mirror of
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor.git
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Merge branch 'no-exit-bootstrap-squashed'
This commit is contained in:
commit
5b770ac7b7
14 changed files with 418 additions and 73 deletions
9
changes/bug13718-add-internal-bootstrap-statuses
Normal file
9
changes/bug13718-add-internal-bootstrap-statuses
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Add "internal" to some bootstrap statuses when no exits are available.
|
||||
If the consensus does not contain Exits, Tor will only build internal
|
||||
circuits. In this case, relevant statuses will contain the word
|
||||
"internal" as indicated in the Tor control-spec.txt. When bootstrap
|
||||
completes, Tor will be ready to handle an application requesting an
|
||||
internal circuit to hidden services at ".onion" addresses.
|
||||
If a future consensus contains Exits, exit circuits may become available.
|
||||
Consequential change from #13718.
|
8
changes/bug13718-avoid-excluding-guards
Normal file
8
changes/bug13718-avoid-excluding-guards
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Avoid excluding guards from path building in minimal test networks,
|
||||
when we're in a test network, and excluding guards would exclude
|
||||
all nodes. This typically occurs in incredibly small tor networks,
|
||||
and those using TestingAuthVoteGuard *
|
||||
This fix only applies to minimal, testing tor networks,
|
||||
so it's no less secure.
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||||
Discovered as part of #13718.
|
6
changes/bug13718-check-consensus-exits
Normal file
6
changes/bug13718-check-consensus-exits
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
|
|||
o Minor enhancement:
|
||||
- Check if there are exits in the consensus.
|
||||
Add router_have_consensus_path() which reports whether
|
||||
the consensus has exit paths, internal paths, or whether it
|
||||
just doesn't know.
|
||||
Used by #13718 and #13814.
|
8
changes/bug13718-make-nodelist-args-readable
Normal file
8
changes/bug13718-make-nodelist-args-readable
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
|
|||
o Minor refactoring:
|
||||
- Refactor count_usable_descriptors to use named enums for exit_only.
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors now uses named exit_only values:
|
||||
* USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL
|
||||
* USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY
|
||||
- Add debug logging code for descriptor counts.
|
||||
This resolves nickm's request in bug 13718 to improve argument
|
||||
readability.
|
25
changes/bug13814-avoid-exit-paths-no-exits
Normal file
25
changes/bug13814-avoid-exit-paths-no-exits
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Avoid building exit circuits from a consensus with no exits
|
||||
Tor can now build circuits from a consensus with no exits.
|
||||
But if it tries to build exit circuits, they fail and flood the logs.
|
||||
The circuit types in the Exit Circuits list below will only be
|
||||
built if the current consensus has exits. If it doesn't,
|
||||
only the Internal Circuits will be built. (This can change
|
||||
with each new consensus.)
|
||||
Fixes bug #13814, causes fewer path failures due to #13817.
|
||||
|
||||
Exit Circuits:
|
||||
Predicted Exit Circuits
|
||||
User Traffic Circuits
|
||||
Most AP Streams
|
||||
Circuits Marked Exit
|
||||
Build Timeout Circuits (with exits)
|
||||
|
||||
Internal Circuits:
|
||||
Hidden Service Server Circuits
|
||||
Hidden Service Client Circuits
|
||||
Hidden Service AP Streams
|
||||
Hidden Service Intro Point Streams
|
||||
Circuits Marked Internal
|
||||
Build Timeout Circuits (with no exits)
|
||||
Other Circuits?
|
15
changes/bug13814-reachability-without-exits
Normal file
15
changes/bug13814-reachability-without-exits
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Allow tor to build circuits using a consensus with
|
||||
no exits. If the consensus has no exits (typical of
|
||||
a bootstrapping test network), allow tor to build
|
||||
circuits once enough descriptors have been
|
||||
downloaded.
|
||||
When there are no exits, we always have "enough"
|
||||
exit descriptors. (We treat the proportion of
|
||||
available exit descriptors as 100%.)
|
||||
This assists in bootstrapping a testing Tor
|
||||
network.
|
||||
Fixes bug 13718.
|
||||
Makes bug 13161's TestingDirAuthVoteExit
|
||||
non-essential.
|
||||
(But still useful for speeding up a bootstrap.)
|
7
changes/bug13924-fix-testing-reachability
Normal file
7
changes/bug13924-fix-testing-reachability
Normal file
|
@ -0,0 +1,7 @@
|
|||
o Minor bugfixes:
|
||||
- Stop assuming that private addresses are local when checking
|
||||
reachability in a TestingTorNetwork. Instead, when testing, assume
|
||||
all OR connections are remote. (This is necessary due to many test
|
||||
scenarios running all nodes on localhost.)
