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switch tor-design to usenix format
svn:r1381
This commit is contained in:
Roger Dingledine
parent
96ebb0bc88
commit
94f048c248
@ -1,7 +1,10 @@
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\documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article}
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\usepackage{latex8}
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\usepackage{times}
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\documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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\usepackage{usenix}
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%\documentclass[times,10pt,twocolumn]{article}
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%\usepackage{latex8}
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%\usepackage{times}
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\usepackage{url}
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\usepackage{graphics}
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\usepackage{amsmath}
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@ -81,7 +84,7 @@ We close with a list of open problems in anonymous communication.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\Section{Overview}
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\section{Overview}
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\label{sec:intro}
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Onion Routing is a distributed overlay network designed to anonymize
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@ -245,7 +248,7 @@ Routing project in Section~\ref{sec:conclusion}.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\Section{Related work}
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\section{Related work}
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\label{sec:related-work}
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Modern anonymity systems date to Chaum's {\bf Mix-Net}
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@ -398,7 +401,7 @@ Eternity and Free~Haven.
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% didn't include rewebbers. No clear place to put them, so I'll leave
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% them out for now. -RD
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\Section{Design goals and assumptions}
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\section{Design goals and assumptions}
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\label{sec:assumptions}
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\noindent{\large\bf Goals}\\
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@ -483,7 +486,7 @@ provided by an external service if appropriate.
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\textbf{Not steganographic:} Tor does not try to conceal who is connected
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to the network.
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\SubSection{Threat Model}
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\subsection{Threat Model}
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\label{subsec:threat-model}
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A global passive adversary is the most commonly assumed threat when
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@ -529,7 +532,7 @@ each of these attacks.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\Section{The Tor Design}
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\section{The Tor Design}
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\label{sec:design}
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The Tor network is an overlay network; each onion router (OR)
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@ -575,7 +578,7 @@ Finally,
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Section~\ref{subsec:congestion} talks about congestion control and
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fairness issues.
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\SubSection{Cells}
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\subsection{Cells}
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\label{subsec:cells}
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Onion routers communicate with one another, and with users' OPs, via
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@ -628,7 +631,7 @@ in more detail below.
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\end{picture}
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\end{figure}
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\SubSection{Circuits and streams}
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\subsection{Circuits and streams}
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\label{subsec:circuits}
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Onion Routing originally built one circuit for each
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@ -786,7 +789,7 @@ node can send a \emph{relay truncated} cell back to Alice. Thus the
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``break a node and see which circuits go down''
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attack~\cite{freedom21-security} is weakened.
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\SubSection{Opening and closing streams}
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\subsection{Opening and closing streams}
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\label{subsec:tcp}
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When Alice's application wants a TCP connection to a given
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@ -840,7 +843,7 @@ connections.
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% such as broken HTTP clients that close their side of the
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%stream after writing but are still willing to read.
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\SubSection{Integrity checking on streams}
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\subsection{Integrity checking on streams}
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\label{subsec:integrity-checking}
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Because the old Onion Routing design used a stream cipher without integrity
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@ -897,7 +900,7 @@ is
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acceptably low, given that Alice or Bob tear down the circuit if they
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receive a bad hash.
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\SubSection{Rate limiting and fairness}
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\subsection{Rate limiting and fairness}
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\label{subsec:rate-limit}
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Volunteers are more willing to run services that can limit
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@ -934,7 +937,7 @@ attack, but an adversary observing both
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ends of the stream can already learn this information through timing
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attacks.
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\SubSection{Congestion control}
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\subsection{Congestion control}
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\label{subsec:congestion}
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Even with bandwidth rate limiting, we still need to worry about
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@ -995,7 +998,7 @@ to be flushed is under some threshold (currently 10 cells' worth).
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These arbitrarily chosen parameters seem to give tolerable throughput
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and delay; see Section~\ref{sec:in-the-wild}.
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\SubSection{Rendezvous Points and hidden services}
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\subsection{Rendezvous Points and hidden services}
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\label{subsec:rendezvous}
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Rendezvous points are a building block for \emph{location-hidden
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@ -1043,10 +1046,10 @@ In Appendix~\ref{sec:rendezvous-specifics} we provide a more detailed
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description of the rendezvous protocol, integration issues, attacks,
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and related rendezvous work.
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\Section{Other design decisions}
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\section{Other design decisions}
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\label{sec:other-design}
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\SubSection{Resource management and denial-of-service}
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\subsection{Resource management and denial-of-service}
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\label{subsec:dos}
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Providing Tor as a public service creates many opportunities for
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@ -1094,7 +1097,7 @@ disrupted. This solution would require more buffering at the network
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edges, however, and the performance and anonymity implications from this
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extra complexity still require investigation.
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\SubSection{Exit policies and abuse}
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\subsection{Exit policies and abuse}
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\label{subsec:exitpolicies}
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% originally, we planned to put the "users only know the hostname,
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@ -1189,7 +1192,7 @@ unsolved problem, and will probably remain an arms race for the
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foreseeable future. The abuse problems faced by Princeton's CoDeeN
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project~\cite{darkside} give us a glimpse of likely issues.
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\SubSection{Directory Servers}
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\subsection{Directory Servers}
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\label{subsec:dirservers}
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First-generation Onion Routing designs~\cite{freedom2-arch,or-jsac98} used
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@ -1295,7 +1298,7 @@ forcing clients to periodically announce their existence to any
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central point.
