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Merge branch 'bug21018_024' into maint-0.2.8

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2016-12-19 07:58:21 -05:00
commit c11de4c45f
3 changed files with 17 additions and 4 deletions
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11
changes/bug21018 Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,11 @@
o Major bugfixes (parsing, security):
- Fix a bug in parsing that could cause clients to read a single
byte past the end of an allocated region. This bug could be
used to cause hardened clients (built with
--enable-expensive-hardening) to crash if they tried to visit
a hostile hidden service. Non-hardened clients are only
affected depending on the details of their platform's memory
allocator. Fixes bug 21018; bugfix on 0.2.0.8-alpha. Found by
using libFuzzer. Also tracked as TROVE-2016-12-002 and as
CVE-2016-1254.

4
src/or/rendcache.c
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@ -915,7 +915,9 @@ rend_cache_store_v2_desc_as_client(const char *desc,
if (n_intro_points <= 0) { if (n_intro_points <= 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the " log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to parse introduction points. Either the "
"service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have " "service has published a corrupt descriptor or you have "
"provided invalid authorization data."); "provided invalid authorization data, or (maybe!) the "
"server is deliberately serving broken data in an attempt "
"to crash you with bug 21018.");
goto err; goto err;
} else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) { } else if (n_intro_points > MAX_INTRO_POINTS) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden " log_warn(LD_REND, "Found too many introduction points on a hidden "

6
src/or/routerparse.c
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@ -4122,7 +4122,7 @@ get_next_token(memarea_t *area,
if (tok->tp == ERR_) { if (tok->tp == ERR_) {
/* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */ /* No keyword matched; call it an "K_opt" or "A_unrecognized" */
if (**s == '@') if (*s < eol && **s == '@')
tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_; tok->tp = A_UNKNOWN_;
else else
tok->tp = K_OPT; tok->tp = K_OPT;
@ -5171,7 +5171,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted,
crypto_cipher_free(cipher); crypto_cipher_free(cipher);
len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN; len = ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len - CIPHER_IV_LEN;
dec = tor_malloc(len); dec = tor_malloc_zero(len + 1);
declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len, declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(session_key, dec, len,
ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len, ipos_encrypted + 2 + client_entries_len,
ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len); ipos_encrypted_size - 2 - client_entries_len);
@ -5203,7 +5203,7 @@ rend_decrypt_introduction_points(char **ipos_decrypted,
"small."); "small.");
return -1; return -1;
} }
dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1); dec = tor_malloc_zero(ipos_encrypted_size - CIPHER_IV_LEN - 1 + 1);
declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec, declen = crypto_cipher_decrypt_with_iv(descriptor_cookie, dec,
ipos_encrypted_size - ipos_encrypted_size -