|
||||
This assists in bootstrapping a testing Tor network.
|
||||
Fixes bugs 13718 & 13924.
|
|
@ -1378,8 +1378,10 @@ onionskin_answer(or_circuit_t *circ,
|
|||
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Finished sending '%s' cell.",
|
||||
circ->is_first_hop ? "created_fast" : "created");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) &&
|
||||
!channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
|
||||
/* Ignore the local bit when testing - many test networks run on local
|
||||
* addresses */
|
||||
if ((!channel_is_local(circ->p_chan) || get_options()->TestingTorNetwork)
|
||||
&& !channel_is_outgoing(circ->p_chan)) {
|
||||
/* record that we could process create cells from a non-local conn
|
||||
* that we didn't initiate; presumably this means that create cells
|
||||
* can reach us too. */
|
||||
|
@ -1863,7 +1865,7 @@ onion_pick_cpath_exit(origin_circuit_t *circ, extend_info_t *exit)
|
|||
choose_good_exit_server(circ->base_.purpose, state->need_uptime,
|
||||
state->need_capacity, state->is_internal);
|
||||
if (!node) {
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"failed to choose an exit server");
|
||||
log_warn(LD_CIRC,"Failed to choose an exit server");
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
exit = extend_info_from_node(node, 0);
|
||||
|
@ -1990,7 +1992,8 @@ choose_good_middle_server(uint8_t purpose,
|
|||
tor_assert(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MIN_ <= purpose &&
|
||||
purpose <= CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_MAX_);
|
||||
|
||||
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop: random choice.");
|
||||
log_debug(LD_CIRC, "Contemplating intermediate hop %d: random choice.",
|
||||
cur_len);
|
||||
excluded = smartlist_new();
|
||||
if ((r = build_state_get_exit_node(state))) {
|
||||
nodelist_add_node_and_family(excluded, r);
|
||||
|
@ -2052,9 +2055,18 @@ choose_good_entry_server(uint8_t purpose, cpath_build_state_t *state)
|
|||
smartlist_add(excluded, (void*)node);
|
||||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* and exclude current entry guards and their families, if applicable */
|
||||
/* and exclude current entry guards and their families,
|
||||
* unless we're in a test network, and excluding guards
|
||||
* would exclude all nodes (i.e. we're in an incredibly small tor network,
|
||||
* or we're using TestingAuthVoteGuard *).
|
||||
* This is an incomplete fix, but is no worse than the previous behaviour,
|
||||
* and only applies to minimal, testing tor networks
|
||||
* (so it's no less secure) */
|
||||
/*XXXX025 use the using_as_guard flag to accomplish this.*/
|
||||
if (options->UseEntryGuards) {
|
||||
if (options->UseEntryGuards
|
||||
&& (!options->TestingTorNetwork ||
|
||||
smartlist_len(nodelist_get_list()) > smartlist_len(get_entry_guards())
|
||||
)) {
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(get_entry_guards(), const entry_guard_t *, entry,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if ((node = node_get_by_id(entry->identity))) {
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1024,9 +1024,11 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|||
|
||||
/* Second, see if we need any more exit circuits. */
|
||||
/* check if we know of a port that's been requested recently
|
||||
* and no circuit is currently available that can handle it. */
|
||||
* and no circuit is currently available that can handle it.
|
||||
* Exits (obviously) require an exit circuit. */
|
||||
if (!circuit_all_predicted_ports_handled(now, &port_needs_uptime,
|
||||
&port_needs_capacity)) {
|
||||
&port_needs_capacity)
|
||||
&& router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
|
||||
if (port_needs_uptime)
|
||||
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
||||
if (port_needs_capacity)
|
||||
|
@ -1038,8 +1040,10 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Third, see if we need any more hidden service (server) circuits. */
|
||||
if (num_rend_services() && num_uptime_internal < 3) {
|
||||
/* Third, see if we need any more hidden service (server) circuits.
|
||||
* HS servers only need an internal circuit. */
|
||||
if (num_rend_services() && num_uptime_internal < 3
|
||||
&& router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
flags = (CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY | CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME |
|
||||
CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL);
|
||||
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
||||
|
@ -1050,11 +1054,13 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Fourth, see if we need any more hidden service (client) circuits. */
|
||||
/* Fourth, see if we need any more hidden service (client) circuits.
