2016-09-05 19:03:30 +03:00
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/* Copyright (c) 2016, The Tor Project, Inc. */
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/* See LICENSE for licensing information */
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/**
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* \file test_hs_service.c
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* \brief Test hidden service functionality.
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*/
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#define HS_SERVICE_PRIVATE
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#define HS_INTROPOINT_PRIVATE
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#define RENDSERVICE_PRIVATE
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#define CIRCUITLIST_PRIVATE
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#include "test.h"
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#include "crypto.h"
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#include "or.h"
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#include "ht.h"
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#include "hs/cell_establish_intro.h"
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#include "hs_service.h"
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#include "hs_circuitmap.h"
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#include "hs_intropoint.h"
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#include "circuitlist.h"
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#include "circuituse.h"
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#include "rendservice.h"
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/* Mock function to avoid networking in unittests */
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static int
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mock_send_intro_established_cell(or_circuit_t *circ)
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{
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(void) circ;
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return 0;
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}
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/* Try sending an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell on a circuit that is already an intro
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* point. Should fail. */
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static void
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test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
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uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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ssize_t cell_len = 0;
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2016-12-12 16:45:28 -05:00
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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2016-09-05 19:03:30 +03:00
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(void)arg;
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/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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2016-09-05 19:03:30 +03:00
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memcpy(intro_circ->rend_circ_nonce, circuit_key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
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/* Set a bad circuit purpose!! :) */
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_INTRO_POINT);
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/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
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attempt to parse it. */
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establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
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sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
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cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
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establish_intro_cell);
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tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
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/* Receive the cell */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
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done:
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hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
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}
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/* Prepare a circuit for accepting an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell */
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static void
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(or_circuit_t *circ,
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uint8_t *circuit_key_material)
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{
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/* Prepare the circuit for the incoming ESTABLISH_INTRO */
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circuit_change_purpose(TO_CIRCUIT(circ), CIRCUIT_PURPOSE_OR);
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memcpy(circ->rend_circ_nonce, circuit_key_material, DIGEST_LEN);
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}
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/* Send an empty ESTABLISH_INTRO cell. Should fail. */
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static void
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test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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(void)arg;
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/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
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/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, (uint8_t*)"", 0);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
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done:
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
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}
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/* Send an ESTABLISH_INTRO cell with an unknown auth key type. Should fail. */
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static void
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test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
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uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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ssize_t cell_len = 0;
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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2016-09-05 19:03:30 +03:00
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(void)arg;
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/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
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/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
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attempt to parse it. */
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establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
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sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
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cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
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establish_intro_cell);
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tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
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/* Mutate the auth key type! :) */
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cell_body[0] = 42;
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/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
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done:
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hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
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}
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/* Send a legit ESTABLISH_INTRO cell but slightly change the signature. Should
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* fail. */
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static void
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test_establish_intro_wrong_sig(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0,NULL);;
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uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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ssize_t cell_len = 0;
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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2016-09-05 19:03:30 +03:00
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(void)arg;
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/* Get the auth key of the intro point */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
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/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
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attempt to parse it. */
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establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
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sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
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cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
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establish_intro_cell);
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tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
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/* Mutate the last byte (signature)! :) */
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cell_body[cell_len-1]++;
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/* Receive the cell. Should fail. */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, -1);
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done:
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hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
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}
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/* Helper function: Send a well-formed v3 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell to
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* <b>intro_circ</b>. Return the cell. */
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static hs_cell_establish_intro_t *
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helper_establish_intro_v3(or_circuit_t *intro_circ)
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{
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int retval;
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hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
