Added censorship resistant refs. Answered Roger's key question with

more questions.


svn:r660

doc/tor-design.bib

@@ -20,6 +20,14 @@
   note = {\url{http://freehaven.net/doc/fc03/econymics.pdf}}, 
 }
 
+@inproceedings{eternity,
+  title = {The Eternity Service}, 
+  author = {Ross Anderson}, 
+  booktitle = {Proceedings of Pragocrypt '96}, 
+  year = {1996}, 
+  note =  {\url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/rja14/eternity/eternity.html}}, 
+}
+
 
 @inproceedings{minion-design,
   title = {Mixminion: Design of a Type {III} Anonymous Remailer Protocol}, 
@@ -171,6 +179,22 @@ full_papers/rao/rao.pdf}},
   note =         {\url{http://www.onion-router.net/Publications/WDIAU-2000.ps.gz}},
 }
 
+@Inproceedings{freenet-pets00,
+  title =        {Freenet: A Distributed Anonymous Information Storage
+    and Retrieval System}, 
+  author =       {Ian Clarke and Oskar Sandberg and Brandon Wiley and
+    Theodore W. Hong},  
+  booktitle =    {Designing Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Workshop
+                  on Design Issue in Anonymity and Unobservability},
+  year =         2000,
+  month =        {July},
+  pages =        {46--66},
+  editor =       {H. Federrath},
+  publisher =    {Springer-Verlag, LNCS 2009},
+  note =         {\url{http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/clarke00freenet.html}},
+}
+
+
 @InProceedings{or-ih96,
   author = 	 {David M. Goldschlag and Michael G. Reed and Paul
                   F. Syverson}, 
@@ -590,6 +614,20 @@ full_papers/rao/rao.pdf}},
   note =        {\newline \url{http://www.scs.cs.nyu.edu/~dm/}},
 }
 
+
+
+@InProceedings{tangler,
+  author = 	 {Marc Waldman and David Mazi\`{e}res},
+  title = 	 {Tanger: A Censorship-Resistant Publishing System
+                  Based on Document Entanglements}, 
+  booktitle = 	 {$8^{th}$ ACM Conference on Computer and
+                  Communications Security (CCS-8)},
+  pages =	 {86--135},
+  year =	 2001,
+  publisher =	 {ACM Press},
+  note =	 {\url{http://www.scs.cs.nyu.edu/~dm/}}
+}
+
 @misc{neochaum,
    author =      {Tim May},
    title =       {Payment mixes for anonymity}, 
@@ -706,9 +744,11 @@ full_papers/rao/rao.pdf}},
 @inproceedings{SS03,
   title = {Passive Attack Analysis for Connection-Based Anonymity Systems}, 
   author = {Andrei Serjantov and Peter Sewell}, 
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of ESORICS 2003}, 
+  booktitle = {Computer Security -- ESORICS 2003}, 
+  publisher =   {Springer-Verlag, LNCS (forthcoming)},
   year = {2003}, 
   month = {October}, 
+  note = {\url{http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/users/aas23/papers_aas/conn_sys.ps}},
 }
 
 @Article{raghavan87randomized,
@@ -853,6 +893,18 @@ full_papers/rao/rao.pdf}},
   month = {December}, 
 }
 
+@Article{taz,
+  author = 	 {Ian Goldberg and David Wagner},
+  title = 	 {TAZ Servers and the Rewebber Network: Enabling
+                  Anonymous Publishing on the World Wide Web},
+  journal = 	 {First Monday},
+  year = 	 1998,
+  volume =	 3,
+  number =	 4,
+  month =	 {August},
+  note =	 {\url{http://www.firstmonday.dk/issues/issue3_4/goldberg/}}
+}
+
 @inproceedings{wright02,
   title = {An Analysis of the Degradation of Anonymous Protocols}, 
   author = {Matthew Wright and Micah Adler and Brian Neil Levine and Clay Shields}, 
@@ -865,9 +917,11 @@ full_papers/rao/rao.pdf}},
 @inproceedings{wright03,
   title = {Defending Anonymous Communication Against Passive Logging Attacks}, 
   author = {Matthew Wright and Micah Adler and Brian Neil Levine and Clay Shields}, 
-  booktitle = {Proceedings of the 2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy}, 
+  booktitle = {2003 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy}, 
+  pages= {28--41}
   year = {2003}, 
   month = {May}, 
+  publisher = {IEEE CS}, 
 }
 