|
||||
* HS clients only need an internal circuit. */
|
||||
if (rep_hist_get_predicted_internal(now, &hidserv_needs_uptime,
|
||||
&hidserv_needs_capacity) &&
|
||||
((num_uptime_internal<2 && hidserv_needs_uptime) ||
|
||||
num_internal<2)) {
|
||||
num_internal<2)
|
||||
&& router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
if (hidserv_needs_uptime)
|
||||
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME;
|
||||
if (hidserv_needs_capacity)
|
||||
|
@ -1071,15 +1077,23 @@ circuit_predict_and_launch_new(void)
|
|||
/* Finally, check to see if we still need more circuits to learn
|
||||
* a good build timeout. But if we're close to our max number we
|
||||
* want, don't do another -- we want to leave a few slots open so
|
||||
* we can still build circuits preemptively as needed. */
|
||||
if (num < MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS-2 &&
|
||||
! circuit_build_times_disabled() &&
|
||||
circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(get_circuit_build_times())) {
|
||||
flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
||||
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
||||
"Have %d clean circs need another buildtime test circ.", num);
|
||||
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
* we can still build circuits preemptively as needed.
|
||||
* XXXX make the assumption that build timeout streams should be
|
||||
* created whenever we can build internal circuits. */
|
||||
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN) {
|
||||
if (num < MAX_UNUSED_OPEN_CIRCUITS-2 &&
|
||||
! circuit_build_times_disabled() &&
|
||||
circuit_build_times_needs_circuits_now(get_circuit_build_times())) {
|
||||
flags = CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_CAPACITY;
|
||||
/* if there are no exits in the consensus, make timeout
|
||||
* circuits internal */
|
||||
if (router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL)
|
||||
flags |= CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL;
|
||||
log_info(LD_CIRC,
|
||||
"Have %d clean circs need another buildtime test circ.", num);
|
||||
circuit_launch(CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_C_GENERAL, flags);
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1096,11 +1110,17 @@ circuit_build_needed_circs(time_t now)
|
|||
{
|
||||
const or_options_t *options = get_options();
|
||||
|
||||
/* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one */
|
||||
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
||||
/* launch a new circ for any pending streams that need one
|
||||
* XXXX make the assumption that (some) AP streams (i.e. HS clients)
|
||||
* don't require an exit circuit, review in #13814.
|
||||
* This allows HSs to function in a consensus without exits. */
|
||||
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN)
|
||||
connection_ap_attach_pending();
|
||||
|
||||
/* make sure any hidden services have enough intro points */
|
||||
rend_services_introduce();
|
||||
/* make sure any hidden services have enough intro points
|
||||
* HS intro point streams only require an internal circuit */
|
||||
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN)
|
||||
rend_services_introduce();
|
||||
|
||||
circuit_expire_old_circs_as_needed(now);
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1632,6 +1652,16 @@ circuit_launch(uint8_t purpose, int flags)
|
|||
return circuit_launch_by_extend_info(purpose, NULL, flags);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** DOCDOC */
|
||||
static int
|
||||
have_enough_path_info(int need_exit)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (need_exit)
|
||||
return router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT;
|
||||
else
|
||||
return router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Launch a new circuit with purpose <b>purpose</b> and exit node
|
||||
* <b>extend_info</b> (or NULL to select a random exit node). If flags
|
||||
* contains CIRCLAUNCH_NEED_UPTIME, choose among routers with high uptime. If
|
||||
|
@ -1646,10 +1676,14 @@ circuit_launch_by_extend_info(uint8_t purpose,
|
|||
{
|
||||
origin_circuit_t *circ;
|
||||
int onehop_tunnel = (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_ONEHOP_TUNNEL) != 0;
|
||||
int have_path = have_enough_path_info(! (flags & CIRCLAUNCH_IS_INTERNAL) );
|
||||
|
||||
if (!onehop_tunnel && !router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
|
||||
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Haven't fetched enough directory info yet; canceling "
|
||||
"circuit launch.");
|
||||
if (!onehop_tunnel && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
|
||||
log_debug(LD_CIRC,"Haven't %s yet; canceling "
|
||||
"circuit launch.",
|
||||
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
||||
"fetched enough directory info" :
|
||||
"received a consensus with exits");
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
|
@ -1806,7 +1840,9 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|||
return 1; /* we're happy */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!want_onehop && !router_have_minimum_dir_info()) {
|
||||
int have_path = have_enough_path_info(!need_internal);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!want_onehop && (!router_have_minimum_dir_info() || !have_path)) {
|
||||
if (!connection_get_by_type(CONN_TYPE_DIR)) {
|
||||
int severity = LOG_NOTICE;
|
||||
/* FFFF if this is a tunneled directory fetch, don't yell
|
||||
|
@ -1814,14 +1850,20 @@ circuit_get_open_circ_or_launch(entry_connection_t *conn,
|
|||
if (entry_list_is_constrained(options) &&
|
||||
entries_known_but_down(options)) {
|
||||
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
||||
"Application request when we haven't used client functionality "
|
||||
"lately. Optimistically trying known %s again.",
|
||||
"Application request when we haven't %s. "
|
||||
"Optimistically trying known %s again.",
|
||||
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
||||
"used client functionality lately" :
|
||||
"received a consensus with exits",
|
||||
options->UseBridges ? "bridges" : "entrynodes");
|
||||
entries_retry_all(options);
|
||||
} else if (!options->UseBridges || any_bridge_descriptors_known()) {
|
||||
log_fn(severity, LD_APP|LD_DIR,
|
||||
"Application request when we haven't used client functionality "
|
||||
"lately. Optimistically trying directory fetches again.");
|
||||
"Application request when we haven't %s. "
|
||||
"Optimistically trying directory fetches again.",
|
||||
!router_have_minimum_dir_info() ?
