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fbc08477e8
`PaymentParams` is all about the parameters for a payment, i.e. the parameters which are static across all the paths of a paymet. `RouteParameters` is about the information specific to a given `Route` (i.e. a set of paths, among multiple potential sets of paths for a payment). The CLTV delta thus doesn't belong in `RouterParameters` but instead in `PaymentParameters`. Worse, because `RouteParameters` is built from the information in the last hops of a `Route`, when we deliberately inflate the CLTV delta in path-finding, retries of the payment will have the final CLTV delta double-inflated as it inflates starting from the final CLTV delta used in the last attempt. By moving the CLTV delta to `PaymentParameters` we avoid this issue, leaving only the sought amount in the `RouteParameters`.
1037 lines
79 KiB
Rust
1037 lines
79 KiB
Rust
// This file is Copyright its original authors, visible in version control
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// history.
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//
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// This file is licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 <LICENSE-APACHE
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// or http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0> or the MIT license
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// <LICENSE-MIT or http://opensource.org/licenses/MIT>, at your option.
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// You may not use this file except in accordance with one or both of these
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// licenses.
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//! Test that no series of bytes received over the wire/connections created/payments sent can
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//! result in a crash. We do this by standing up a node and then reading bytes from input to denote
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//! actions such as creating new inbound/outbound connections, bytes to be read from a connection,
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//! or payments to send/ways to handle events generated.
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//! This test has been very useful, though due to its complexity good starting inputs are critical.
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use bitcoin::TxMerkleNode;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{Transaction, TxOut};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Builder, Script};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::locktime::PackedLockTime;
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use bitcoin::consensus::encode::deserialize;
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use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
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use bitcoin::hashes::Hash as TraitImport;
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use bitcoin::hashes::HashEngine as TraitImportEngine;
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use bitcoin::hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
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use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
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use bitcoin::hash_types::{Txid, BlockHash, WPubkeyHash};
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use lightning::chain;
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use lightning::chain::{BestBlock, ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus, Confirm, Listen};
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use lightning::chain::chaininterface::{BroadcasterInterface, ConfirmationTarget, FeeEstimator};
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use lightning::chain::chainmonitor;
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use lightning::chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use lightning::chain::keysinterface::{InMemorySigner, Recipient, KeyMaterial, EntropySource, NodeSigner, SignerProvider};
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use lightning::ln::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage, PaymentSecret};
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use lightning::ln::channelmanager::{ChainParameters, ChannelDetails, ChannelManager, PaymentId};
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use lightning::ln::peer_handler::{MessageHandler,PeerManager,SocketDescriptor,IgnoringMessageHandler};
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use lightning::ln::msgs::{self, DecodeError};
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use lightning::ln::script::ShutdownScript;
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use lightning::routing::gossip::{P2PGossipSync, NetworkGraph};
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use lightning::routing::router::{find_route, InFlightHtlcs, PaymentParameters, Route, RouteHop, RouteParameters, Router};
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use lightning::routing::scoring::FixedPenaltyScorer;
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use lightning::util::config::UserConfig;
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use lightning::util::errors::APIError;
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use lightning::util::events::Event;
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use lightning::util::enforcing_trait_impls::{EnforcingSigner, EnforcementState};
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use lightning::util::logger::Logger;
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use lightning::util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
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use crate::utils::test_logger;
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use crate::utils::test_persister::TestPersister;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::{Message, PublicKey, SecretKey, Scalar, Secp256k1};
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdh::SharedSecret;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::ecdsa::{RecoverableSignature, Signature};
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use std::cell::RefCell;
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use hashbrown::{HashMap, hash_map};
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use std::convert::TryInto;
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use std::cmp;
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use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
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use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicU64,AtomicUsize,Ordering};
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use bitcoin::bech32::u5;
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#[inline]
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pub fn slice_to_be16(v: &[u8]) -> u16 {
