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Merge remote-tracking branch 'dgoulet/bug27550_035_01'
This commit is contained in:
commit
5e5e019b31
4 changed files with 23 additions and 8 deletions
5
changes/ticket27550
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5
changes/ticket27550
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@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
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o Minor bugfixes (hidden service v3):
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- Don't warn so loudly when tor is unable to decode a descriptor. This can
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now happen as a normal use case if a client gets a descriptor with
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client authorization but the client is not authorized. Fixes bug 27550;
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bugfix on 0.3.5.1-alpha.
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@ -2720,7 +2720,7 @@ handle_response_fetch_hsdesc_v3(dir_connection_t *conn,
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case 200:
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/* We got something: Try storing it in the cache. */
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if (hs_cache_store_as_client(body, &conn->hs_ident->identity_pk) < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor");
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log_info(LD_REND, "Failed to store hidden service descriptor");
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/* Fire control port FAILED event. */
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hs_control_desc_event_failed(conn->hs_ident, conn->identity_digest,
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"BAD_DESC");
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@ -1270,10 +1270,6 @@ hs_client_decode_descriptor(const char *desc_str,
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client_auht_sk, desc);
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memwipe(subcredential, 0, sizeof(subcredential));
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if (ret < 0) {
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "Could not parse received descriptor as client.");
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if (get_options()->SafeLogging_ == SAFELOG_SCRUB_NONE) {
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log_warn(LD_GENERAL, "%s", escaped(desc_str));
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}
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goto err;
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}
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@ -1540,7 +1540,7 @@ decrypt_desc_layer,(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
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* This is a critical check that is making sure the computed MAC matches the
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* one in the descriptor. */
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if (!tor_memeq(our_mac, desc_mac, sizeof(our_mac))) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed");
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log_info(LD_REND, "Encrypted service descriptor MAC check failed");
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goto err;
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}
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@ -1662,7 +1662,6 @@ desc_decrypt_encrypted(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
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desc->superencrypted_data.encrypted_blob_size,
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descriptor_cookie, 0, &encrypted_plaintext);
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if (!encrypted_len) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Decrypting encrypted desc failed.");
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goto err;
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}
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tor_assert(encrypted_plaintext);
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@ -2272,7 +2271,22 @@ desc_decode_encrypted_v3(const hs_descriptor_t *desc,
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* in the descriptor as a blob of bytes. */
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message_len = desc_decrypt_encrypted(desc, client_auth_sk, &message);
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if (!message_len) {
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Service descriptor decryption failed.");
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/* Two possible situation here. Either we have a client authorization
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* configured that didn't work or we do not have any configured for this
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* onion address so likely the descriptor is for authorized client only,
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* we are not. */
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if (client_auth_sk) {
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/* At warning level so the client can notice that its client
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* authorization is failing. */
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log_warn(LD_REND, "Client authorization for requested onion address "
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"is invalid. Can't decrypt the descriptor.");
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} else {
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/* Inform at notice level that the onion address requested can't be
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* reached without client authorization most likely. */
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log_notice(LD_REND, "Fail to decrypt descriptor for requested onion "
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"address. It is likely requiring client "
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"authorization.");
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}
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goto err;
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}
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tor_assert(message);
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