|
||||
"used client functionality lately" :
|
||||
"received a consensus with exits");
|
||||
routerlist_retry_directory_downloads(time(NULL));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -1833,7 +1833,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
|
|||
directory_fetches_dir_info_early(old_options)) ||
|
||||
!bool_eq(directory_fetches_dir_info_later(options),
|
||||
directory_fetches_dir_info_later(old_options))) {
|
||||
/* Make sure update_router_have_min_dir_info gets called. */
|
||||
/* Make sure update_router_have_minimum_dir_info() gets called. */
|
||||
router_dir_info_changed();
|
||||
/* We might need to download a new consensus status later or sooner than
|
||||
* we had expected. */
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -4807,23 +4807,43 @@ bootstrap_status_to_string(bootstrap_status_t s, const char **tag,
|
|||
break;
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_DESCRIPTORS:
|
||||
*tag = "requesting_descriptors";
|
||||
*summary = "Asking for relay descriptors";
|
||||
/* XXXX this appears to incorrectly report internal on most loads */
|
||||
*summary = router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL ?
|
||||
"Asking for relay descriptors for internal paths" :
|
||||
"Asking for relay descriptors";
|
||||
break;
|
||||
/* If we're sure there are no exits in the consensus,
|
||||
* inform the controller by adding "internal"
|
||||
* to the status summaries.
|
||||
* (We only check this while loading descriptors,
|
||||
* so we may not know in the earlier stages.)
|
||||
* But if there are exits, we can't be sure whether
|
||||
* we're creating internal or exit paths/circuits.
|
||||
* XXXX Or should be use different tags or statuses
|
||||
* for internal and exit/all? */
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_LOADING_DESCRIPTORS:
|
||||
*tag = "loading_descriptors";
|
||||
*summary = "Loading relay descriptors";
|
||||
*summary = router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL ?
|
||||
"Loading relay descriptors for internal paths" :
|
||||
"Loading relay descriptors";
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_OR:
|
||||
*tag = "conn_or";
|
||||
*summary = "Connecting to the Tor network";
|
||||
*summary = router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL ?
|
||||
"Connecting to the Tor network internally" :
|
||||
"Connecting to the Tor network";
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_HANDSHAKE_OR:
|
||||
*tag = "handshake_or";
|
||||
*summary = "Finishing handshake with first hop";
|
||||
*summary = router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL ?
|
||||
"Finishing handshake with first hop of internal circuit" :
|
||||
"Finishing handshake with first hop";
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CIRCUIT_CREATE:
|
||||
*tag = "circuit_create";
|
||||
*summary = "Establishing a Tor circuit";
|
||||
*summary = router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL ?
