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r12371@catbus: nickm | 2007-04-14 20:01:09 -0400
Add comments to blocking.tex based on an old email from Ian, so I can get the email out of my todo folder. svn:r9957
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@ -1280,6 +1280,9 @@ in the face of an adversary with limited resources.
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%bridge authority, in a way that's sticky even when we add bridge
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%directory authorities, but isn't sticky when our authority goes
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%away. Does this exist?)
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% [[Ian says: What about just using something like hash table chaining?
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% This should work, so long as the client knows which authorities currently
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% exist.]]
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%\subsection{Discovery based on social networks}
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@ -1322,6 +1325,19 @@ but we should keep both sides of the issue in mind.
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%Nick, want to rewrite/elaborate on this section?
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%Ian suggests:
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% Possession of Tor: this is totally of-the-cuff, and there are lots of
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% security issues to think about, but what about an ActiveX version of
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% Tor? The magic you learn (as opposed to a bridge address) is a plain
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% old HTTPS server, which feeds you an ActiveX applet pre-configured with
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% some bridge address (possibly on the same machine). For bonus points,
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% somehow arrange that (a) the applet is signed in some way the user can
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% reliably check, but (b) don't end up with anything like an incriminating
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% long-term cert stored on the user's computer. This may be marginally
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% useful in some Internet-cafe situations as well, though (a) is even
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% harder to get right there.
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\subsection{Observers can tell who is publishing and who is reading}
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\label{subsec:upload-padding}
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@ -1588,6 +1604,12 @@ SSL certificates.
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%it has received a message it does not understand (as would be the
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%case were it not a bridge).
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% Ian suggests a ``socialist millionaires'' protocol here, for something.
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% Did we once mention knocking here? it's a good idea, but we should clarify
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% what we mean. Ian also notes that knocking itself is very fingerprintable,
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% and we should beware.
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\subsection{How to motivate people to run bridge relays}
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\label{subsec:incentives}
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@ -1675,6 +1697,9 @@ each bridge, so users who hear about an honest bridge can get a good
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copy.
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See Section~\ref{subsec:first-bridge} for more discussion.
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% Ian suggests that we have every tor server distribute a signed copy of the
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% software.
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\section{Future designs}
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\label{sec:future}
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