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some cleanups, and cite SS03

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svn:r1050
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Roger Dingledine 2004-02-01 20:44:28 +00:00
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doc/tor-design.tex
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@ -1,4 +1,3 @@
% XXX Cite SS03
\documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article}
\usepackage{latex8}
@ -212,11 +211,15 @@ security, and became useless if any node in the path went down
or rotated its keys. In Tor, clients negotiate {\it rendezvous points}
to connect with hidden servers; reply onions are no longer required.
Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not require OS kernel
patches or network stack support. This prevents us from anonymizing
non-TCP protocols, but has greatly helped our portability and
deployability.
Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor does not anonymize
non-TCP protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an
operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's
portability and deployability.
%Unlike Freedom~\cite{freedom2-arch}, Tor only anonymizes
%TCP-based protocols---not requiring patches (or built-in support) in an
%operating system's network stack has been valuable to Tor's
%portability and deployability.
We have implemented all of the above features except rendezvous
points. Our source code is
@ -227,7 +230,7 @@ earlier versions of Onion Routing.
We have deployed a wide-area alpha network
to test the design, to get more experience with usability
and users, and to provide a research platform for experimentation.
As of this writing, the network stands at sixteen nodes in thirteen
As of this writing, the network stands at eighteen nodes in thirteen
distinct administrative domains on two continents.
We review previous work in Section~\ref{sec:related-work}, describe
@ -273,7 +276,8 @@ delivery confirmation. But because these designs typically
involve many packets that must be delivered quickly, it is
difficult for them to prevent an attacker who can eavesdrop both ends of the
communication from correlating the timing and volume
of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it. These
of traffic entering the anonymity network with traffic leaving it \cite{SS03}.
These
protocols are similarly vulnerable to an active adversary who introduces
timing patterns into traffic entering the network and looks
for correlated patterns among exiting traffic.
@ -1520,8 +1524,8 @@ in~\cite{mix-acc}.\\
\Section{Early experiences: Tor in the Wild}
\label{sec:in-the-wild}
As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 17 nodes
(15 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code
As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 18 nodes
(16 in the US, 2 in Europe), and more are joining each week as the code
matures.\footnote{For comparison, the current remailer network
has about 30 reliable nodes. We haven't asked PlanetLab to provide
Tor nodes, since their AUP wouldn't allow exit nodes (see