mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2025-02-23 22:47:12 +01:00
Merge branch 'sandbox-aarch64-riscv-fixes' into 'main'
Fix sandbox on AArch64, RISC-V Closes #24454 See merge request tpo/core/tor!446
This commit is contained in:
David Goulet
commit
ca9ca6da04
3 changed files with 232 additions and 73 deletions
6
changes/bug40465
Normal file
6
changes/bug40465
Normal file
|
|
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
|||
o Major bugfixes (sandbox):
|
||||
- Fix sandbox to work on architectures that use Linux's generic syscall
|
||||
interface, extending support for AArch64 (ARM64) and adding support for
|
||||
RISC-V, allowing test_include.sh and the sandbox unit tests to pass on
|
||||
these systems even when building with fragile hardening enabled. Fixes
|
||||
bugs 40465 and 40599; bugfix on 0.2.5.1-alpha.
|
||||
|
|
@ -125,6 +125,15 @@
|
|||
#define SYSCALL_NAME_DEBUGGING
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* On newer architectures Linux provides a standardized, generic set of system
|
||||
* calls (defined in Linux's include/uapi/asm-generic/unistd.h), which omits a
|
||||
* number of legacy calls used by glibc on other platforms.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__riscv)
|
||||
#define ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/**Determines if at least one sandbox is active.*/
|
||||
static int sandbox_active = 0;
|
||||
/** Holds the parameter list configuration for the sandbox.*/
|
||||
|
|
@ -263,8 +272,9 @@ static int filter_nopar_gen[] = {
|
|||
#ifdef __NR_sigreturn
|
||||
SCMP_SYS(sigreturn),
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(__NR_stat)
|
||||
SCMP_SYS(stat),
|
||||
#if defined(__i386__) && defined(__NR_statx)
|
||||
#elif defined(__i386__) && defined(__NR_statx)
|
||||
SCMP_SYS(statx),
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
SCMP_SYS(uname),
|
||||
|
|
@ -335,6 +345,8 @@ static int filter_nopar_gen[] = {
|
|||
seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),3,(f1),(f2),(f3))
|
||||
#define seccomp_rule_add_4(ctx,act,call,f1,f2,f3,f4) \
|
||||
seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),4,(f1),(f2),(f3),(f4))
|
||||
#define seccomp_rule_add_5(ctx,act,call,f1,f2,f3,f4,f5) \
|
||||
seccomp_rule_add((ctx),(act),(call),4,(f1),(f2),(f3),(f4),(f5))
|
||||
|
||||
static const char *sandbox_get_interned_string(const char *str);
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -516,18 +528,33 @@ is_libc_at_least(int major, int minor)
|
|||
static int
|
||||
libc_uses_openat_for_open(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_open
|
||||
return is_libc_at_least(2, 26);
|
||||
#else
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__NR_open) */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Calls to opendir() cannot be filtered by the sandbox when built with fragile
|
||||
* hardening for an architecture that uses Linux's generic syscall interface,
|
||||
* so prevent a compiler warning by omitting this function along with
|
||||
* sb_opendir(). */
|
||||
#if !(defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) && defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS))
|
||||
/* Return true if we think we're running with a libc that uses openat for the
|
||||
* opendir function on linux. */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
libc_uses_openat_for_opendir(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_open
|
||||
// libc 2.27 and above or between 2.15 (inclusive) and 2.22 (exclusive)
|
||||
return is_libc_at_least(2, 27) ||
|
||||
(is_libc_at_least(2, 15) && !is_libc_at_least(2, 22));
|
||||
#else
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__NR_open) */
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* !(defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) &&
|
||||
defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)) */
|
||||
|
||||
/** Allow a single file to be opened. If <b>use_openat</b> is true,
|
||||
* we're using a libc that remaps all the opens into openats. */
|
||||
|
|
@ -557,10 +584,25 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
int use_openat = libc_uses_openat_for_open();
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING
|
||||
/* AddressSanitizer uses the "open" syscall to access information about the
|
||||
* running process via the filesystem, so that call must be allowed without
|
||||
/* AddressSanitizer uses either the "open" or the "openat" syscall (depending
|
||||
* on the architecture) to access information about the running process via
|
||||
* the filesystem, so the appropriate call must be allowed without
|
||||
* restriction or the sanitizer will be unable to execute normally when the
|
||||
* process terminates. */
|
||||
#ifdef ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(openat),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add openat syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* The "open" syscall is not defined on this architecture, so any other
|
||||
* requests to open files will necessarily use "openat" as well and there is
|
||||
* no need to consider any additional rules. */
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_0(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(open));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add open syscall, received "
|
||||
|
|
@ -572,7 +614,8 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
* there is no need to consider any additional rules. */
|
||||
if (!use_openat)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS) */
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) */
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
|
|
