From 1309885fcdf6c91ebc48ad84816212ef915173c2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Nick Mathewson Date: Sat, 22 Jan 2005 01:35:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] Turn challenges.tex into minimally valid LaTeX svn:r3411 --- doc/design-paper/challenges.tex | 12 +++++++----- 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex index 62f9aee7c9..dd310911af 100644 --- a/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex +++ b/doc/design-paper/challenges.tex @@ -1,8 +1,8 @@ +\documentclass[twocolumn]{article} +\title{Challenges in bringing low-latency stream anonymity to the masses (DRAFT)} - -Challenges in bringing low-latency stream anonymity to the masses - +\begin{document} \section{Introduction} @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ useful network to a practical useful anonymous network. Tor works like this. -weasel's graph of # nodes and of bandwidth, ideally from week 0. +weasel's graph of \# nodes and of bandwidth, ideally from week 0. Tor has the following goals. @@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ continued money, and they periodically ask what they will do when it dries up. Logging. Making logs not revealing. A happy coincidence that verbose -logging is our #2 performance bottleneck. Is there a way to detect +logging is our \#2 performance bottleneck. Is there a way to detect modified servers, or to have them volunteer the information that they're logging verbosely? Would that actually solve any attacks? @@ -172,3 +172,5 @@ assuming that, how much anonymity can we get. we're not here to model or to simulate or to produce equations and formulae. but those have their roles too. +\end{document} +