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((v[0] as u16) << 8*1) |
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((v[1] as u16) << 8*0)
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}
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#[inline]
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pub fn slice_to_be24(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
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((v[0] as u32) << 8*2) |
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((v[1] as u32) << 8*1) |
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((v[2] as u32) << 8*0)
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}
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#[inline]
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pub fn slice_to_be32(v: &[u8]) -> u32 {
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((v[0] as u32) << 8*3) |
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((v[1] as u32) << 8*2) |
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((v[2] as u32) << 8*1) |
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((v[3] as u32) << 8*0)
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}
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#[inline]
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pub fn be64_to_array(u: u64) -> [u8; 8] {
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let mut v = [0; 8];
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v[0] = ((u >> 8*7) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[1] = ((u >> 8*6) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[2] = ((u >> 8*5) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[3] = ((u >> 8*4) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[4] = ((u >> 8*3) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[5] = ((u >> 8*2) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[6] = ((u >> 8*1) & 0xff) as u8;
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v[7] = ((u >> 8*0) & 0xff) as u8;
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v
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}
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struct InputData {
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data: Vec<u8>,
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read_pos: AtomicUsize,
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}
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impl InputData {
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fn get_slice(&self, len: usize) -> Option<&[u8]> {
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let old_pos = self.read_pos.fetch_add(len, Ordering::AcqRel);
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if self.data.len() < old_pos + len {
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return None;
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}
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Some(&self.data[old_pos..old_pos + len])
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}
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}
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struct FuzzEstimator {
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input: Arc<InputData>,
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}
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impl FeeEstimator for FuzzEstimator {
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fn get_est_sat_per_1000_weight(&self, _: ConfirmationTarget) -> u32 {
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//TODO: We should actually be testing at least much more than 64k...
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match self.input.get_slice(2) {
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Some(slice) => cmp::max(slice_to_be16(slice) as u32, 253),
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None => 253
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}
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}
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}
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struct FuzzRouter {}
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impl Router for FuzzRouter {
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fn find_route(
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&self, _payer: &PublicKey, _params: &RouteParameters, _first_hops: Option<&[&ChannelDetails]>,
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_inflight_htlcs: &InFlightHtlcs
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) -> Result<Route, msgs::LightningError> {
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Err(msgs::LightningError {
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err: String::from("Not implemented"),
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action: msgs::ErrorAction::IgnoreError
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})
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}
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fn notify_payment_path_failed(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
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fn notify_payment_path_successful(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
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fn notify_payment_probe_successful(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop]) {}
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fn notify_payment_probe_failed(&self, _path: &[&RouteHop], _short_channel_id: u64) {}
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}
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struct TestBroadcaster {
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txn_broadcasted: Mutex<Vec<Transaction>>,
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}
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impl BroadcasterInterface for TestBroadcaster {
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fn broadcast_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction) {
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self.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().push(tx.clone());
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone)]
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struct Peer<'a> {
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id: u8,
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peers_connected: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
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}
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impl<'a> SocketDescriptor for Peer<'a> {
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fn send_data(&mut self, data: &[u8], _resume_read: bool) -> usize {
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data.len()
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}
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fn disconnect_socket(&mut self) {
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assert!(self.peers_connected.borrow()[self.id as usize]);
