuits && conn->n_circuits && newer) ||
/* If neither has circuits we prefer the newer: */
(!best->n_circuits && !conn->n_circuits && newer) ||
/* We prefer connections with circuits: */
(!best->n_circuits && conn->n_circuits)) {
best = conn;
};
}
return best;
}
/** Launch a new OR connection to <b>addr</b>:<b>port</b> and expect to
* handshake with an OR with identity digest <b>id_digest</b>.
*
* If <b>id_digest</b> is me, do nothing. If we're already connected to it,
* return that connection. If the connect() is in progress, set the
* new conn's state to 'connecting' and return it. If connect() succeeds,
* call connection_tls_start_handshake() on it.
*
* This function is called from router_retry_connections(), for
* ORs connecting to ORs, and circuit_establish_circuit(), for
* OPs connecting to ORs.
*
* Return the launched conn, or NULL if it failed.
*/
or_connection_t *
connection_or_connect(uint32_t addr, uint16_t port, const char *id_digest)
{
or_connection_t *conn;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
tor_assert(id_digest);
if (server_mode(options) && router_digest_is_me(id_digest)) {
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Client asked me to connect to myself. Refusing.");
return NULL;
}
conn = TO_OR_CONN(connection_new(CONN_TYPE_OR));
/* set up conn so it's got all the data we need to remember */
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn, addr, port, id_digest, 1);
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_CONNECTING;
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_LAUNCHED, 0);
if (options->HttpsProxy) {
/* we shouldn't connect directly. use the https proxy instead. */
addr = options->HttpsProxyAddr;
port = options->HttpsProxyPort;
}
switch (connection_connect(TO_CONN(conn), conn->_base.address, addr, port)) {
case -1:
/* If the connection failed immediately, and we're using
* an https proxy, our https proxy is down. Don't blame the
* Tor server. */
if (!options->HttpsProxy) {
entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 0,
time(NULL));
router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0);
}
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
END_OR_CONN_REASON_TCP_REFUSED);
connection_free(TO_CONN(conn));
return NULL;
case 0:
connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), EV_READ | EV_WRITE);
/* writable indicates finish, readable indicates broken link,
error indicates broken link on windows */
return conn;
/* case 1: fall through */
}
if (connection_or_finished_connecting(conn) < 0) {
/* already marked for close */
return NULL;
}
return conn;
}
/** Begin the tls handshake with <b>conn</b>. <b>receiving</b> is 0 if
* we initiated the connection, else it's 1.
*
* Assign a new tls object to conn->tls, begin reading on <b>conn</b>, and
* pass <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_continue_handshake().
*
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
*/
int
connection_tls_start_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int receiving)
{
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_HANDSHAKING;
conn->tls = tor_tls_new(conn->_base.s, receiving);
if (!conn->tls) {
log_warn(LD_BUG,"tor_tls_new failed. Closing.");
return -1;
}
connection_start_reading(TO_CONN(conn));
log_debug(LD_OR,"starting TLS handshake on fd %d", conn->_base.s);
note_crypto_pk_op(receiving ? TLS_HANDSHAKE_S : TLS_HANDSHAKE_C);
if (connection_tls_continue_handshake(conn) < 0) {
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Move forward with the tls handshake. If it finishes, hand
* <b>conn</b> to connection_tls_finish_handshake().
*
* Return -1 if <b>conn</b> is broken, else return 0.
*/
int
connection_tls_continue_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
{
check_no_tls_errors();
switch (tor_tls_handshake(conn->tls)) {
CASE_TOR_TLS_ERROR_ANY:
log_info(LD_OR,"tls error. breaking connection.");
return -1;
case TOR_TLS_DONE:
return connection_tls_finish_handshake(conn);
case TOR_TLS_WANTWRITE:
connection_start_writing(TO_CONN(conn));
log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted write");
return 0;
case TOR_TLS_WANTREAD: /* handshaking conns are *always* reading */
log_debug(LD_OR,"wanted read");
return 0;
case TOR_TLS_CLOSE:
log_info(LD_OR,"tls closed. breaking connection.");
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** Return 1 if we initiated this connection, or 0 if it started
* out as an incoming connection.