@ -592,31 +635,7 @@ sb_open(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_chmod(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
||||
== SCMP_SYS(chmod)) {
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(chmod),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add chmod syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_fchmodat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -642,8 +661,60 @@ sb_fchmodat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_chmod(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __i386__
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
||||
== SCMP_SYS(chmod)) {
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_1(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(chmod),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add chmod syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS) */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_fchownat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
||||
== SCMP_SYS(fchownat)) {
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchownat syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#elif defined(__i386__)
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_chown32(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
|
@ -693,34 +764,9 @@ sb_chown(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__i386__) */
|
||||
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_fchownat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && param->syscall
|
||||
== SCMP_SYS(fchownat)) {
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(fchownat),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add fchownat syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS) || defined(__i386__) */
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__NR_rename)
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the rename syscall for
|
||||
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
||||
|
|
@ -751,7 +797,7 @@ sb_rename(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#elif defined(__NR_renameat)
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the renameat syscall for
|
||||
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
||||
|
|
@ -784,7 +830,53 @@ sb_renameat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#else
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the renameat2 syscall for
|
||||
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_renameat2(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc;
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 &&
|
||||
param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(renameat2)) {
|
||||
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_5(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(renameat2),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(2, AT_FDCWD),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(3, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value2),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP(4, SCMP_CMP_EQ, 0));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add renameat2 syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__NR_rename) || defined(__NR_renameat) */
|
||||
|
||||
/* If Tor is built with fragile hardening for an architecture that uses Linux's
|
||||
* generic syscall interface a rule allowing the "openat" syscall without
|
||||
* restriction will have already been added by sb_open(), so there is no need
|
||||
* to consider adding additional, more restrictive rules here as they will
|
||||
* simply be ignored.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Also, since the "open" syscall is not defined on these architectures, glibc
|
||||
* will necessarily use "openat" for its implementation of opendir() as well.
|
||||
* This means neither of the following two functions will have any effect and
|
||||
* both can be omitted. */
|
||||
#if !(defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) && defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS))
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the openat syscall for
|
||||
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
||||
|
|
@ -840,6 +932,8 @@ sb_opendir(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* !(defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) &&
|
||||
defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)) */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING
|
||||
/**
|
||||
|
|
@ -859,9 +953,17 @@ sb_ptrace(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
/* AddressSanitizer uses "PTRACE_GETREGSET" on AArch64 (ARM64) and
|
||||
* System/390, "PTRACE_GETREGS" everywhere else. */
|
||||
#if defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__s390__)
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ptrace),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTRACE_GETREGSET),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, pid));
|
||||
#else
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(ptrace),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP(0, SCMP_CMP_EQ, PTRACE_GETREGS),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, pid));
|
||||
#endif /* defined(__aarch64__) || defined(__s390__) */
|
||||
if (rc)
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1351,6 +1453,40 @@ sb_mremap(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
|||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the newfstatat syscall for
|
||||
* the seccomp filter sandbox.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int
|
||||
sb_newfstatat(scmp_filter_ctx ctx, sandbox_cfg_t *filter)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rc = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