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\Section{Attacks and Defenses}
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\section{Attacks and Defenses}
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\label{sec:attacks}
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Below we summarize a variety of attacks, and discuss how well our
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@ -1521,7 +1524,7 @@ servers must actively test ORs by building circuits and streams as
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appropriate. The tradeoffs of a similar approach are discussed
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in~\cite{mix-acc}.\\
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\Section{Early experiences: Tor in the Wild}
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\section{Early experiences: Tor in the Wild}
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\label{sec:in-the-wild}
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As of mid-January 2004, the Tor network consists of 18 nodes
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@ -1610,7 +1613,7 @@ nodes and maybe 10,000 users before we're forced to become
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more distributed. With luck, the experience we gain running the current
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topology will help us choose among alternatives when the time comes.
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\Section{Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity}
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\section{Open Questions in Low-latency Anonymity}
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\label{sec:maintaining-anonymity}
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In addition to the non-goals in
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@ -1718,7 +1721,7 @@ a higher churn rate.
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
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\Section{Future Directions}
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\section{Future Directions}
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\label{sec:conclusion}
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Tor brings together many innovations into a unified deployable system. The
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@ -1823,7 +1826,7 @@ our overall usability.
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\newpage
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\appendix
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\Section{Rendezvous points and hidden services}
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\section{Rendezvous points and hidden services}
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\label{sec:rendezvous-specifics}
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In this appendix we provide specifics about the rendezvous points
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@ -1910,7 +1913,7 @@ for consulting the DHT\@. All of these approaches
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limit exposure even when
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some selected users collude in the DoS\@.
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\SubSection{Integration with user applications}
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\subsection{Integration with user applications}
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Bob configures his onion proxy to know the local IP address and port of his
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service, a strategy for authorizing clients, and a public key. Bob
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98
doc/usenix.sty
Normal file
98
doc/usenix.sty
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@ -0,0 +1,98 @@
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% usenix-2e.sty - to be used with latex2e (the new one) for USENIX.
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% To use this style file, do this:
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%
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% \documentclass[twocolumn]{article}
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% \usepackage{usenix-2e}
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% and put {\rm ....} around the author names.
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%
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% $Id$
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%
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% The following definitions are modifications of standard article.sty
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% definitions, arranged to do a better job of matching the USENIX
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% guidelines.
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% It will automatically select two-column mode and the Times-Roman
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% font.
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%
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% USENIX papers are two-column.
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% Times-Roman font is nice if you can get it (requires NFSS,
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% which is in latex2e.
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\if@twocolumn\else\input twocolumn.sty\fi
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\usepackage{times}
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%
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% USENIX wants margins of: 7/8" side, 1" bottom, and 3/4" top.
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% 0.25" gutter between columns.
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% Gives active areas of 6.75" x 9.25"
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%
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\setlength{\textheight}{9.0in}
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\setlength{\columnsep}{0.25in}
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%%\setlength{\textwidth}{6.75in}
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\setlength{\textwidth}{7.00in}
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%\setlength{\footheight}{0.0in}
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\setlength{\topmargin}{-0.25in}
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\setlength{\headheight}{0.0in}
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\setlength{\headsep}{0.0in}
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\setlength{\evensidemargin}{-0.125in}
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\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-0.125in}
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%
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% Usenix wants no page numbers for submitted papers, so that they can
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% number them themselves.
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%
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\pagestyle{empty}
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%
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% Usenix titles are in 14-point bold type, with no date, and with no
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% change in the empty page headers. The whol author section is 12 point
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% italic--- you must use {\rm } around the actual author names to get
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% them in roman.
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%
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\def\maketitle{\par
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\begingroup
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\renewcommand\thefootnote{\fnsymbol{footnote}}%
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\def\@makefnmark{\hbox to\z@{$\m@th^{\@thefnmark}$\hss}}%
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\long\def\@makefntext##1{\parindent 1em\noindent
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\hbox to1.8em{\hss$\m@th^{\@thefnmark}$}##1}%
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\if@twocolumn
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\twocolumn[\@maketitle]%
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\else \newpage
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\global\@topnum\z@
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\@maketitle \fi\@thanks
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\endgroup
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\setcounter{footnote}{0}%
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\let\maketitle\relax
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\let\@maketitle\relax
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\gdef\@thanks{}\gdef\@author{}\gdef\@title{}\let\thanks\relax}
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\def\@maketitle{\newpage
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\vbox to 2.5in{
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\vspace*{\fill}
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\vskip 2em
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\begin{center}%
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{\Large\bf \@title \par}%
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\vskip 0.375in minus 0.300in
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{\large\it
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\lineskip .5em
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\begin{tabular}[t]{c}\@author
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\end{tabular}\par}%
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\end{center}%
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\par
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\vspace*{\fill}
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% \vskip 1.5em
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}
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}
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%
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% The abstract is preceded by a 12-pt bold centered heading
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\def\abstract{\begin{center}%
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{\large\bf \abstractname\vspace{-.5em}\vspace{\z@}}%
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\end{center}}
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\def\endabstract{}
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%
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% Main section titles are 12-pt bold. Others can be same or smaller.
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%
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\def\section{\@startsection {section}{1}{\z@}{-3.5ex plus-1ex minus
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-.2ex}{2.3ex plus.2ex}{\reset@font\large\bf}}
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