*/
int
connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(or_connection_t *conn)
{
tor_assert(conn->_base.type == CONN_TYPE_OR);
if (!conn->tls)
return 1; /* it's still in proxy states or something */
return !tor_tls_is_server(conn->tls);
}
/** <b>Conn</b> just completed its handshake. Return 0 if all is well, and
* return -1 if he is lying, broken, or otherwise something is wrong.
*
* If we initiated this connection (<b>started_here</b> is true), make sure
* the other side sent sent a correctly formed certificate. If I initiated the
* connection, make sure it's the right guy.
*
* Otherwise (if we _didn't_ initiate this connection), it's okay for
* the certificate to be weird or absent.
*
* If we return 0, and the certificate is as expected, write a hash of the
* identity key into digest_rcvd, which must have DIGEST_LEN space in it. (If
* we return -1 this buffer is undefined.) If the certificate is invalid
* or missing on an incoming connection, we return 0 and set digest_rcvd to
* DIGEST_LEN 0 bytes.
*
* As side effects,
* 1) Set conn->circ_id_type according to tor-spec.txt.
* 2) If we're an authdirserver and we initiated the connection: drop all
* descriptors that claim to be on that IP/port but that aren't
* this guy; and note that this guy is reachable.
*/
static int
connection_or_check_valid_handshake(or_connection_t *conn, int started_here,
char *digest_rcvd)
{
crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd=NULL;
or_options_t *options = get_options();
int severity = server_mode(options) ? LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN : LOG_WARN;
const char *safe_address =
started_here ? conn->_base.address : safe_str(conn->_base.address);
const char *conn_type = started_here ? "outgoing" : "incoming";
int has_cert = 0, has_identity = 0;
check_no_tls_errors();
has_cert = tor_tls_peer_has_cert(conn->tls);
if (started_here && !has_cert) {
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but it didn't "
"send a cert! Closing.",
safe_address, conn->_base.port);
return -1;
} else if (!has_cert) {
log_debug(LD_PROTOCOL,"Got incoming connection with no certificate. "
"That's ok.");
}
check_no_tls_errors();
if (has_cert) {
int v = tor_tls_verify(started_here?severity:LOG_INFO,
conn->tls, &identity_rcvd);
if (started_here && v<0) {
log_fn(severity,LD_OR,"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d: It"
" has a cert but it's invalid. Closing.",
safe_address, conn->_base.port);
return -1;
} else if (v<0) {
log_info(LD_PROTOCOL,"Incoming connection gave us an invalid cert "
"chain; ignoring.");
} else {
log_debug(LD_OR,"The certificate seems to be valid on %s connection "
"with %s:%d", conn_type, safe_address, conn->_base.port);
}
check_no_tls_errors();
}
if (identity_rcvd) {
has_identity=1;
crypto_pk_get_digest(identity_rcvd, digest_rcvd);
if (crypto_pk_cmp_keys(get_identity_key(), identity_rcvd)<0) {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_LOWER;
} else {
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_HIGHER;
}
crypto_free_pk_env(identity_rcvd);
} else {
memset(digest_rcvd, 0, DIGEST_LEN);
conn->circ_id_type = CIRC_ID_TYPE_NEITHER;
}
if (started_here) {
int as_advertised = 1;
tor_assert(has_cert);
tor_assert(has_identity);
if (memcmp(digest_rcvd, conn->identity_digest, DIGEST_LEN)) {
/* I was aiming for a particular digest. I didn't get it! */
char seen[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
char expected[HEX_DIGEST_LEN+1];
base16_encode(seen, sizeof(seen), digest_rcvd, DIGEST_LEN);
base16_encode(expected, sizeof(expected), conn->identity_digest,
DIGEST_LEN);
log_fn(severity, LD_OR,
"Tried connecting to router at %s:%d, but identity key was not "
"as expected: wanted %s but got %s.",
conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port, expected, seen);
entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest,0,time(NULL));
router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 0);
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_FAILED,
END_OR_CONN_REASON_OR_IDENTITY);
as_advertised = 0;
}
if (authdir_mode_handles_descs(options)) {
/* We initiated this connection to address:port. Drop all routers
* with the same address:port and a different key.