|
||||
"Establishing an internal Tor circuit" :
|
||||
"Establishing a Tor circuit";
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_DONE:
|
||||
*tag = "done";
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ running_long_enough_to_decide_unreachable(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Each server needs to have passed a reachability test no more
|
||||
* than this number of seconds ago, or he is listed as down in
|
||||
* than this number of seconds ago, or it is listed as down in
|
||||
* the directory. */
|
||||
#define REACHABLE_TIMEOUT (45*60)
|
||||
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -24,6 +24,23 @@
|
|||
|
||||
static void nodelist_drop_node(node_t *node, int remove_from_ht);
|
||||
static void node_free(node_t *node);
|
||||
|
||||
/** count_usable_descriptors counts descriptors with these flag(s)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
/* All descriptors regardless of flags */
|
||||
USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL = 0,
|
||||
/* Only descriptors with the Exit flag */
|
||||
USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY = 1
|
||||
} usable_descriptor_t;
|
||||
static void count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present,
|
||||
int *num_usable,
|
||||
smartlist_t *descs_out,
|
||||
const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
||||
const or_options_t *options,
|
||||
time_t now,
|
||||
routerset_t *in_set,
|
||||
usable_descriptor_t exit_only);
|
||||
static void update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void);
|
||||
static double get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(const or_options_t *options,
|
||||
const networkstatus_t *ns);
|
||||
|
@ -1256,20 +1273,28 @@ router_set_status(const char *digest, int up)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** True iff, the last time we checked whether we had enough directory info
|
||||
* to build circuits, the answer was "yes". */
|
||||
* to build circuits, the answer was "yes". If there are no exits in the
|
||||
* consensus, we act as if we have 100% of the exit directory info. */
|
||||
static int have_min_dir_info = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/** Does the consensus contain nodes that can exit? */
|
||||
static consensus_path_type_t have_consensus_path = CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
|
||||
/** True iff enough has changed since the last time we checked whether we had
|
||||
* enough directory info to build circuits that our old answer can no longer
|
||||
* be trusted. */
|
||||
static int need_to_update_have_min_dir_info = 1;
|
||||
/** String describing what we're missing before we have enough directory
|
||||
* info. */
|
||||
static char dir_info_status[256] = "";
|
||||
static char dir_info_status[512] = "";
|
||||
|
||||
/** Return true iff we have enough networkstatus and router information to
|
||||
* start building circuits. Right now, this means "more than half the
|
||||
* networkstatus documents, and at least 1/4 of expected routers." */
|
||||
//XXX should consider whether we have enough exiting nodes here.
|
||||
/** Return true iff we have enough consensus information to
|
||||
* start building circuits. Right now, this means "a consensus that's
|
||||
* less than a day old, and at least 60% of router descriptors (configurable),
|
||||
* weighted by bandwidth. Treat the exit fraction as 100% if there are
|
||||
* no exits in the consensus."
|
||||
* To obtain the final weighted bandwidth, we multiply the
|
||||
* weighted bandwidth fraction for each position (guard, middle, exit). */
|
||||
int
|
||||
router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -1291,6 +1316,24 @@ router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
|||
return have_min_dir_info;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT if there is at least one exit node
|
||||
* in the consensus. We update this flag in compute_frac_paths_available if
|
||||
* there is at least one relay that has an Exit flag in the consensus.
|
||||
* Used to avoid building exit circuits when they will almost certainly fail.
|
||||
* Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL if there are no exits in the consensus.
|
||||
* (This situation typically occurs during bootstrap of a test network.)
|
||||
* Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN if we have never checked, or have
|
||||
* reason to believe our last known value was invalid or has expired.
|
||||
* If we're in a network with TestingDirAuthVoteExit set,
|
||||
* this can cause router_have_consensus_path() to be set to
|
||||
* CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT, even if there are no nodes with accept exit policies.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
consensus_path_type_t
|
||||
router_have_consensus_path(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return have_consensus_path;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Called when our internal view of the directory has changed. This can be
|
||||
* when the authorities change, networkstatuses change, the list of routerdescs
|
||||
* changes, or number of running routers changes.
|
||||
|
@ -1313,20 +1356,23 @@ get_dir_info_status_string(void)
|
|||
/** Iterate over the servers listed in <b>consensus</b>, and count how many of
|
||||
* them seem like ones we'd use, and how many of <em>those</em> we have
|
||||
* descriptors for. Store the former in *<b>num_usable</b> and the latter in
|
||||
* *<b>num_present</b>. If <b>in_set</b> is non-NULL, only consider those
|
||||
* routers in <b>in_set</b>. If <b>exit_only</b> is true, only consider nodes
|
||||
* with the Exit flag. If *descs_out is present, add a node_t for each
|
||||
* usable descriptor to it.
|
||||
* *<b>num_present</b>.
|
||||
* If <b>in_set</b> is non-NULL, only consider those routers in <b>in_set</b>.
|
||||
* If <b>exit_only</b> is USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY, only consider nodes
|
||||
* with the Exit flag.
|
||||
* If *<b>descs_out</b> is present, add a node_t for each usable descriptor
|
||||
* to it.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static void
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, int *num_usable,
|
||||
smartlist_t *descs_out,
|
||||
const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
||||
const or_options_t *options, time_t now,
|
||||
routerset_t *in_set, int exit_only)
|
||||
routerset_t *in_set,
|
||||
usable_descriptor_t exit_only)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const int md = (consensus->flavor == FLAV_MICRODESC);
|
||||
*num_present = 0, *num_usable=0;
|
||||
*num_present = 0, *num_usable = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(consensus->routerstatus_list, routerstatus_t *, rs)
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
@ -1334,7 +1380,7 @@ count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, int *num_usable,
|
|||
if (!node)
|
||||
continue; /* This would be a bug: every entry in the consensus is
|
||||
* supposed to have a node. */
|
||||
if (exit_only && ! rs->is_exit)
|
||||
if (exit_only == USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY && ! rs->is_exit)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
if (in_set && ! routerset_contains_routerstatus(in_set, rs, -1))
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
@ -1358,11 +1404,21 @@ count_usable_descriptors(int *num_present, int *num_usable,
|
|||
|
||||
log_debug(LD_DIR, "%d usable, %d present (%s%s).",
|
||||
*num_usable, *num_present,
|
||||
md ? "microdesc" : "desc", exit_only ? " exits" : "s");
|
||||
md ? "microdesc" : "desc",
|
||||
exit_only == USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY ? " exits" : "s");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** Return an estimate of which fraction of usable paths through the Tor
|
||||
* network we have available for use. */
|
||||
* network we have available for use.
