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some minor cleanups before i move a bnuch of sections

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svn:r3581
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Roger Dingledine 2005-02-08 07:37:30 +00:00
parent 42bbd86276
commit 9d653b47fc
1 changed files with 11 additions and 14 deletions
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25
doc/design-paper/challenges.tex
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@ -423,8 +423,7 @@ financial health as well as network security.
% this para should probably move to the scalability / directory system. -RD
% Nope. Cut for space, except for small comment added above -PFS
\section{Crossroads: Policy issues}
\label{sec:crossroads-policy}
\section{Policy issues}
Many of the issues the Tor project needs to address extend beyond
system design and technology development. In particular, the
@ -802,8 +801,7 @@ time.
%[XXX Mention correct DNS-RBL implementation. -NM]
\section{Crossroads: Design choices}
\label{sec:crossroads-design}
\section{Design choices}
In addition to social issues, Tor also faces some design challenges that must
be addressed as the network develops.
@ -969,15 +967,15 @@ reveal the path taken by large traffic flows under low-usage circumstances.
\label{subsec:helper-nodes}
It has been thought for some time that the best anonymity protection
comes from running your own node~\cite{or-pet00,tor-design}.
(In fact, in Onion Routing's first design, this was the only option
possible~\cite{or-ih96}.) While the first implementation
comes from running your own node~\cite{tor-design,or-pet00}.
(In fact, this was the only option in the earliest Onion Routing
design~\cite{or-ih96}.) While the first implementation
had a fixed path length of five nodes, first generation
Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen
Onion Routing design included random length routes chosen
to simultaneously maximize efficiency and unpredictability in routes.
If one followed Tor's three node default
path length, an enclave-to-enclave communication (in which the entry and
exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves)
exit nodes were run by enclaves themselves)
would be completely compromised by the
middle node. Thus for enclave-to-enclave communication, four is the fewest
number of nodes that preserves the $\frac{c^2}{n^2}$ degree of protection
@ -1188,8 +1186,7 @@ trust decisions than the Tor developers.
%RIAA; less so if threat is to application data or individuals or...
\section{Scaling}
%\label{sec:crossroads-scaling}
%P2P + anonymity issues:
\label{sec:scaling}
Tor is running today with hundreds of nodes and tens of thousands of
users, but it will certainly not scale to millions.
@ -1486,16 +1483,16 @@ this stage if the developers stopped actively working on it. We may get
an unexpected boon from the fact that we're a general-purpose overlay
network: as Tor grows more popular, other groups who need an overlay
network on the Internet are starting to adapt Tor to their needs.
%
Second, Tor is only one of many components that preserve privacy online.
To keep identifying information out of application traffic, we must build
more and better protocol-aware proxies that are usable by ordinary people.
%
Third, we need to gain a reputation for social good, and learn how to
coexist with the variety of Internet services and their established
authentication mechanisms. We can't just keep escalating the blacklist
standoff forever.
%
Fourth, as described in Section~\ref{sec:scaling}, the current Tor
architecture does not scale even to handle current user demand. We must
find designs and incentives to let clients relay traffic too, without