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An adversary could let the first stream request succeed (ie the resolve), but then tag and timeout the remainder (via cell dropping), forcing them on new circuits. Rolling back the state will cause us to probe such circuits, which should lead to probe failures in the event of such tagging due to either unrecognized cells coming in while we wait for the probe, or the cipher state getting out of sync in the case of dropped cells. |
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ReleaseNotes |
Tor protects your privacy on the internet by hiding the connection between your Internet address and the services you use. We believe Tor is reasonably secure, but please ensure you read the instructions and configure it properly. To build Tor from source: ./configure && make && make install Home page: https://www.torproject.org/ Download new versions: https://www.torproject.org/download.html Documentation, including links to installation and setup instructions: https://www.torproject.org/documentation.html Making applications work with Tor: https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorifyHOWTO Frequently Asked Questions: https://www.torproject.org/faq.html https://wiki.torproject.org/noreply/TheOnionRouter/TorFAQ