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293 lines
13 KiB
Text
293 lines
13 KiB
Text
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Filename: 115-two-hop-paths.txt
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Title: Two Hop Paths
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Version: $Revision$
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Last-Modified: $Date$
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Author: Mike Perry
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Created:
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Status: Open
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Supersedes: 112
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Overview:
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The idea is that users should be able to choose if they would like
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to have either two or three hop paths through the tor network.
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This value should be modifiable from the controller, and should be
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available from Vidalia.
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Motivation:
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The Tor network is slow and overloaded. Increasingly often I hear
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stories about friends and friends of friends who are behind firewalls,
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annoying censorware, or under surveillance that interferes with their
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productivity and Internet usage, or chills their speech. These people
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know about Tor, but they choose to put up with the censorship because
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Tor is too slow to be usable for them. In fact, to download a fresh,
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complete copy of levine-timing.pdf for the Theoretical Argument
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section of this proposal over Tor took me 3 tries.
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Furthermore, the biggest current problem with Tor's anonymity for
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those who really need it is not someone attacking the network to
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discover who they are. It's instead the extreme danger that so few
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people use Tor because it's so slow, that those who do use it have
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essentially no confusion set.
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The recent case where the professor and the rogue Tor user were the
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only Tor users on campus, and thus suspected in an incident involving
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Tor and that University underscores this point: "That was why the police
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had come to see me. They told me that only two people on our campus were
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using Tor: me and someone they suspected of engaging in an online scam.
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The detectives wanted to know whether the other user was a former
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student of mine, and why I was using Tor"[1].
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Not only does Tor provide no anonymity if you use it to be anonymous
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but are obviously from a certain institution, location or circumstance,
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it is also dangerous to use Tor for risk of being accused of having
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something significant enough to hide to be willing to put up with
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the horrible performance.
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There are many ways to improve the speed problem, and of course we
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should and will implement as many as we can. Johannes's GSoC project
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and my reputation system are longer term, higher-effort things that
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will still provide benefit independent of this proposal.
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However, reducing the path length to 2 for those who do not need the
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(questionable) extra anonymity 3 hops provide not only improves their
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Tor experience but also reduces their load on the Tor network by 33%,
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and can be done in less than 10 lines of code (not counting various
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security enhancements). That's not just Win-Win, it's Win-Win-Win.
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Theoretical Argument:
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It has long been established that timing attacks against mixed
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and onion networks are extremely effective, and that regardless
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of path length, if the adversary has compromised your first and
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last hop of your path, you can assume they have compromised your
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identity for that connection.
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In fact, it was demonstrated that for all but the slowest, lossiest
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networks, error rates for false positives and false negatives were
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very near zero[2]. Only for constant streams of traffic over slow and
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(more importantly) extremely lossy network links did the error rate
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hit 20%. For loss rates typical to the Internet, even the error rate
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for slow nodes with constant traffic streams was 13%.
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When you take into account that most Tor streams are not constant,
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but probably much more like their "HomeIP" dataset, which consists
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mostly of web traffic that exists over finite intervals at specific
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times, error rates drop to fractions of 1%, even for the "worst"
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network nodes.
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Therefore, the user has little benefit from the extra hop, assuming
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the adversary does timing correlation on their nodes. Since timing
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correlation is simply an implementation issue and is most likely
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a single up-front cost (and one that is like quite a bit cheaper
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than the cost of the machines purchased to host the nodes to mount
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an attack), the real protection is the low probability of getting
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both the first and last hop of a client's stream.
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Practical Issues:
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Theoretical issues aside, there are several practical issues with the
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implementation of Tor that need to be addressed to ensure that
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identity information is not leaked by the implementation.
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Exit policy issues:
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If a client chooses an exit with a very restrictive exit policy
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(such as an IP or IP range), the first hop then knows a good deal
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about the destination. For this reason, clients should not select
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exits that match their destination IP with anything other than "*".
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Partitioning:
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Partitioning attacks form another concern. Since Tor uses telescoping
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to build circuits, it is possible to tell a user is constructing only
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two hop paths at the entry node and on the local network. An external
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adversary can potentially differentiate 2 and 3 hop users, and decide
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that all IP addresses connecting to Tor and using 3 hops have something
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to hide, and should be scrutinized more closely or outright apprehended.
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One solution to this is to use the "leaky-circuit" method of attaching
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streams: The user always creates 3-hop circuits, but if the option
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is enabled, they always exit from their 2nd hop. The ideal solution
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would be to create a RELAY_SHISHKABOB cell which contains onion
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skins for every host along the path, but this requires protocol
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changes at the nodes to support.
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Guard nodes:
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Since guard nodes do rotate due to network failure, node upgrades and
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other issues, if you amortize the risk a user is exposed to over any
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reasonable duration of Tor usage (on the order of a year), it is the
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same with or without guard nodes. Assuming an adversary has c%/n% of
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network bandwidth, and guards rotate on average with period R,
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statistically speaking, it's merely a question of if the user wishes
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their risk to be concentrated with probability c/n over an expected
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period of R*c, and probability 0 over an expected period of R*(n-c),
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versus a continuous risk of (c/n)^2. So statistically speaking, guards
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only create a time-tradeoff of risk over the long run for normal Tor
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usage. They do not reduce risk for normal client usage long term.[3]
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Guard nodes do offer a measure of accountability of sorts. If a user
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was using a small set of guard nodes, and then is suddenly apprehended
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as a result of Tor usage, having a fixed set of entry points to suspect
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is a lot better than suspecting the whole network.
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It has been speculated that a set of guard nodes can be used to
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fingerprint a user (presumably by a local adversary) when they move
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about. However, it is precisely this activity of moving your laptop that
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causes guards to be marked as down by the Tor client, which then chooses
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new ones.
