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Some more documentation and specs for CONNECT_DIR and BEGIN_DIR.
Demand that BEGIN_DIR cells have an empty payload. svn:r9104
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doc/TODO
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doc/TODO
@ -54,7 +54,10 @@ R - Specify actual events.
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o Implement
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o Use for something, so we can be sure it works.
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o Test and debug
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- be able to connect without having a server descriptor, to bootstrap
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- turn the received socks addr:port into a digest for setting .exit
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- be able to connect without having a server descriptor, to bootstrap.
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- handle connect-dir streams that don't have a chosen_exit_name set.
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- include ORPort in DirServers lines so we can know where to connect.
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N - Document .noconnect addresses... but where?
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@ -53,7 +53,15 @@ Tor's extensions to the SOCKS protocol
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address" portion of the reply.
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(This command was not supported before Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha.)
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3. HTTP-resistance
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3. Other command extensions.
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Tor 0.1.2.4-alpha added a new command value: "CONNECT_DIR" [F2].
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In this case, Tor will open an encrypted direct TCP connection to the
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directory port of the Tor server specified by address:port (the port
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specified should be the ORPort of the server). It uses a one-hop tunnel
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and a "BEGIN_DIR" relay cell to accomplish this secure connection.
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4. HTTP-resistance
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Tor checks the first byte of each SOCKS request to see whether it looks
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more like an HTTP request (that is, it starts with a "G", "H", or "P"). If
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@ -733,6 +733,9 @@ TODO:
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If the Tor server is not running a directory service, it should respond
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with a REASON_NOTDIRECTORY RELAY_END cell.
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Clients MUST generate an all-zero payload for RELAY_BEGIN_DIR cells,
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and servers MUST ignore the payload.
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[RELAY_BEGIN_DIR was not supported before Tor 0.1.2.2-alpha; clients
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SHOULD NOT send it to routers running earlier versions of Tor.]
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@ -1651,8 +1651,9 @@ connection_ap_handshake_send_begin(edge_connection_t *ap_conn,
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tor_assert(circ->build_state->onehop_tunnel == 0);
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}
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if (connection_edge_send_command(ap_conn, TO_CIRCUIT(circ),
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begin_type, payload, payload_len,
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if (connection_edge_send_command(ap_conn, TO_CIRCUIT(circ), begin_type,
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begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload : NULL,
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begin_type == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN ? payload_len : 0,
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ap_conn->cpath_layer) < 0)
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return -1; /* circuit is closed, don't continue */
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25
src/or/or.h
25
src/or/or.h
@ -1185,7 +1185,9 @@ typedef struct {
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int need_capacity;
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/** Whether the last hop was picked with exiting in mind. */
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int is_internal;
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/** Did we pick this as a one-hop tunnel (not safe for other conns)? */
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/** Did we pick this as a one-hop tunnel (not safe for other conns)?
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* These are for encrypted connections that exit to this router, not
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* for arbitrary exits from the circuit. */
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int onehop_tunnel;
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/** The crypt_path_t to append after rendezvous: used for rendezvous. */
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crypt_path_t *pending_final_cpath;
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@ -1710,10 +1712,16 @@ static INLINE void or_state_mark_dirty(or_state_t *state, time_t when)
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#define MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN 1024
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#define MAX_SOCKS_ADDR_LEN 256
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT 0x01
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT_DIR 0xE0
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE 0xF0
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR 0xF1
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/** Please open a TCP connection to this addr:port. */
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT 0x01
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/** Please turn this FQDN into an IP address, privately. */
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE 0xF0
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/** Please turn this IP address into an FQDN, privately. */
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_RESOLVE_PTR 0xF1
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/** Please open an encrypted direct TCP connection to the directory port
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* of the Tor server specified by address:port. (In this case address:port
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* specifies the ORPort of the server.) */
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT_DIR 0xF2
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#define SOCKS_COMMAND_IS_CONNECT(c) ((c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT || \
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(c)==SOCKS_COMMAND_CONNECT_DIR)
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@ -1722,8 +1730,11 @@ static INLINE void or_state_mark_dirty(or_state_t *state, time_t when)
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/** State of a SOCKS request from a user to an OP */
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struct socks_request_t {
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char socks_version; /**< Which version of SOCKS did the client use? */
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int command; /**< What has the user requested? One from the above list. */
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/** Which version of SOCKS did the client use? One of "0, 4, 5" -- where
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* 0 means that no socks handshake ever took place, and this is just a
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* stub connection (e.g. see connection_ap_make_bridge()). */
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char socks_version;
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int command; /**< What is this stream's goal? One from the above list. */
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size_t replylen; /**< Length of <b>reply</b>. */
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char reply[MAX_SOCKS_REPLY_LEN]; /**< Write an entry into this string if
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* we want to specify our own socks reply,
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