 %%% Local Variables: 

doc/tor-design.tex

@@ -294,15 +294,27 @@ forced to launch jondos using many different identities and on many
 different networks to succeed'' \cite{crowds-tissec}.
 
 
+Many systems have been designed for censorship resistant publishing.
+The first of these was the Eternity Service \cite{eternity}. Since
+then, there have been many alternatives and refinements, of which we note
+but a few
+\cite{eternity,gap-pets03,freenet-pets00,freehaven-berk,publius,tangler,taz}.
+From the first, traffic analysis resistant communication has been
+recognized as an important element of censorship resistance because of
+the relation between the ability to censor material and the ability to
+find its distribution source.
+
+Tor is not primarily for censorship resistance but for anonymous
+communication. However, Tor's rendezvous points, which enable
+connections between mutually anonymous entities, also facilitate
+connections to hidden servers.  These building blocks to censorship
+resistance and other capabilities are described in
+Section~\ref{sec:rendezvous}.
+
+
 [XXX I'm considering the subsection as ended here for now. I'm leaving the
 following notes in case we want to revisit any of them. -PS]
 
-There are also many systems which are intended for anonymous
-and/or censorship resistant file sharing. [XXX Should we list all these
-or just say it's out of scope for the paper?
-eternity, gnunet, freenet, freehaven, publius, tangler, taz/rewebber]
-
-
 
 Channel-based anonymizing systems also differ in their use of dummy traffic.
 [XXX]
@@ -433,15 +445,38 @@ The basic adversary components we consider are:
   to it including refusing them entirely, intentionally modifying what
   it sends and at what rate, and selectively closing them. Also a
   special case of the disrupter.
-\item[Key breaker:] can break the longterm private decryption key of a
-  Tor-node.
+\item[Key breaker:] can break the key used to encrypt connection
+  initiation requests sent to a Tor-node.
 % Er, there are no long-term private decryption keys. They have
 % long-term private signing keys, and medium-term onion (decryption)
 % keys. Plus short-term link keys. Should we lump them together or
 % separate them out? -RD
-\item[Compromised Tor-node:] can arbitrarily manipulate the connections
-  under its control, as well as creating new connections (that pass
-  through itself).
+%
+%  Hmmm, I was talking about the keys used to encrypt the onion skin
+%  that contains the public DH key from the initiator. Is that what you
+%  mean by medium-term onion key? (``Onion key'' used to mean the
+%  session keys distributed in the onion, back when there were onions.)
+%  Also, why are link keys short-term? By link keys I assume you mean
+%  keys that neighbor nodes use to superencrypt all the stuff they send
+%  to each other on a link.  Did you mean the session keys? I had been
+%  calling session keys short-term and everything else long-term. I
+%  know I was being sloppy. (I _have_ written papers formalizing
+%  concepts of relative freshness.) But, there's some questions lurking
+%  here. First up, I don't see why the onion-skin encryption key should
+%  be any shorter term than the signature key in terms of threat
+%  resistance. I understand that how we update onion-skin encryption
+%  keys makes them depend on the signature keys. But, this is not the
+%  basis on which we should be deciding about key rotation. Another
+%  question is whether we want to bother with someone who breaks a
+%  signature key as a particular adversary. He should be able to do
+%  nearly the same as a compromised tor-node, although they're not the
+%  same. I reworded above, I'm thinking we should leave other concerns
+%  for later. -PS
+
+  
+\item[Compromised Tor-node:] can arbitrarily manipulate the
+  connections under its control, as well as creating new connections
+  (that pass through itself).
 \end{description}