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self.peers_connected.borrow_mut()[self.id as usize] = false;
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}
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}
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impl<'a> PartialEq for Peer<'a> {
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fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
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self.id == other.id
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}
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}
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impl<'a> Eq for Peer<'a> {}
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impl<'a> std::hash::Hash for Peer<'a> {
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fn hash<H : std::hash::Hasher>(&self, h: &mut H) {
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self.id.hash(h)
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}
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}
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type ChannelMan<'a> = ChannelManager<
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Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
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Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<KeyProvider>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, &'a FuzzRouter, Arc<dyn Logger>>;
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type PeerMan<'a> = PeerManager<Peer<'a>, Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>, Arc<P2PGossipSync<Arc<NetworkGraph<Arc<dyn Logger>>>, Arc<dyn chain::Access>, Arc<dyn Logger>>>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<dyn Logger>, IgnoringMessageHandler, Arc<KeyProvider>>;
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struct MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
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manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
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monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
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handler: PeerMan<'a>,
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peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
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funding_txn: Vec<Transaction>,
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txids_confirmed: HashMap<Txid, usize>,
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header_hashes: Vec<(BlockHash, u32)>,
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height: usize,
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max_height: usize,
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blocks_connected: u32,
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}
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impl<'a> MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
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pub fn new(peers: &'a RefCell<[bool; 256]>,
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manager: Arc<ChannelMan<'a>>,
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monitor: Arc<chainmonitor::ChainMonitor<EnforcingSigner, Arc<dyn chain::Filter>, Arc<TestBroadcaster>, Arc<FuzzEstimator>, Arc<dyn Logger>, Arc<TestPersister>>>,
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handler: PeerMan<'a>) -> Self {
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MoneyLossDetector {
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manager,
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monitor,
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handler,
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peers,
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funding_txn: Vec::new(),
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txids_confirmed: HashMap::new(),
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header_hashes: vec![(genesis_block(Network::Bitcoin).block_hash(), 0)],
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height: 0,
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max_height: 0,
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blocks_connected: 0,
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}
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}
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fn connect_block(&mut self, all_txn: &[Transaction]) {
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let mut txdata = Vec::with_capacity(all_txn.len());
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for (idx, tx) in all_txn.iter().enumerate() {
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let txid = tx.txid();
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match self.txids_confirmed.entry(txid) {
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hash_map::Entry::Vacant(e) => {
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e.insert(self.height);
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txdata.push((idx + 1, tx));
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},
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_ => {},
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}
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}
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self.blocks_connected += 1;
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let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height].0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: self.blocks_connected, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
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self.height += 1;
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self.manager.transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
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self.manager.best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
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(*self.monitor).transactions_confirmed(&header, &txdata, self.height as u32);
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(*self.monitor).best_block_updated(&header, self.height as u32);
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if self.header_hashes.len() > self.height {
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self.header_hashes[self.height] = (header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected);
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} else {
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assert_eq!(self.header_hashes.len(), self.height);
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self.header_hashes.push((header.block_hash(), self.blocks_connected));
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}
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self.max_height = cmp::max(self.height, self.max_height);
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}
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fn disconnect_block(&mut self) {
