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r12212@catbus: nickm | 2007-03-17 17:05:54 -0400
Merge or-dev discussion into 109; mark 109 accepted. svn:r9864
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@ -27,6 +27,6 @@ Proposals by number:
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106 Checking fewer things during TLS handshakes [CLOSED]
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107 Uptime Sanity Checking [CLOSED]
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108 Base "Stable" Flag on Mean Time Between Failures [OPEN]
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109 No more than one server per IP address [OPEN]
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109 No more than one server per IP address [ACCEPTED]
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110 Avoiding infinite length circuits [OPEN]
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111 Prioritizing local traffic over relayed traffic [OPEN]
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@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ Version:
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Last-Modified:
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Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
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Created: 9-March-2007
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Status: Open
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Status: Accepted
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Overview:
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This document describes a solution to a Sybil attack vulnerability in the
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@ -30,9 +30,24 @@ Security implications:
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attacker must control in order to carry out traffic analysis.
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Specification:
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We propose that the directory servers check if an incoming Tor router IP
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address is already registered under another router. If this is the case,
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then prevent the new router from joining the network.
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For each IP address, each directory authority tracks the number of routers
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using that IP address, along with their total observed bandwidth. If there
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are more than MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP servers at some IP, the authority should
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"disable" all but MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP servers. If the total observed
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bandwidth of the remaining non-"disabled" servers exceeds MAX_BW_PER_IP,
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the authority should "disable" some of the remaining servers until only one
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server remains, or until the remaining observed bandwidth of non-"disabled"
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servers is under MAX_BW_PER_IP. When choosing which servers to disable,
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the authority should first disable non-Running servers in increasing order
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of observed bandwidth, and then should disable Running servers in
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increasing order of bandwidth.
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Servers that are "disabled" MUST be marked as non-Valid and non-Running.
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MAX_SERVERS_PER_IP is 3.
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MAX_BW_PER_IP is 8 MB per s.
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Compatibility:
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@ -66,17 +81,3 @@ Compatibility:
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would only make use of a bit of it. So Roger suggested that he run
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two Tor servers, to use more.
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Alternatives:
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Roger suggested that instead of capping number of servers per IP to 1, we
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should cap total declared bandwidth per IP to some N, and total declared
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servers to some M. (He suggested N=5MB/s and M=5.) Directory authorities
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would then always choose to keep the highest-bandwidth running servers
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-- if they pick based on time joining the network we can get into bad
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race conditions.
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Roger also suggested that rather than not listing servers, we mark them as
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not Running. (He originally suggested marking them as Running but not
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Valid, but that would still allow an attacker to control an arbitrary
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number of middle hops, which is still likely to be worrisome.)
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