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uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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ssize_t cell_len = 0;
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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tt_assert(intro_circ);
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/* Prepare the circuit for the incoming ESTABLISH_INTRO */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
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/* Create outgoing ESTABLISH_INTRO cell and extract its payload so that we
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attempt to parse it. */
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establish_intro_cell = generate_establish_intro_cell(circuit_key_material,
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sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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tt_assert(establish_intro_cell);
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cell_len = get_establish_intro_payload(cell_body, sizeof(cell_body),
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establish_intro_cell);
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tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
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/* Receive the cell */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ, cell_body, cell_len);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
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done:
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return establish_intro_cell;
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}
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/* Helper function: Send a well-formed v2 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell to
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* <b>intro_circ</b>. Return the public key advertised in the cell. */
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static crypto_pk_t *
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helper_establish_intro_v2(or_circuit_t *intro_circ)
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{
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crypto_pk_t *key1 = NULL;
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int retval;
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uint8_t cell_body[RELAY_PAYLOAD_SIZE];
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ssize_t cell_len = 0;
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uint8_t circuit_key_material[DIGEST_LEN] = {0};
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tt_assert(intro_circ);
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/* Prepare the circuit for the incoming ESTABLISH_INTRO */
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crypto_rand((char *) circuit_key_material, sizeof(circuit_key_material));
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helper_prepare_circ_for_intro(intro_circ, circuit_key_material);
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/* Send legacy establish_intro */
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key1 = pk_generate(0);
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/* Use old circuit_key_material why not */
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cell_len = encode_establish_intro_cell_legacy((char*)cell_body,
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key1,
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(char *) circuit_key_material);
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tt_int_op(cell_len, >, 0);
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/* Receive legacy establish_intro */
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retval = hs_intro_received_establish_intro(intro_circ,
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cell_body, cell_len);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
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done:
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return key1;
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}
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/** Successfuly register a v2 intro point and a v3 intro point. Ensure that HS
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* circuitmap is maintained properly. */
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static void
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test_intro_point_registration(void *arg)
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{
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int retval;
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hs_circuitmap_ht *the_hs_circuitmap = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *intro_circ = NULL;
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hs_cell_establish_intro_t *establish_intro_cell = NULL;
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ed25519_public_key_t auth_key;
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crypto_pk_t *legacy_auth_key = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *legacy_intro_circ = NULL;
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or_circuit_t *returned_intro_circ = NULL;
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(void) arg;
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MOCK(hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell, mock_send_intro_established_cell);
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hs_circuitmap_init();
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/* Check that the circuitmap is currently empty */
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{
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the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
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tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
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tt_int_op(0, ==, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
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/* Do a circuitmap query in any case */
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returned_intro_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3(&auth_key);
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tt_ptr_op(returned_intro_circ, ==, NULL);
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}
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/* Create a v3 intro point */
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{
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intro_circ = or_circuit_new(0, NULL);
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tt_assert(intro_circ);
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establish_intro_cell = helper_establish_intro_v3(intro_circ);
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/* Check that the intro point was registered on the HS circuitmap */
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the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
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tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
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tt_int_op(1, ==, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
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get_auth_key_from_establish_intro_cell(&auth_key, establish_intro_cell);
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returned_intro_circ = hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v3(&auth_key);
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tt_ptr_op(intro_circ, ==, returned_intro_circ);
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}
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/* Create a v2 intro point */
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{
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char key_digest[DIGEST_LEN];
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legacy_intro_circ = or_circuit_new(1, NULL);
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tt_assert(legacy_intro_circ);
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legacy_auth_key = helper_establish_intro_v2(legacy_intro_circ);
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tt_assert(legacy_auth_key);
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/* Check that the circuitmap now has two elements */
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the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
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tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
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tt_int_op(2, ==, HT_SIZE(the_hs_circuitmap));
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/* Check that the new element is our legacy intro circuit. */
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retval = crypto_pk_get_digest(legacy_auth_key, key_digest);
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tt_int_op(retval, ==, 0);
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returned_intro_circ= hs_circuitmap_get_intro_circ_v2((uint8_t*)key_digest);
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tt_ptr_op(legacy_intro_circ, ==, returned_intro_circ);
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}
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/* XXX Continue test and try to register a second v3 intro point with the
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* same auth key. Make sure that old intro circuit gets closed. */
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done:
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crypto_pk_free(legacy_auth_key);
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(intro_circ));
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circuit_free(TO_CIRCUIT(legacy_intro_circ));
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hs_cell_establish_intro_free(establish_intro_cell);
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{ /* Test circuitmap free_all function. */
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|
|
the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
|
|
|
|
tt_assert(the_hs_circuitmap);
|
|
|
|
hs_circuitmap_free_all();
|
|
|
|
the_hs_circuitmap = get_hs_circuitmap();
|
|
|
|
tt_assert(!the_hs_circuitmap);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
UNMOCK(hs_intro_send_intro_established_cell);
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
struct testcase_t hs_intropoint_tests[] = {
|
|
|
|
{ "intro_point_registration",
|
|
|
|
test_intro_point_registration, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_keytype",
|
|
|
|
test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2",
|
|
|
|
test_establish_intro_wrong_keytype2, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_purpose",
|
|
|
|
test_establish_intro_wrong_purpose, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
{ "receive_establish_intro_wrong_sig",
|
|
|
|
test_establish_intro_wrong_sig, TT_FORK, NULL, NULL },
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
END_OF_TESTCASES
|
|
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|