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Support channel_t in connection_edge.c

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Andrea Shepard 2012-08-25 11:55:39 -07:00 • committed by Andrea Shepard
parent 519c971f6a
commit 4768c0efe3
1 changed files with 26 additions and 24 deletions
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50
src/or/connection_edge.c
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@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
#include "or.h"
#include "buffers.h"
#include "channel.h"
#include "circuitlist.h"
#include "circuituse.h"
#include "config.h"
@ -3068,27 +3069,30 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn && !options->AllowSingleHopExits &&
(or_circ->is_first_hop ||
(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
or_circ->p_conn->identity_digest) &&
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan) {
tor_assert(!(or_circ->p_chan->is_listener));
if (!options->AllowSingleHopExits &&
(or_circ->is_first_hop ||
(!connection_or_digest_is_known_relay(
or_circ->p_chan->u.cell_chan.identity_digest) &&
should_refuse_unknown_exits(options)))) {
/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
*/
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
safe_str(or_circ->p_conn->_base.address),
or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
"from unknown relay");
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
or_circ->is_first_hop ?
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
NULL);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
/* Don't let clients use us as a single-hop proxy, unless the user
* has explicitly allowed that in the config. It attracts attackers
* and users who'd be better off with, well, single-hop proxies.
*/
log_fn(LOG_PROTOCOL_WARN, LD_PROTOCOL,
"Attempt by %s to open a stream %s. Closing.",
safe_str(channel_get_canonical_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan)),
or_circ->is_first_hop ? "on first hop of circuit" :
"from unknown relay");
relay_send_end_cell_from_edge(rh.stream_id, circ,
or_circ->is_first_hop ?
END_STREAM_REASON_TORPROTOCOL :
END_STREAM_REASON_MISC,
NULL);
tor_free(address);
return 0;
}
}
} else if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
if (!directory_permits_begindir_requests(options) ||
@ -3101,8 +3105,8 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
* caller might want to know whether his IP address has changed, and
* we might already have corrected _base.addr[ess] for the relay's
* canonical IP address. */
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_conn)
address = tor_dup_addr(&or_circ->p_conn->real_addr);
if (or_circ && or_circ->p_chan)
address = tor_strdup(channel_get_actual_remote_descr(or_circ->p_chan));
else
address = tor_strdup("127.0.0.1");
port = 1; /* XXXX This value is never actually used anywhere, and there
@ -3178,8 +3182,6 @@ connection_exit_begin_conn(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
if (rh.command == RELAY_COMMAND_BEGIN_DIR) {
tor_assert(or_circ);
if (or_circ->p_conn && !tor_addr_is_null(&or_circ->p_conn->real_addr))
tor_addr_copy(&n_stream->_base.addr, &or_circ->p_conn->real_addr);
return connection_exit_connect_dir(n_stream);
}