|
||||
* Count how many routers seem like ones we'd use, and how many of
|
||||
* <em>those</em> we have descriptors for. Store the former in
|
||||
* *<b>num_usable_out</b> and the latter in *<b>num_present_out</b>.
|
||||
* If **<b>status_out</b> is present, allocate a new string and print the
|
||||
* available percentages of guard, middle, and exit nodes to it, noting
|
||||
* whether there are exits in the consensus.
|
||||
* If there are no guards in the consensus,
|
||||
* we treat the exit fraction as 100%.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static double
|
||||
compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
||||
const or_options_t *options, time_t now,
|
||||
|
@ -1375,14 +1431,19 @@ compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
|||
smartlist_t *myexits= smartlist_new();
|
||||
smartlist_t *myexits_unflagged = smartlist_new();
|
||||
double f_guard, f_mid, f_exit, f_myexit, f_myexit_unflagged;
|
||||
int np, nu; /* Ignored */
|
||||
double f_path = 0.0;
|
||||
/* Used to determine whether there are any exits in the consensus */
|
||||
int np = 0;
|
||||
/* Used to determine whether there are any exits with descriptors */
|
||||
int nu = 0;
|
||||
const int authdir = authdir_mode_v3(options);
|
||||
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(num_present_out, num_usable_out,
|
||||
mid, consensus, options, now, NULL, 0);
|
||||
mid, consensus, options, now, NULL,
|
||||
USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
|
||||
if (options->EntryNodes) {
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, guards, consensus, options, now,
|
||||
options->EntryNodes, 0);
|
||||
options->EntryNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH(mid, const node_t *, node, {
|
||||
if (authdir) {
|
||||
|
@ -1395,22 +1456,78 @@ compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
|||
});
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* All nodes with exit flag */
|
||||
/* All nodes with exit flag
|
||||
* If we're in a network with TestingDirAuthVoteExit set,
|
||||
* this can cause false positives on have_consensus_path,
|
||||
* incorrectly setting it to CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT. This is
|
||||
* an unavoidable feature of forcing authorities to declare
|
||||
* certain nodes as exits.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, exits, consensus, options, now,
|
||||
NULL, 1);
|
||||
NULL, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY);
|
||||
log_debug(LD_NET,
|
||||
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
|
||||
"exits",
|
||||
np,
|
||||
nu);
|
||||
|
||||
/* We need at least 1 exit present in the consensus to consider
|
||||
* building exit paths */
|
||||
/* Update our understanding of whether the consensus has exits */
|
||||
consensus_path_type_t old_have_consensus_path = have_consensus_path;
|
||||
have_consensus_path = ((np > 0) ?
