mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
synced 2024-11-20 02:09:24 +01:00
Minor edits suggested by Susan Landau
svn:r10686
This commit is contained in:
parent
c045c8909d
commit
94847ceb3e
@ -71,20 +71,22 @@ logical or physical locations to those sites or to observers. It
|
||||
enables hosts to be publicly accessible yet have similar protection
|
||||
against location through its \emph{location-hidden services}.
|
||||
|
||||
To connect to a remote server via Tor, the client software learns
|
||||
To connect to a remote server via Tor the client software first learns
|
||||
a %signed
|
||||
list of Tor nodes from several central \emph{directory servers} via a
|
||||
voting protocol to avoid dependence on or complete trust in any one of
|
||||
them, and incrementally creates a private pathway or \emph{circuit} of
|
||||
encrypted connections through authenticated Tor nodes on the network
|
||||
whose public keys were obtained form the directory servers,
|
||||
negotiating a separate set of encryption keys for each hop along the
|
||||
voting protocol (to avoid dependence on or complete trust in any one
|
||||
of these servers). It then incrementally creates a private pathway or
|
||||
\emph{circuit} across the network. This circuit consists of
|
||||
encrypted connections through authenticated Tor nodes
|
||||
whose public keys were obtained from the directory servers. The client
|
||||
software negotiates a separate set of encryption keys for each hop along the
|
||||
circuit. The nodes in the circuit are chosen at random by the client
|
||||
subject to a preference for higher performing nodes to allocate
|
||||
resources effectively and with a client-chosen preferred set of first
|
||||
nodes called \emph{entry guards} to complicate profiling attacks by
|
||||
internal adversaries~\cite{hs-attack}.
|
||||
The circuit is extended one node at a time, and each node
|
||||
The circuit is extended one node at a time, tunneling extensions
|
||||
through already established portions of the circuit, and each node
|
||||
along the way knows only the immediately previous and following nodes
|
||||
in the circuit, so no individual Tor node knows the complete path that
|
||||
each fixed-sized data packet (or \emph{cell}) will take. Thus,
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user