*/
dirserv_orconn_tls_done(conn->_base.address, conn->_base.port,
digest_rcvd, as_advertised);
}
if (!as_advertised)
return -1;
}
return 0;
}
/** The tls handshake is finished.
*
* Make sure we are happy with the person we just handshaked with.
*
* If he initiated the connection, make sure he's not already connected,
* then initialize conn from the information in router.
*
* If all is successful, call circuit_n_conn_done() to handle events
* that have been pending on the <tls handshake completion. Also set the
* directory to be dirty (only matters if I'm an authdirserver).
*/
static int
connection_tls_finish_handshake(or_connection_t *conn)
{
char digest_rcvd[DIGEST_LEN];
int started_here = connection_or_nonopen_was_started_here(conn);
log_debug(LD_OR,"tls handshake done. verifying.");
if (connection_or_check_valid_handshake(conn, started_here, digest_rcvd) < 0)
return -1;
if (!started_here) {
connection_or_init_conn_from_address(conn,conn->_base.addr,
conn->_base.port, digest_rcvd, 0);
}
directory_set_dirty();
conn->_base.state = OR_CONN_STATE_OPEN;
control_event_or_conn_status(conn, OR_CONN_EVENT_CONNECTED, 0);
if (started_here) {
rep_hist_note_connect_succeeded(conn->identity_digest, time(NULL));
if (entry_guard_register_connect_status(conn->identity_digest, 1,
time(NULL)) < 0) {
/* pending circs get closed in circuit_about_to_close_connection() */
return -1;
}
router_set_status(conn->identity_digest, 1);
}
connection_watch_events(TO_CONN(conn), EV_READ);
circuit_n_conn_done(conn, 1); /* send the pending creates, if any. */
return 0;
}
/** Pack <b>cell</b> into wire-format, and write it onto <b>conn</b>'s outbuf.
* For cells that use or affect a circuit, this should only be called by
* connection_or_flush_from_first_active_circuit()
*/
void
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(const cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
{
packed_cell_t networkcell;
tor_assert(cell);
tor_assert(conn);
cell_pack(&networkcell, cell);
connection_write_to_buf(networkcell.body, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, TO_CONN(conn));
}
/** Process cells from <b>conn</b>'s inbuf.
*
* Loop: while inbuf contains a cell, pull it off the inbuf, unpack it,
* and hand it to command_process_cell().
*
* Always return 0.
*/
static int
connection_or_process_cells_from_inbuf(or_connection_t *conn)
{
char buf[CELL_NETWORK_SIZE];
cell_t cell;
loop:
log_debug(LD_OR,
"%d: starting, inbuf_datalen %d (%d pending in tls object).",
conn->_base.s,(int)buf_datalen(conn->_base.inbuf),
tor_tls_get_pending_bytes(conn->tls));
if (buf_datalen(conn->_base.inbuf) < CELL_NETWORK_SIZE) /* whole response
available? */
return 0; /* not yet */
connection_fetch_from_buf(buf, CELL_NETWORK_SIZE, TO_CONN(conn));
/* retrieve cell info from buf (create the host-order struct from the
* network-order string) */
cell_unpack(&cell, buf);
command_process_cell(&cell, conn);
goto loop; /* process the remainder of the buffer */
}
/** Write a destroy cell with circ ID <b>circ_id</b> and reason <b>reason</b>
* onto OR connection <b>conn</b>. Don't perform range-checking on reason:
* we may want to propagate reasons from other cells.
*
* Return 0.
*/
int
connection_or_send_destroy(uint16_t circ_id, or_connection_t *conn, int reason)
{
cell_t cell;
tor_assert(conn);
memset(&cell, 0, sizeof(cell_t));
cell.circ_id = circ_id;
cell.command = CELL_DESTROY;
cell.payload[0] = (uint8_t) reason;
log_debug(LD_OR,"Sending destroy (circID %d).", circ_id);
#if 0
/* XXXX020 Actually, don't kill the cell queue: it may have data that we're
* waiting to flush. We need to do something more sensible here. */
/* Clear the cell queue on the circuit, so that our destroy cell will
* be the very next thing written.*/
circ = circuit_get_by_circid_orconn(circ_id, conn);
circuit_clear_cell_queue(circ, conn);
#endif
connection_or_write_cell_to_buf(&cell, conn);
return 0;
}