|
||||
CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT :
|
||||
CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL);
|
||||
|
||||
if (have_consensus_path == CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL
|
||||
&& old_have_consensus_path != have_consensus_path) {
|
||||
log_notice(LD_NET,
|
||||
"The current consensus has no exit nodes. "
|
||||
"Tor can only build internal paths, "
|
||||
"such as paths to hidden services.");
|
||||
|
||||
/* However, exit nodes can reachability self-test using this consensus,
|
||||
* join the network, and appear in a later consensus. This will allow
|
||||
* the network to build exit paths, such as paths for world wide web
|
||||
* browsing (as distinct from hidden service web browsing). */
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* All nodes with exit flag in ExitNodes option */
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, myexits, consensus, options, now,
|
||||
options->ExitNodes, 1);
|
||||
options->ExitNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_EXIT_ONLY);
|
||||
log_debug(LD_NET,
|
||||
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
|
||||
"myexits",
|
||||
np,
|
||||
nu);
|
||||
|
||||
/* Now compute the nodes in the ExitNodes option where which we don't know
|
||||
* what their exit policy is, or we know it permits something. */
|
||||
count_usable_descriptors(&np, &nu, myexits_unflagged,
|
||||
consensus, options, now,
|
||||
options->ExitNodes, 0);
|
||||
options->ExitNodes, USABLE_DESCRIPTOR_ALL);
|
||||
log_debug(LD_NET,
|
||||
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
|
||||
"myexits_unflagged (initial)",
|
||||
np,
|
||||
nu);
|
||||
|
||||
SMARTLIST_FOREACH_BEGIN(myexits_unflagged, const node_t *, node) {
|
||||
if (node_has_descriptor(node) && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node))
|
||||
if (node_has_descriptor(node) && node_exit_policy_rejects_all(node)) {
|
||||
SMARTLIST_DEL_CURRENT(myexits_unflagged, node);
|
||||
/* this node is not actually an exit */
|
||||
np--;
|
||||
/* this node is unusable as an exit */
|
||||
nu--;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} SMARTLIST_FOREACH_END(node);
|
||||
|
||||
log_debug(LD_NET,
|
||||
"%s: %d present, %d usable",
|
||||
"myexits_unflagged (final)",
|
||||
np,
|
||||
nu);
|
||||
|
||||
f_guard = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(guards, WEIGHT_FOR_GUARD);
|
||||
f_mid = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(mid, WEIGHT_FOR_MID);
|
||||
f_exit = frac_nodes_with_descriptors(exits, WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
||||
|
@ -1418,6 +1535,12 @@ compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
|||
f_myexit_unflagged=
|
||||
frac_nodes_with_descriptors(myexits_unflagged,WEIGHT_FOR_EXIT);
|
||||
|
||||
log_debug(LD_NET,
|
||||
"f_exit: %.2f, f_myexit: %.2f, f_myexit_unflagged: %.2f",
|
||||
f_exit,
|
||||
f_myexit,
|
||||
f_myexit_unflagged);
|
||||
|
||||
/* If our ExitNodes list has eliminated every possible Exit node, and there
|
||||
* were some possible Exit nodes, then instead consider nodes that permit
|
||||
* exiting to some ports. */
|
||||
|
@ -1439,16 +1562,28 @@ compute_frac_paths_available(const networkstatus_t *consensus,
|
|||
if (f_myexit < f_exit)
|
||||
f_exit = f_myexit;
|
||||
|
||||
/* if the consensus has no exits, treat the exit fraction as 100% */
|
||||
if (router_have_consensus_path() != CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT) {
|
||||
f_exit = 1.0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
f_path = f_guard * f_mid * f_exit;
|
||||
|
||||
if (status_out)
|
||||
tor_asprintf(status_out,
|
||||
"%d%% of guards bw, "
|
||||
"%d%% of midpoint bw, and "
|
||||
"%d%% of exit bw",
|
||||
"%d%% of exit bw%s = "
|
||||
"%d%% of path bw",
|
||||
(int)(f_guard*100),
|
||||
(int)(f_mid*100),
|
||||
(int)(f_exit*100));
|
||||
(int)(f_exit*100),
|
||||
(router_have_consensus_path() == CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT ?
|
||||
"" :
|
||||
" (no exits in consensus)"),
|
||||
(int)(f_path*100));
|
||||
|
||||
return f_guard * f_mid * f_exit;
|
||||
return f_path;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/** We just fetched a new set of descriptors. Compute how far through
|
||||
|
@ -1521,6 +1656,9 @@ update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
|||
|
||||
using_md = consensus->flavor == FLAV_MICRODESC;
|
||||
|
||||
#define NOTICE_DIR_INFO_STATUS_INTERVAL (60)
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check fraction of available paths */
|
||||
{
|
||||
char *status = NULL;
|
||||
int num_present=0, num_usable=0;
|
||||
|
@ -1529,16 +1667,37 @@ update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
|||
&status);
|
||||
|
||||
if (paths < get_frac_paths_needed_for_circs(options,consensus)) {
|
||||
tor_snprintf(dir_info_status, sizeof(dir_info_status),
|
||||
"We need more %sdescriptors: we have %d/%d, and "
|
||||
"can only build %d%% of likely paths. (We have %s.)",
|
||||
using_md?"micro":"", num_present, num_usable,
|
||||
(int)(paths*100), status);
|
||||
/* log_notice(LD_NET, "%s", dir_info_status); */
