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r12521@Kushana: nickm | 2007-03-10 01:15:58 -0500

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Update and close proposal 107.


svn:r9792
This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2007-03-10 07:39:20 +00:00
parent 887b87614d
commit 4a2ed13370
1 changed files with 17 additions and 11 deletions
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28
doc/spec/proposals/107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
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@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ Filename: 107-uptime-sanity-checking.txt
Title: Uptime Sanity Checking
Version:
Last-Modified:
Author: Kevin Buaer and Damon McCoy
Author: Kevin Bauer & Damon McCoy
Created: 8-March-2007
Status: Open
@ -28,10 +28,14 @@ Security implications:
Specification:
We propose that uptime be capped at two months. Currently there are
approximetly 50 nodes with this amount of uptime, and the average uptime
is around 9 days. This cap would prevent these 50 nodes from being
displaced by an attacker.
So we could patch Section 3.1 of dir-spec.txt to say:
"Stable" -- A router is 'Stable' if it is running, valid, not
hibernating, and either its uptime is at least the median uptime for
known running, valid, non-hibernating routers, or its uptime is at
least one month. Routers are never called stable if they are running
a version of Tor known to drop circuits stupidly. (0.1.1.10-alpha
through 0.1.1.16-rc are stupid this way.)
Compatibility:
@ -39,10 +43,12 @@ Compatibility:
Implementation:
#define MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME 60*24*60*60
dirserv.c
1448: *up = (uint32_t) real_uptime(ri, now);
if(*up > MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME) {
*up = MAX_BELIEVABLE_UPTIME;
}
Implemented and merged into dir-spec in 0.2.0.0-alpha-dev (r9788).
Discussion:
Initially, this proposal set the maximum at 50 days, not 30; the 30 day
limit and spec wording was suggested by Roger in an or-dev post on 9 March
2007.
This proposal also led to 108-mtbf-based-uptime.txt