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Fix log.c comments about assert vs tor_assert vs raw_assert.

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This commit is contained in:
Nick Mathewson 2018-08-28 15:58:16 -04:00
commit 219f6ea516
10 changed files with 145 additions and 34 deletions
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2
doc/tor.1.txt
View File

@ -2827,7 +2827,7 @@ The following options are used to configure a hidden service.
[[HiddenServiceVersion]] **HiddenServiceVersion** **2**|**3**::
A list of rendezvous service descriptor versions to publish for the hidden
service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 2)
service. Currently, versions 2 and 3 are supported. (Default: 3)
[[HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient]] **HiddenServiceAuthorizeClient** __auth-type__ __client-name__,__client-name__,__...__::
If configured, the hidden service is accessible for authorized clients

24
src/feature/hs/hs_config.c
View File

@ -143,6 +143,24 @@ helper_parse_uint64(const char *opt, const char *value, uint64_t min,
return ret;
}
/* Return the service version by trying to learn it from the key on disk if
* any. If nothing is found, the current service configured version is
* returned. */
static int
config_learn_service_version(hs_service_t *service)
{
int version;
tor_assert(service);
version = hs_service_get_version_from_key(service);
if (version < 0) {
version = service->config.version;
}
return version;
}
/* Return true iff the given options starting at line_ for a hidden service
* contains at least one invalid option. Each hidden service option don't
* apply to all versions so this function can find out. The line_ MUST start
@ -490,6 +508,12 @@ config_service(const config_line_t *line, const or_options_t *options,
0) < 0) {
goto err;
}
/* We'll try to learn the service version here by loading the key(s) if
* present. Depending on the key format, we can figure out the service
* version. If we can't find a key, the configuration version will be used
* which has been set previously. */
service->config.version = config_learn_service_version(service);
/* Different functions are in charge of specific options for a version. We
* start just after the service directory line so once we hit another
* directory line, the function knows that it has to stop parsing. */

57
src/feature/hs/hs_service.c
View File

@ -1037,7 +1037,7 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service)
/* Don't ask for key creation, we want to know if we were able to load it or
* we had to generate it. Better logging! */
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT, LOG_INFO, NULL, 0, 0,
0, NULL);
0, NULL, NULL);
if (!kp) {
log_info(LD_REND, "Unable to load keys from %s. Generating it...", fname);
/* We'll now try to generate the keys and for it we want the strongest
@ -1045,7 +1045,7 @@ load_service_keys(hs_service_t *service)
uint32_t key_flags = INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE | INIT_ED_KEY_EXTRA_STRONG |
INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT;
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, key_flags, LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0,
NULL);
NULL, NULL);
if (!kp) {
log_warn(LD_REND, "Unable to generate keys and save in %s.", fname);
goto end;
@ -2884,6 +2884,29 @@ service_add_fnames_to_list(const hs_service_t *service, smartlist_t *list)
smartlist_add(list, hs_path_from_filename(s_dir, fname));
}
/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. */
static int
service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
{
int ret = 0;
char *fname;
ed25519_keypair_t *kp = NULL;
tor_assert(directory_path);
/* Build the v3 key path name and then try to load it. */
fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, fname_keyfile_prefix);
kp = ed_key_init_from_file(fname, INIT_ED_KEY_SPLIT,
LOG_DEBUG, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, NULL);
if (kp) {
ret = 1;
}
ed25519_keypair_free(kp);
tor_free(fname);
return ret;
}
/* ========== */
/* Public API */
/* ========== */
@ -3375,6 +3398,36 @@ hs_service_circuit_has_opened(origin_circuit_t *circ)
}
}
/* Return the service version by looking at the key in the service directory.
* If the key is not found or unrecognized, -1 is returned. Else, the service
* version is returned. */
int
hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service)
{
int version = -1; /* Unknown version. */
const char *directory_path;
tor_assert(service);
/* We'll try to load the key for version 3. If not found, we'll try version
* 2 and if not found, we'll send back an unknown version (-1). */
directory_path = service->config.directory_path;
/* Version 3 check. */
if (service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
version = HS_VERSION_THREE;
goto end;
}
/* Version 2 check. */
if (rend_service_key_on_disk(directory_path)) {
version = HS_VERSION_TWO;
goto end;
}
end:
return version;
}
/* Load and/or generate keys for all onion services including the client
* authorization if any. Return 0 on success, -1 on failure. */
int

3
src/feature/hs/hs_service.h
View File

@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
/* When loading and configuring a service, this is the default version it will
* be configured for as it is possible that no HiddenServiceVersion is
* present. */
#define HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION HS_VERSION_TWO
#define HS_SERVICE_DEFAULT_VERSION HS_VERSION_THREE
/* As described in the specification, service publishes their next descriptor
* at a random time between those two values (in seconds). */
@ -262,6 +262,7 @@ void hs_service_free_(hs_service_t *service);
unsigned int hs_service_get_num_services(void);
void hs_service_stage_services(const smartlist_t *service_list);
int hs_service_load_all_keys(void);
int hs_service_get_version_from_key(const hs_service_t *service);
void hs_service_lists_fnames_for_sandbox(smartlist_t *file_list,
smartlist_t *dir_list);
int hs_service_set_conn_addr_port(const origin_circuit_t *circ,

21
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.c
View File

@ -248,6 +248,9 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
* <b>fname</b>, with certificate type <b>cert_type</b>. On failure, return
* NULL; on success return the keypair.
*
* The <b>options</b> is used to look at the change_key_passphrase value when
* writing to disk a secret key. It is safe to be NULL even in that case.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE is set in <b>flags</b>, then create the key (and
* certificate if requested) if it doesn't exist, and save it to disk.
*
@ -276,9 +279,6 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
* secret key unless no public key is found. Do not return a secret key. (but
* create and save one if needed).
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_NO_LOAD_SECRET is set in <b>flags</b>, don't try to load
* a secret key, no matter what.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_TRY_ENCRYPTED is set, we look for an encrypted secret key
* and consider encrypting any new secret key.
*
@ -291,6 +291,9 @@ write_secret_key(const ed25519_secret_key_t *key, int encrypted,
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_EXPLICIT_FNAME is set, use the provided file name for the
* secret key file, encrypted or not.
*
* If INIT_ED_KEY_OFFLINE_SECRET is set, we won't try to load the master
* secret key and we log a message at <b>severity</b> that we've done so.
*/
ed25519_keypair_t *
ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
@ -299,7 +302,8 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out)
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options)
{
char *secret_fname = NULL;
char *encrypted_secret_fname = NULL;
@ -503,7 +507,8 @@ ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
/* Write it to disk if we're supposed to do with a new passphrase, or if
* we just created it. */
if (created_sk || (have_secret && get_options()->change_key_passphrase)) {
if (created_sk || (have_secret && options != NULL &&
options->change_key_passphrase)) {
if (write_secret_key(&keypair->seckey,
encrypt_key,
secret_fname, tag, encrypted_secret_fname) < 0
@ -734,7 +739,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT|
INIT_ED_KEY_INCLUDE_SIGNING_KEY_IN_CERT,
LOG_INFO,
NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert);
NULL, 0, 0, CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options);
tor_free(fname);
check_signing_cert = sign_cert;
use_signing = sign;
@ -836,7 +841,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
id = ed_key_init_from_file(
fname,
flags,
LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL);
LOG_WARN, NULL, 0, 0, 0, NULL, options);
tor_free(fname);
if (!id) {
if (need_new_signing_key) {
@ -904,7 +909,7 @@ load_ed_keys(const or_options_t *options, time_t now)
flags, LOG_WARN,
sign_signing_key_with_id, now,
options->SigningKeyLifetime,
CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert);
CERT_TYPE_ID_SIGNING, &sign_cert, options);
tor_free(fname);
if (!sign)
FAIL("Missing signing key");

3
src/feature/relay/routerkeys.h
View File

@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_init_from_file(const char *fname, uint32_t flags,
time_t now,
time_t lifetime,
uint8_t cert_type,
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out);
struct tor_cert_st **cert_out,
const or_options_t *options);
ed25519_keypair_t *ed_key_new(const ed25519_keypair_t *signing_key,
uint32_t flags,
time_t now,

23
src/feature/rend/rendservice.c
View File

@ -1341,6 +1341,29 @@ rend_service_poison_new_single_onion_dir(const rend_service_t *s,
return 0;
}
/* Return true iff the given service identity key is present on disk. This is
* used to try to learn the service version during configuration time. */
int
rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path)
{
int ret = 0;
char *fname;
crypto_pk_t *pk = NULL;
tor_assert(directory_path);
/* Load key */
fname = hs_path_from_filename(directory_path, private_key_fname);
pk = init_key_from_file(fname, 0, LOG_DEBUG, 0);
if (pk) {
ret = 1;
}
crypto_pk_free(pk);
tor_free(fname);
return ret;
}
/** Load and/or generate private keys for all hidden services, possibly
* including keys for client authorization.
* If a <b>service_list</b> is provided, treat it as the list of hidden

1
src/feature/rend/rendservice.h
View File

@ -145,6 +145,7 @@ int rend_config_service(const struct config_line_t *line_,
void rend_service_prune_list(void);
void rend_service_free_staging_list(void);
int rend_service_load_all_keys(const smartlist_t *service_list);
int rend_service_key_on_disk(const char *directory_path);
void rend_services_add_filenames_to_lists(smartlist_t *open_lst,
smartlist_t *stat_lst);
void rend_consider_services_intro_points(time_t now);

9
src/lib/log/log.c
View File

@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ sev_to_string(int severity)
case LOG_NOTICE: return "notice";
case LOG_WARN: return "warn";
case LOG_ERR: return "err";
default: /* Call assert, not tor_assert, since tor_assert
default: /* Call raw_assert, not tor_assert, since tor_assert
* calls log on failure. */
raw_assert_unreached(); return "UNKNOWN"; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
@ -122,7 +122,8 @@ should_log_function_name(log_domain_mask_t domain, int severity)
/* We care about places where bugs occur. */
return (domain & (LD_BUG|LD_NOFUNCNAME)) == LD_BUG;
default:
/* Call assert, not tor_assert, since tor_assert calls log on failure. */
/* Call raw_assert, not tor_assert, since tor_assert calls
* log on failure. */
raw_assert(0); return 0; // LCOV_EXCL_LINE
}
}
@ -579,7 +580,7 @@ logv,(int severity, log_domain_mask_t domain, const char *funcname,
char *end_of_prefix=NULL;
int callbacks_deferred = 0;
/* Call assert, not raw_assert, since raw_assert calls log on failure. */
/* Call raw_assert, not tor_assert, since tor_assert calls log on failure. */
raw_assert(format);
/* check that severity is sane. Overrunning the masks array leads to
* interesting and hard to diagnose effects */
@ -694,7 +695,7 @@ tor_log_update_sigsafe_err_fds(void)
if (!found_real_stderr &&
int_array_contains(fds, n_fds, STDOUT_FILENO)) {
/* Don't use a virtual stderr when we're also logging to stdout. */
raw_assert(n_fds >= 2); /* Don't raw_assert inside log fns */
raw_assert(n_fds >= 2); /* Don't tor_assert inside log fns */
fds[0] = fds[--n_fds];
}

36
src/test/test_routerkeys.c
View File

@ -262,13 +262,14 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
unlink(fname2);
/* Fail to load a key that isn't there. */
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert,
NULL);
tt_assert(kp1 == NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
/* Create the key if requested to do so. */
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO,
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp1 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_1_cert"), &st), OP_LT, 0);
@ -276,24 +277,24 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
/* Fail to load if we say we need a cert */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT, LOG_INFO,
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
/* Fail to load if we say the wrong key type */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO,
NULL, now, 0, 6, &cert);
NULL, now, 0, 6, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
/* Load successfully if we're not picky, whether we say "create" or not. */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE, LOG_INFO,
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
ed25519_keypair_free(kp2); kp2 = NULL;
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, 0, LOG_INFO,
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
@ -302,7 +303,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
/* Now create a key with a cert. */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT),
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert);
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert != NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_NE, kp2, sizeof(*kp1));
@ -315,7 +316,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
/* Now verify we can load the cert... */
kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, (INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE|
INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT),
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, OP_EQ, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
@ -323,7 +324,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
/* ... even without create... */
kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
tt_mem_op(cert2->encoded, OP_EQ, cert->encoded, cert->encoded_len);
ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
@ -331,13 +332,13 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_basic(void *arg)
/* ... but that we don't crash or anything if we say we don't want it. */
kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, NULL);
LOG_INFO, kp1, now, 7200, 7, NULL, NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp2, OP_EQ, kp3, sizeof(*kp2));
ed25519_keypair_free(kp3); kp3 = NULL;
/* Fail if we're told the wrong signing key */
kp3 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname2, INIT_ED_KEY_NEEDCERT,
LOG_INFO, kp2, now, 7200, 7, &cert2);
LOG_INFO, kp2, now, 7200, 7, &cert2, NULL);
tt_assert(kp3 == NULL);
tt_assert(cert2 == NULL);
@ -368,13 +369,14 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
unlink(fname2);
/* Can't load key that isn't there. */
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags, LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert,
NULL);
tt_assert(kp1 == NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
/* Create a split key */
kp1 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp1 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_int_op(stat(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_cert"), &st), OP_LT, 0);
@ -383,7 +385,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
/* Load it. */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_mem_op(kp1, OP_EQ, kp2, sizeof(*kp2));
@ -392,7 +394,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
/* Okay, try killing the secret key and loading it. */
unlink(get_fname("test_ed_key_3_secret_key"));
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags,
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, OP_EQ, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey));
@ -402,7 +404,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
/* Even when we're told to "create", don't create if there's a public key */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags|INIT_ED_KEY_CREATE,
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert);
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 7, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 != NULL);
tt_assert(cert == NULL);
tt_mem_op(&kp1->pubkey, OP_EQ, &kp2->pubkey, sizeof(kp2->pubkey));
@ -412,7 +414,7 @@ test_routerkeys_ed_key_init_split(void *arg)
/* Make sure we fail on a tag mismatch, though */
kp2 = ed_key_init_from_file(fname1, flags,
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 99, &cert);
LOG_INFO, NULL, now, 0, 99, &cert, NULL);
tt_assert(kp2 == NULL);
done: