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a few more discovery pieces, so i have something to send nart

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svn:r8880
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Roger Dingledine 2006-10-31 04:30:26 +00:00
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doc/design-paper/blocking.tex
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@ -4,11 +4,11 @@
\usepackage{amsmath}
\usepackage{epsfig}
%\setlength{\textwidth}{5.9in}
%\setlength{\textheight}{8.4in}
%\setlength{\topmargin}{.5cm}
%\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{1cm}
%\setlength{\evensidemargin}{1cm}
\setlength{\textwidth}{5.9in}
\setlength{\textheight}{8.4in}
\setlength{\topmargin}{.5cm}
\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{1cm}
\setlength{\evensidemargin}{1cm}
\newenvironment{tightlist}{\begin{list}{$\bullet$}{
\setlength{\itemsep}{0mm}
@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
\begin{document}
\title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system}
\title{Design of a blocking-resistant anonymity system\\DRAFT}
%\author{Roger Dingledine\inst{1} \and Nick Mathewson\inst{1}}
\author{Roger Dingledine \and Nick Mathewson}
@ -763,16 +763,28 @@ available bridges),
\subsection{Social networks with directory-side support}
In the above designs,
- social network scheme, with accounts and stuff.
- public proxies. given out like circumventors. or all sorts of other rate limiting ways.
Pick some seeds --- trusted people in the blocked area --- and give
them each a few hundred bridge addresses. Run a website next to the
bridge authority, where they can log in (they only need persistent
pseudonyms). Give them tokens slowly over time. They can use these
tokens to delegate trust to other people they know. The tokens can
be exchanged for new accounts on the website.
Accounts in ``good standing'' accrue new bridge addresses and new
tokens.
This is great, except how do we decide that an account is in good
standing? One answer is to measure based on whether the bridge addresses
we give it end up blocked. But how do we decide if they get blocked?
Other questions below too.
\subsection{Public bridges, allocated in different ways}
public proxies. given out like circumventors. or all sorts of other rate
limiting ways.
\subsection{Remaining unsorted notes}
In the first subsection we describe how to find a first bridge.
@ -836,23 +848,21 @@ There are two reasons why we're in better shape. Firstly, the users don't
actually need to reach the watering hole directly: it can respond to
email, for example. Secondly,
% In fact, the JAP
%project~\cite{web-mix,koepsell:wpes2004} suggested an alternative approach
%to a mailing list: new users email a central address and get an automated
%response listing a proxy for them.
% While the exact details of the
%proposal are still to be worked out, the idea of giving out
In fact, the JAP
project~\cite{web-mix,koepsell:wpes2004} suggested an alternative approach
to a mailing list: new users email a central address and get an automated
response listing a proxy for them.
While the exact details of the
proposal are still to be worked out, the idea of giving out
\subsection{Discovery based on social networks}
A token that can be exchanged at the BDA (assuming you
can reach it) for a new IP:dirport or server descriptor.
A token that can be exchanged at the bridge authority (assuming you
can reach it) for a new bridge address.
The account server
runs as a Tor controller for the bridge authority
The account server runs as a Tor controller for the bridge authority.
Users can establish reputations, perhaps based on social network
connectivity, perhaps based on not getting their bridge relays blocked,
@ -971,6 +981,22 @@ solution though.
\section{Security considerations}
\label{sec:security}
\subsection{Possession of Tor in oppressed areas}
Many people speculate that installing and using a Tor client in areas with
particularly extreme firewalls is a high risk --- and the risk increases
as the firewall gets more restrictive. This is probably true, but there's
a counter pressure as well: as the firewall gets more restrictive, more
ordinary people use Tor for more mainstream activities, such as learning
about Wall Street prices or looking at pictures of women's ankles. So
if the restrictive firewall pushes up the number of Tor users, then the
``typical'' Tor user becomes more mainstream.
Hard to say which of these pressures will ultimately win out.
...
% Nick can rewrite/elaborate on this section?
\subsection{Observers can tell who is publishing and who is reading}
\label{subsec:upload-padding}