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All of this is not terribly relevant to this proposal, but worth bearing
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in mind, since guard nodes do have a bit more ability to wreak
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havoc with two hops than with three.
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Two hop paths allow malicious guards to get considerably more benefit
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from failing circuits if they do not extend to their colluding peers for
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the exit hop. Since guards can detect the number of hops in a path via
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either timing or by statistical analysis of the exit policy of the 2nd
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hop, they can perform this attack predominantly against 2 hop users
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only.
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This can be addressed by completely abandoning an entry guard after a
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certain ratio of extend or general circuit failures with respect to
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non-failed circuits. The proper value for this ratio can be determined
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experimentally with TorFlow. There is the possibility that the local
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network can abuse this feature to cause certain guards to be dropped,
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but they can do that anyways with the current Tor by just making guards
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they don't like unreachable. With this mechanism, Tor will complain
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loudly if any guard failure rate exceeds the expected in any failure
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case, local or remote.
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Eliminating guards entirely would actually not address this issue due
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to the time-tradeoff nature of risk. In fact, it would just make it
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worse. Without guard nodes, it becomes much more difficult for clients
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to become alerted to Tor entry points that are failing circuits to make
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sure that they only devote bandwidth to carry traffic for streams which
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they observe both ends.
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For this reason, guard nodes should remain enabled for 2 hop users,
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at least until an IP-independent, undetectable guard scanner can
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be created. TorFlow can scan for failing guards, but after a while,
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its unique behavior gives away the fact that its IP is a scanner and
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it can be given selective service.
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Why not fix Pathlen=2?:
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The main reason I am not advocating that we always use 2 hops is that
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in some situations, timing correlation evidence by itself may not be
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considered as solid and convincing as an actual, uninterrupted, fully
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traced path. Are these timing attacks as effective on a real network as
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they are in simulation? Maybe the circuit multiplexing of Tor can serve
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to frustrate them to a degree? Would an extralegal adversary or
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authoritarian government even care? In the face of these situation
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dependent unknowns, it should be up to the user to decide if this is
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a concern for them or not.
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It should probably also be noted that even a false positive
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rate of 1% for a 200k concurrent-user network could mean that for a
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given node, a given stream could be confused with something like 10
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users, assuming ~200 nodes carry most of the traffic (ie 1000 users
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each). Though of course to really know for sure, someone needs to do
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an attack on a real network, unfortunately.
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Additionally, at some point cover traffic schemes may be implemented to
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frustrate timing attacks on the first hop. It is possible some expert
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users may do this ad-hoc already, and may wish to continue using 3 hops
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for this reason.
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Who will enable this option?
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This is the crux of the proposal. Admittedly, there is some anonymity
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loss and some degree of decreased investment required on the part of
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the adversary to attack 2 hop users versus 3 hop users, even if it is
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minimal and limited mostly to up-front costs and false positives.
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The key questions are:
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1. Are these users in a class such that their risk is significantly
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less than the amount of this anonymity loss?
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2. Are these users able to identify themselves?
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Many many users of Tor are not at risk for an adversary capturing c/n
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nodes of the network just to see what they do. These users use Tor to
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circumvent aggressive content filters, or simply to keep their IP out of
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marketing and search engine databases. Most content filters have no
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interest in running Tor nodes to catch violators, and marketers
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certainly would never consider such a thing, both on a cost basis and a
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legal one.
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In a sense, this represents an alternate threat model against these
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users who are not at risk for Tor's normal threat model.
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It should be evident to these users that they fall into this class. All
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that should be needed is a radio button
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* "I use Tor for censorship resistance and IP obfuscation, not anonymity.
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Speed is more important to me than high anonymity."
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* "I use Tor for anonymity. I need more protection at the cost of speed."
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and then some explanation in the help for exactly what this means, and
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the risks involved with eliminating the adversary's need for timing
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attacks with respect to false positives.
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Implementation:
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new_route_len() can be modified directly with a check of the
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Pathlen option.
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The exit policy hack is a bit more tricky. compare_addr_to_addr_policy
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needs to return an alternate ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED_WILDCARD or
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ADDR_POLICY_ACCEPTED_SPECIFIC return value for use in
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circuit_is_acceptable.
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The leaky exit is trickier still.. handle_control_attachstream
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does allow paths to exit at a given hop. Presumably something similar
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can be done in connection_ap_handshake_process_socks, and elsewhere?
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Circuit construction would also have to be performed such that the
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2nd hop's exit policy is what is considered, not the 3rd's.
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The entry_guard_t structure could have num_circ_failed and
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num_circ_succeeded members such that if it exceeds F% circuit
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extend failure rate to a second hop, it is removed from the entry list.
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F should be sufficiently high to avoid churn from normal Tor circuit
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failure as determined by TorFlow scans.
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The Vidalia option should be presented as a radio button.
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Migration:
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Phase 1: Adjust exit policy checks if Pathlen is set. Modify
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new_route_len() to obey a 'Pathlen' config option.
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Phase 2: Implement leaky circuit ability.
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Phase 3: Experiment to determine the proper ratio of circuit
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failures used to expire garbage or malicious guards via TorFlow
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(pending Bug #440 backport+adoption).
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Phase 4: Implement guard expiration code to kick off failure-prone
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guards and warn the user.
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Phase 5: Make radiobutton in Vidalia, along with help entry
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that explains in layman's terms the risks involved.
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Phase 6: Allow user to specify pathlength by HTTP URL suffix.
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[1] http://p2pnet.net/story/11279
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[2] http://www.cs.umass.edu/~mwright/papers/levine-timing.pdf
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[3] Proof available upon request ;)
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