Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug27550_035_01'

This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2018-09-26 08:36:09 -04:00
commit 5e5e019b31
4 changed files with 23 additions and 8 deletions

5
changes/ticket27550 Normal file
View file

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3):
- Don't warn so loudly when tor is unable to decode a descriptor. This can
now happen as a normal use case if a client gets a descriptor with
client authorization but the client is not authorized. Fixes bug 27550;
bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.

View file

@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3(dir_connection_t *conn,
case 200: case 200:
/* We got something: Try storing it in the cache. */ /* We got something: Try storing it in the cache. */
if (hs_cache_store_as_client(body, &conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) < 0) { if (hs_cache_store_as_client(body, &conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) < 0) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor"); log_info(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor");
/* Fire control port FAILED event. */ /* Fire control port FAILED event. */
hs_control_desc_event_failed(conn->hs_ident, conn->identity_digest, hs_control_desc_event_failed(conn->hs_ident, conn->identity_digest,
"BAD_DESC"); "BAD_DESC");

View file

@ -1270,10 +1270,6 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
client_auht_sk, desc); client_auht_sk, desc);
memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential)); memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
if (ret < 0) { if (ret < 0) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client.");
if (get_options()->SafeLogging_ == SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE) {
log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "%s", escaped(desc_str));
}
goto err; goto err;
} }

View file

@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ decrypt_desc_layer,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
* This is a critical check that is making sure the computed MAC matches the * This is a critical check that is making sure the computed MAC matches the
* one in the descriptor. */ * one in the descriptor. */
if (!tor_memeq(our_mac, desc_mac, sizeof(our_mac))) { if (!tor_memeq(our_mac, desc_mac, sizeof(our_mac))) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed"); log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed");
goto err; goto err;
} }
@ -1662,7 +1662,6 @@ desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
desc->superencrypted_data.encrypted_blob_size, desc->superencrypted_data.encrypted_blob_size,
descriptor_cookie, 0, &encrypted_plaintext); descriptor_cookie, 0, &encrypted_plaintext);
if (!encrypted_len) { if (!encrypted_len) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Decrypting encrypted desc failed.");
goto err; goto err;
} }
tor_assert(encrypted_plaintext); tor_assert(encrypted_plaintext);
@ -2272,7 +2271,22 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
* in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */ * in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */
message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &message); message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &message);
if (!message_len) { if (!message_len) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed."); /* Two possible situation here. Either we have a client authorization
* configured that didn't work or we do not have any configured for this
* onion address so likely the descriptor is for authorized client only,
* we are not. */
if (client_auth_sk) {
/* At warning level so the client can notice that its client
* authorization is failing. */
log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization for requested onion address "
"is invalid. Can't decrypt the descriptor.");
} else {
/* Inform at notice level that the onion address requested can't be
* reached without client authorization most likely. */
log_notice(LD_REND, "Fail to decrypt descriptor for requested onion "
"address. It is likely requiring client "
"authorization.");
}
goto err; goto err;
} }
tor_assert(message); tor_assert(message);