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if self.height > 0 && (self.max_height < 6 || self.height >= self.max_height - 6) {
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let header = BlockHeader { version: 0x20000000, prev_blockhash: self.header_hashes[self.height - 1].0, merkle_root: TxMerkleNode::all_zeros(), time: self.header_hashes[self.height].1, bits: 42, nonce: 42 };
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self.manager.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
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self.monitor.block_disconnected(&header, self.height as u32);
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self.height -= 1;
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let removal_height = self.height;
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self.txids_confirmed.retain(|_, height| {
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removal_height != *height
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});
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}
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}
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}
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impl<'a> Drop for MoneyLossDetector<'a> {
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fn drop(&mut self) {
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if !::std::thread::panicking() {
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// Disconnect all peers
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for (idx, peer) in self.peers.borrow().iter().enumerate() {
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if *peer {
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self.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: idx as u8, peers_connected: &self.peers});
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}
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}
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// Force all channels onto the chain (and time out claim txn)
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self.manager.force_close_all_channels_broadcasting_latest_txn();
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}
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}
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}
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struct KeyProvider {
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node_secret: SecretKey,
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inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial,
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counter: AtomicU64,
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signer_state: RefCell<HashMap<u8, (bool, Arc<Mutex<EnforcementState>>)>>
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}
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impl EntropySource for KeyProvider {
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fn get_secure_random_bytes(&self) -> [u8; 32] {
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let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed);
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[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
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(ctr >> 8*7) as u8, (ctr >> 8*6) as u8, (ctr >> 8*5) as u8, (ctr >> 8*4) as u8, (ctr >> 8*3) as u8, (ctr >> 8*2) as u8, (ctr >> 8*1) as u8, 14, (ctr >> 8*0) as u8]
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}
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}
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impl NodeSigner for KeyProvider {
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fn get_node_id(&self, recipient: Recipient) -> Result<PublicKey, ()> {
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let node_secret = match recipient {
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Recipient::Node => Ok(&self.node_secret),
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Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
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}?;
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Ok(PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::signing_only(), node_secret))
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}
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fn ecdh(&self, recipient: Recipient, other_key: &PublicKey, tweak: Option<&Scalar>) -> Result<SharedSecret, ()> {
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let mut node_secret = match recipient {
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Recipient::Node => Ok(self.node_secret.clone()),
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Recipient::PhantomNode => Err(())
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}?;
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if let Some(tweak) = tweak {
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node_secret = node_secret.mul_tweak(tweak).map_err(|_| ())?;
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}
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Ok(SharedSecret::new(other_key, &node_secret))
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}
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fn get_inbound_payment_key_material(&self) -> KeyMaterial {
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self.inbound_payment_key.clone()
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}
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fn sign_invoice(&self, _hrp_bytes: &[u8], _invoice_data: &[u5], _recipient: Recipient) -> Result<RecoverableSignature, ()> {
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unreachable!()
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}
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fn sign_gossip_message(&self, msg: lightning::ln::msgs::UnsignedGossipMessage) -> Result<Signature, ()> {
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let msg_hash = Message::from_slice(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.encode()[..])[..]).map_err(|_| ())?;
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let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
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Ok(secp_ctx.sign_ecdsa(&msg_hash, &self.node_secret))
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}
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}
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impl SignerProvider for KeyProvider {
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type Signer = EnforcingSigner;
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fn generate_channel_keys_id(&self, inbound: bool, _channel_value_satoshis: u64, _user_channel_id: u128) -> [u8; 32] {
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let ctr = self.counter.fetch_add(1, Ordering::Relaxed) as u8;
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self.signer_state.borrow_mut().insert(ctr, (inbound, Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()))));
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[ctr; 32]
