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Give tor_cert_get_id_digests() fail-fast behavior
Right now we can take the digests only of an RSA key, and only expect to take the digests of an RSA key. The old tor_cert_get_id_digests() would return a good set of digests for an RSA key, and an all-zero one for a non-RSA key. This behavior is too error-prone: it carries the risk that we will someday check two non-RSA keys for equality and conclude that they must be equal because they both have the same (zero) "digest". Instead, let's have tor_cert_get_id_digests() return NULL for keys we can't handle, and make its callers explicitly test for NULL.
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40f0d111c2
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3 changed files with 24 additions and 6 deletions
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@ -102,6 +102,7 @@ struct tor_cert_t {
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X509 *cert;
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X509 *cert;
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uint8_t *encoded;
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uint8_t *encoded;
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size_t encoded_len;
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size_t encoded_len;
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unsigned pkey_digests_set : 1;
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digests_t cert_digests;
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digests_t cert_digests;
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digests_t pkey_digests;
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digests_t pkey_digests;
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};
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};
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@ -734,6 +735,7 @@ tor_cert_new(X509 *x509_cert)
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(rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
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(rsa = EVP_PKEY_get1_RSA(pkey))) {
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crypto_pk_env_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
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crypto_pk_env_t *pk = _crypto_new_pk_env_rsa(rsa);
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crypto_pk_get_all_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests);
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crypto_pk_get_all_digests(pk, &cert->pkey_digests);
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cert->pkey_digests_set = 1;
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crypto_free_pk_env(pk);
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crypto_free_pk_env(pk);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
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}
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}
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@ -794,11 +796,15 @@ tor_cert_get_der(const tor_cert_t *cert,
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*size_out = cert->encoded_len;
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*size_out = cert->encoded_len;
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}
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}
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/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
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/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>, or NULL if this
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* cert's public key is not one we know how to take the digest of. */
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const digests_t *
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const digests_t *
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tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
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tor_cert_get_id_digests(const tor_cert_t *cert)
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{
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{
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return &cert->pkey_digests;
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if (cert->pkey_digests_set)
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return &cert->pkey_digests;
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else
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return NULL;
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}
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}
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/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
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/** Return a set of digests for the public key in <b>cert</b>. */
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@ -939,8 +939,12 @@ command_process_cert_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
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conn->handshake_state->authenticated = 1;
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{
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{
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crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
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const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
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const digests_t *id_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
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crypto_pk_env_t *identity_rcvd;
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if (!id_digests)
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ERR("Couldn't compute digests for key in ID cert");
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identity_rcvd = tor_tls_cert_get_key(id_cert);
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memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
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memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
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id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
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id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
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connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
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connection_or_set_circid_type(conn, identity_rcvd);
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@ -1172,6 +1176,9 @@ command_process_authenticate_cell(var_cell_t *cell, or_connection_t *conn)
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const digests_t *id_digests =
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const digests_t *id_digests =
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tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
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tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
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/* This must exist; we checked key type when reading the cert. */
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tor_assert(id_digests);
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memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
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memcpy(conn->handshake_state->authenticated_peer_id,
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id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
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id_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA1], DIGEST_LEN);
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@ -2060,12 +2060,17 @@ connection_or_compute_authenticate_cell_body(or_connection_t *conn,
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{
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{
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const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
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const tor_cert_t *id_cert=NULL, *link_cert=NULL;
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const digests_t *my_digests, *their_digests;
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const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
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const uint8_t *my_id, *their_id, *client_id, *server_id;
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if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert, &id_cert))
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if (tor_tls_get_my_certs(0, &link_cert, &id_cert))
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return -1;
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return -1;
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my_id = (uint8_t*)tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
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my_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(id_cert);
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their_id = (uint8_t*)
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their_digests = tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert);
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tor_cert_get_id_digests(conn->handshake_state->id_cert)->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
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tor_assert(my_digests);
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tor_assert(their_digests);
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my_id = (uint8_t*)my_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
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their_id = (uint8_t*)their_digests->d[DIGEST_SHA256];
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client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
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client_id = server ? their_id : my_id;
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server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
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server_id = server ? my_id : their_id;
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