|
||||
/* these messages can be excessive in testing networks */
|
||||
static ratelim_t last_warned =
|
||||
RATELIM_INIT(NOTICE_DIR_INFO_STATUS_INTERVAL);
|
||||
char *suppression_msg = NULL;
|
||||
if ((suppression_msg = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, time(NULL)))) {
|
||||
tor_snprintf(dir_info_status, sizeof(dir_info_status),
|
||||
"We need more %sdescriptors: we have %d/%d, and "
|
||||
"can only build %d%% of likely paths. (We have %s.)",
|
||||
using_md?"micro":"", num_present, num_usable,
|
||||
(int)(paths*100), status);
|
||||
log_warn(LD_NET, "%s%s", dir_info_status, suppression_msg);
|
||||
tor_free(suppression_msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
tor_free(status);
|
||||
res = 0;
|
||||
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_DESCRIPTORS, 0);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* these messages can be excessive in testing networks */
|
||||
static ratelim_t last_warned =
|
||||
RATELIM_INIT(NOTICE_DIR_INFO_STATUS_INTERVAL);
|
||||
char *suppression_msg = NULL;
|
||||
if ((suppression_msg = rate_limit_log(&last_warned, time(NULL)))) {
|
||||
tor_snprintf(dir_info_status, sizeof(dir_info_status),
|
||||
"We have enough %sdescriptors: we have %d/%d, and "
|
||||
"can build %d%% of likely paths. (We have %s.)",
|
||||
using_md?"micro":"", num_present, num_usable,
|
||||
(int)(paths*100), status);
|
||||
log_info(LD_NET, "%s%s", dir_info_status, suppression_msg);
|
||||
tor_free(suppression_msg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
tor_free(status);
|
||||
|
@ -1546,12 +1705,16 @@ update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
|||
}
|
||||
|
||||
done:
|
||||
|
||||
/* If paths have just become available in this update. */
|
||||
if (res && !have_min_dir_info) {
|
||||
log_notice(LD_DIR,
|
||||
"We now have enough directory information to build circuits.");
|
||||
control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "ENOUGH_DIR_INFO");
|
||||
control_event_bootstrap(BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_OR, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If paths have just become unavailable in this update. */
|
||||
if (!res && have_min_dir_info) {
|
||||
int quiet = directory_too_idle_to_fetch_descriptors(options, now);
|
||||
tor_log(quiet ? LOG_INFO : LOG_NOTICE, LD_DIR,
|
||||
|
@ -1563,7 +1726,7 @@ update_router_have_minimum_dir_info(void)
|
|||
* should only do while circuits are working, like reachability tests
|
||||
* and fetching bridge descriptors only over circuits. */
|
||||
note_that_we_maybe_cant_complete_circuits();
|
||||
|
||||
have_consensus_path = CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN;
|
||||
control_event_client_status(LOG_NOTICE, "NOT_ENOUGH_DIR_INFO");
|
||||
}
|
||||
have_min_dir_info = res;
|
||||
|
|
|
@ -79,7 +79,37 @@ int node_is_unreliable(const node_t *router, int need_uptime,
|
|||
int router_exit_policy_all_nodes_reject(const tor_addr_t *addr, uint16_t port,
|
||||
int need_uptime);
|
||||
void router_set_status(const char *digest, int up);
|
||||
|
||||
/** router_have_minimum_dir_info tests to see if we have enough
|
||||
* descriptor information to create circuits.
|
||||
* If there are exits in the consensus, we wait until we have enough
|
||||
* info to create exit paths before creating any circuits. If there are
|
||||
* no exits in the consensus, we wait for enough info to create internal
|
||||
* paths, and should avoid creating exit paths, as they will simply fail.
|
||||
* We make sure we create all available circuit types at the same time. */
|
||||
int router_have_minimum_dir_info(void);
|
||||
|
||||
/** Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT if there is at least one exit node
|
||||
* in the consensus. We update this flag in compute_frac_paths_available if
|
||||
* there is at least one relay that has an Exit flag in the consensus.
|
||||
* Used to avoid building exit circuits when they will almost certainly fail.
|
||||
* Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL if there are no exits in the consensus.
|
||||
* (This situation typically occurs during bootstrap of a test network.)
|
||||
* Set to CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN if we have never checked, or have
|
||||
* reason to believe our last known value was invalid or has expired.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
/* we haven't checked yet, or we have invalidated our previous check */
|
||||
CONSENSUS_PATH_UNKNOWN = -1,
|
||||
/* The consensus only has internal relays, and we should only
|
||||
* create internal paths, circuits, streams, ... */
|
||||
CONSENSUS_PATH_INTERNAL = 0,
|
||||
/* The consensus has at least one exit, and can therefore (potentially)
|
||||
* create exit and internal paths, circuits, streams, ... */
|
||||
CONSENSUS_PATH_EXIT = 1
|
||||
} consensus_path_type_t;
|
||||
consensus_path_type_t router_have_consensus_path(void);
|
||||
|
||||
void router_dir_info_changed(void);
|
||||
const char *get_dir_info_status_string(void);
|
||||
int count_loading_descriptors_progress(void);
|
||||
|
|
Loading…
Add table
Reference in a new issue