sandbox_cfg_t *elem = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
// for each dynamic parameter filters
|
||||
for (elem = filter; elem != NULL; elem = elem->next) {
|
||||
smp_param_t *param = elem->param;
|
||||
|
||||
if (param != NULL && param->prot == 1 && (param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(open)
|
||||
|| param->syscall == PHONY_OPENDIR_SYSCALL
|
||||
|| param->syscall == SCMP_SYS(newfstatat))) {
|
||||
rc = seccomp_rule_add_2(ctx, SCMP_ACT_ALLOW, SCMP_SYS(newfstatat),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_LOWER32_EQ(0, AT_FDCWD),
|
||||
SCMP_CMP_STR(1, SCMP_CMP_EQ, param->value));
|
||||
if (rc != 0) {
|
||||
log_err(LD_BUG,"(Sandbox) failed to add newfstatat syscall, received "
|
||||
"libseccomp error %d", rc);
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS) */
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Function responsible for setting up the stat64 syscall for
|
||||
|
|
@ -1409,22 +1545,33 @@ static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
|
|||
#ifdef __NR_mmap2
|
||||
sb_mmap2,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef __i386__
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
sb_fchownat,
|
||||
#elif defined(__i386__)
|
||||
sb_chown32,
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sb_chown,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
sb_fchownat,
|
||||
sb_chmod,
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
sb_fchmodat,
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sb_chmod,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
sb_open,
|
||||
#if !(defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) && defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS))
|
||||
sb_openat,
|
||||
sb_opendir,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING
|
||||
sb_ptrace,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#if defined(__NR_rename)
|
||||
sb_rename,
|
||||
#elif defined(__NR_renameat)
|
||||
sb_renameat,
|
||||
#else
|
||||
sb_renameat2,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_fcntl64
|
||||
sb_fcntl64,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
|
@ -1434,7 +1581,9 @@ static sandbox_filter_func_t filter_func[] = {
|
|||
sb_flock,
|
||||
sb_futex,
|
||||
sb_mremap,
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
sb_newfstatat,
|
||||
#elif defined(__NR_stat64)
|
||||
sb_stat64,
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
@ -1690,27 +1839,31 @@ new_element(int syscall, char *value)
|
|||
return new_element2(syscall, value, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __i386__
|
||||
#define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(chown32)
|
||||
#elif defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
#define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(fchownat)
|
||||
#elif defined(__i386__)
|
||||
#define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(chown32)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define SCMP_chown SCMP_SYS(chown)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
#define SCMP_chmod SCMP_SYS(fchmodat)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define SCMP_chmod SCMP_SYS(chmod)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#if defined(__aarch64__) && defined(__LP64__)
|
||||
#if defined(__NR_rename)
|
||||
#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(rename)
|
||||
#elif defined(__NR_renameat)
|
||||
#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(renameat)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(rename)
|
||||
#define SCMP_rename SCMP_SYS(renameat2)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __NR_stat64
|
||||
#if defined(ARCH_USES_GENERIC_SYSCALLS)
|
||||
#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(newfstatat)
|
||||
#elif defined(__NR_stat64)
|
||||
#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat64)
|
||||
#else
|
||||
#define SCMP_stat SCMP_SYS(stat)
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
|
|
@ -364,22 +364,22 @@ test_sandbox_crypto_equix(void *arg)
|
|||
struct testcase_t sandbox_tests[] = {
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST(is_active, TT_FORK),
|
||||
|
||||
/* When Tor is built with fragile compiler-hardening the sandbox is unable to
|
||||
* filter requests to open files or directories (on systems where glibc uses
|
||||
* the "open" system call to provide this functionality), as doing so would
|
||||
/* When Tor is built with fragile compiler-hardening the sandbox is usually
|
||||
* unable to filter requests to open files or directories, as doing so would
|
||||
* interfere with the address sanitizer as it retrieves information about the
|
||||
* running process via the filesystem. Skip these tests in that case as the
|
||||
* corresponding functions are likely to have no effect and this will cause the
|
||||
* tests to fail. */
|
||||
#ifdef ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_SKIPPED(open_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_SKIPPED(openat_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_SKIPPED(opendir_dirname),
|
||||
#else
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(open_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(openat_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(opendir_dirname),
|
||||
#endif /* defined(ENABLE_FRAGILE_HARDENING) */
|
||||
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(openat_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(chmod_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(chown_filename),
|
||||
SANDBOX_TEST_IN_SANDBOX(rename_filename),
|
||||
|
|
|
|||
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue