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Merge branch 'people-to-node-type'
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commit
1bd562f1c4
11 changed files with 17 additions and 17 deletions
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@ -1164,7 +1164,7 @@ circuit_extend(cell_t *cell, circuit_t *circ)
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/* Check if they asked us for 0000..0000. We support using
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* an empty fingerprint for the first hop (e.g. for a bridge relay),
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* but we don't want to let people send us extend cells for empty
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* but we don't want to let clients send us extend cells for empty
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* fingerprints -- a) because it opens the user up to a mitm attack,
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* and b) because it lets an attacker force the relay to hold open a
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* new TLS connection for each extend request. */
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@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ circuit_build_times_network_check_changed(circuit_build_times_t *cbt)
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#define MAX_TIMEOUT ((int32_t) (INT32_MAX/2))
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/* Check to see if this has happened before. If so, double the timeout
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* to give people on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
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* to give clients on abysmally bad network connections a shot at access */
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if (cbt->timeout_ms >= circuit_build_times_get_initial_timeout()) {
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if (cbt->timeout_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT || cbt->close_ms > MAX_TIMEOUT) {
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log_warn(LD_CIRC, "Insanely large circuit build timeout value. "
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@ -2598,7 +2598,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_attach_circuit(entry_connection_t *conn)
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log_debug(LD_APP|LD_CIRC,
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"Attaching apconn to circ %u (stream %d sec old).",
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(unsigned)circ->base_.n_circ_id, conn_age);
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/* print the circ's path, so people can figure out which circs are
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/* print the circ's path, so clients can figure out which circs are
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* sucking. */
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circuit_log_path(LOG_INFO,LD_APP|LD_CIRC,circ);
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@ -1899,7 +1899,7 @@ options_act(const or_options_t *old_options)
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addressmap_clear_invalid_automaps(options);
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/* How long should we delay counting bridge stats after becoming a bridge?
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* We use this so we don't count people who used our bridge thinking it is
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* We use this so we don't count clients who used our bridge thinking it is
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* a relay. If you change this, don't forget to change the log message
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* below. It's 4 hours (the time it takes to stop being used by clients)
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* plus some extra time for clock skew. */
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@ -1300,7 +1300,7 @@ connection_ap_handshake_rewrite(entry_connection_t *conn,
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* an internal address? If so, we should reject it if we're configured to
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* do so. */
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if (options->ClientDNSRejectInternalAddresses) {
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/* Don't let people try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
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/* Don't let clients try to do a reverse lookup on 10.0.0.1. */
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tor_addr_t addr;
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int ok;
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ok = tor_addr_parse_PTR_name(
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@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ directory_caches_dir_info(const or_options_t *options)
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should_refuse_unknown_exits(options);
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}
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/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote people to ask us directory
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/** Return 1 if we want to allow remote clients to ask us directory
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* requests via the "begin_dir" interface, which doesn't require
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* having any separate port open. */
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int
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@ -2236,8 +2236,8 @@ dirserv_set_routerstatus_testing(routerstatus_t *rs)
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}
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/** Routerstatus <b>rs</b> is part of a group of routers that are on
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* too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags: we don't want people
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* using it.
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* too narrow an IP-space. Clear out its flags since we don't want it be used
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* because of its Sybil-like appearance.
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*/
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static void
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clear_status_flags_on_sybil(routerstatus_t *rs)
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@ -284,7 +284,7 @@ dnsserv_reject_request(entry_connection_t *conn)
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}
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/** Look up the original name that corresponds to 'addr' in req. We use this
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* to preserve case in order to facilitate people using 0x20-hacks to avoid
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* to preserve case in order to facilitate clients using 0x20-hacks to avoid
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* DNS poisoning. */
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static const char *
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evdns_get_orig_address(const struct evdns_server_request *req,
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@ -424,8 +424,8 @@ configure_accounting(time_t now)
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if (-0.50 <= delta && delta <= 0.50) {
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/* The start of the period is now a little later or earlier than we
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* remembered. That's fine; we might lose some bytes we could otherwise
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* have written, but better to err on the side of obeying people's
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* accounting settings. */
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* have written, but better to err on the side of obeying accounting
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* settings. */
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log_info(LD_ACCT, "Accounting interval moved by %.02f%%; "
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"that's fine.", delta*100);
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interval_end_time = start_of_accounting_period_after(now);
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@ -896,7 +896,7 @@ hibernate_go_dormant(time_t now)
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log_notice(LD_ACCT,"Going dormant. Blowing away remaining connections.");
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/* Close all OR/AP/exit conns. Leave dir conns because we still want
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* to be able to upload server descriptors so people know we're still
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* to be able to upload server descriptors so clients know we're still
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* running, and download directories so we can detect if we're obsolete.
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* Leave control conns because we still want to be controllable.
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*/
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@ -3883,7 +3883,7 @@ typedef struct {
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uint64_t BandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, are we willing
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* to use in a second? */
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uint64_t MaxAdvertisedBandwidth; /**< How much bandwidth are we willing to
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* tell people we have? */
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* tell other nodes we have? */
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uint64_t RelayBandwidthRate; /**< How much bandwidth, on average, are we
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* willing to use for all relayed conns? */
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uint64_t RelayBandwidthBurst; /**< How much bandwidth, at maximum, will we
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@ -1178,9 +1178,9 @@ router_should_be_directory_server(const or_options_t *options, int dir_port)
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if (accounting_is_enabled(options) &&
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get_options()->AccountingRule != ACCT_IN) {
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/* Don't spend bytes for directory traffic if we could end up hibernating,
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* but allow DirPort otherwise. Some people set AccountingMax because
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* they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a much
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* larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
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* but allow DirPort otherwise. Some relay operators set AccountingMax
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* because they're confused or to get statistics. Directory traffic has a
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* much larger effect on output than input so there is no reason to turn it
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* off if using AccountingRule in. */
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int interval_length = accounting_get_interval_length();
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uint32_t effective_bw = get_effective_bwrate(options);
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@ -4496,7 +4496,7 @@ router_load_extrainfo_from_string(const char *s, const char *eos,
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ei->cache_info.identity_digest,
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DIGEST_LEN);
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smartlist_string_remove(requested_fingerprints, fp);
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/* We silently let people stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for,
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/* We silently let relays stuff us with extrainfos we didn't ask for,
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* so long as we would have wanted them anyway. Since we always fetch
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* all the extrainfos we want, and we never actually act on them
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* inside Tor, this should be harmless. */
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