We only need to rate limit reading on edges for flow control, as per the rate
that comes in the XON from the other side. When we rate limit reading from the
edge source to this rate, we will only deliver that fast to the other side,
thus satisfying its rate request.
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Relay do not accept both stores and lookups of version 2 descriptor.
This effectively disable version 2 HSDir supports for relays.
Part of #40476
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
Upon receiving a v2 introduction request, the relay will close the
circuit and send back a tor protocol error.
Part of #40476
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
The minimum service version is raised from 2 to 3 which effectively
disable loading or creating an onion service v2.
As for ADD_ONION, for version 2, a 551 error is returned:
"551 Failed to add Onion Service"
Part of #40476
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
This effectively turns off the ability of tor to use HSv2 as a client by
invalidating the v2 onion hostname passed through a SOCKS request.
Part of #40476
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
When building with --enable-fragile-hardening, add or relax Linux
seccomp rules to allow AddressSanitizer to execute normally if the
process terminates with the sandbox active.
Further resolves issue 11477.
We currently assume that the only way for Tor to listen on ports in the
privileged port range (1 to 1023), on Linux, is if we are granted the
NET_BIND_SERVICE capability. Today on Linux, it's possible to specify
the beginning of the unprivileged port range using a sysctl
configuration option. Docker (and thus the CI service Tor uses) recently
changed this sysctl value to 0, which causes our tests to fail as they
assume that we should NOT be able to bind to a privileged port *without*
the NET_BIND_SERVICE capability.
In this patch, we read the value of the sysctl value via the /proc/sys/
filesystem iff it's present, otherwise we assume the default
unprivileged port range begins at port 1024.
See: tor#40275
This code is based directly on the specification, without looking at
the reference implementation or the implementation in Arti.
Nonetheless, it is now passing with the test vectors generated by
the reference implementation.
When a directory request fails, we flag the relay as non Running so we
don't use it anymore.
This can be problematic with onion services because there are cases
where a tor instance could have a lot of services, ephemeral ones, and
keeps failing to upload descriptors, let say due to a bad network, and
thus flag a lot of nodes as non Running which then in turn can not be
used for circuit building.
This commit makes it that we never flag nodes as non Running on a onion
service directory request (upload or fetch) failure as to keep the
hashring intact and not affect other parts of tor.
Fortunately, the onion service hashring is _not_ selected by looking at
the Running flag but since we do a 3-hop circuit to the HSDir, other
services on the same instance can influence each other by removing nodes
from the consensus for path selection.
This was made apparent with a small network that ran out of nodes to
used due to rapid succession of onion services uploading and failing.
See #40434 for details.
Fixes#40434
Signed-off-by: David Goulet <dgoulet@torproject.org>