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}
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fn derive_channel_signer(&self, channel_value_satoshis: u64, channel_keys_id: [u8; 32]) -> Self::Signer {
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let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
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let ctr = channel_keys_id[0];
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let (inbound, state) = self.signer_state.borrow().get(&ctr).unwrap().clone();
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EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(if inbound {
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InMemorySigner::new(
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&secp_ctx,
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 2, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 3, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 4, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 5, ctr]).unwrap(),
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[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 6, ctr],
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channel_value_satoshis,
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channel_keys_id,
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)
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} else {
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InMemorySigner::new(
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&secp_ctx,
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 7, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 8, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 9, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 10, ctr]).unwrap(),
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SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 11, ctr]).unwrap(),
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[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 12, ctr],
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channel_value_satoshis,
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channel_keys_id,
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)
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|
}, state, false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn read_chan_signer(&self, mut data: &[u8]) -> Result<EnforcingSigner, DecodeError> {
|
|
let inner: InMemorySigner = Readable::read(&mut data)?;
|
|
let state = Arc::new(Mutex::new(EnforcementState::new()));
|
|
|
|
Ok(EnforcingSigner::new_with_revoked(
|
|
inner,
|
|
state,
|
|
false
|
|
))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn get_destination_script(&self) -> Script {
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
|
|
let channel_monitor_claim_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
|
|
let our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &channel_monitor_claim_key).serialize());
|
|
Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHBYTES_0).push_slice(&our_channel_monitor_claim_key_hash[..]).into_script()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn get_shutdown_scriptpubkey(&self) -> ShutdownScript {
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::signing_only();
|
|
let secret_key = SecretKey::from_slice(&[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1]).unwrap();
|
|
let pubkey_hash = WPubkeyHash::hash(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &secret_key).serialize());
|
|
ShutdownScript::new_p2wpkh(&pubkey_hash)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
pub fn do_test(data: &[u8], logger: &Arc<dyn Logger>) {
|
|
let input = Arc::new(InputData {
|
|
data: data.to_vec(),
|
|
read_pos: AtomicUsize::new(0),
|
|
});
|
|
let fee_est = Arc::new(FuzzEstimator {
|
|
input: input.clone(),
|
|
});
|
|
let router = FuzzRouter {};
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! get_slice {
|
|
($len: expr) => {
|
|
match input.get_slice($len as usize) {
|
|
Some(slice) => slice,
|
|
None => return,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! get_pubkey {
|
|
() => {
|
|
match PublicKey::from_slice(get_slice!(33)) {
|
|
Ok(key) => key,
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let our_network_key = match SecretKey::from_slice(get_slice!(32)) {
|
|
Ok(key) => key,
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let inbound_payment_key = [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 42];
|
|
|
|
let broadcast = Arc::new(TestBroadcaster{ txn_broadcasted: Mutex::new(Vec::new()) });
|
|
let monitor = Arc::new(chainmonitor::ChainMonitor::new(None, broadcast.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger), fee_est.clone(),
|
|
Arc::new(TestPersister { update_ret: Mutex::new(ChannelMonitorUpdateStatus::Completed) })));
|
|
|
|
let keys_manager = Arc::new(KeyProvider {
|
|
node_secret: our_network_key.clone(),
|
|
inbound_payment_key: KeyMaterial(inbound_payment_key.try_into().unwrap()),
|
|
counter: AtomicU64::new(0),
|
|
signer_state: RefCell::new(HashMap::new())
|
|
});
|
|
let mut config = UserConfig::default();
|
|
config.channel_config.forwarding_fee_proportional_millionths = slice_to_be32(get_slice!(4));
|
|
config.channel_handshake_config.announced_channel = get_slice!(1)[0] != 0;
|
|
let network = Network::Bitcoin;
|
|
let params = ChainParameters {
|
|
network,
|
|
best_block: BestBlock::from_genesis(network),
|
|
};
|
|
let channelmanager = Arc::new(ChannelManager::new(fee_est.clone(), monitor.clone(), broadcast.clone(), &router, Arc::clone(&logger), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), keys_manager.clone(), config, params));
|
|
// Adding new calls to `EntropySource::get_secure_random_bytes` during startup can change all the
|
|
// keys subsequently generated in this test. Rather than regenerating all the messages manually,
|
|
// it's easier to just increment the counter here so the keys don't change.
|
|
keys_manager.counter.fetch_sub(3, Ordering::AcqRel);
|
|
let our_id = &keys_manager.get_node_id(Recipient::Node).unwrap();
|
|
let network_graph = Arc::new(NetworkGraph::new(genesis_block(network).block_hash(), Arc::clone(&logger)));
|
|
let gossip_sync = Arc::new(P2PGossipSync::new(Arc::clone(&network_graph), None, Arc::clone(&logger)));
|
|
let scorer = FixedPenaltyScorer::with_penalty(0);
|
|
|
|
let peers = RefCell::new([false; 256]);
|
|
let mut loss_detector = MoneyLossDetector::new(&peers, channelmanager.clone(), monitor.clone(), PeerManager::new(MessageHandler {
|
|
chan_handler: channelmanager.clone(),
|
|
route_handler: gossip_sync.clone(),
|
|
onion_message_handler: IgnoringMessageHandler {},
|
|
}, 0, &[0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 15, 0], Arc::clone(&logger), IgnoringMessageHandler{}, keys_manager.clone()));
|
|
|
|
let mut should_forward = false;
|
|
let mut payments_received: Vec<PaymentHash> = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut payments_sent = 0;
|
|
let mut pending_funding_generation: Vec<([u8; 32], PublicKey, u64, Script)> = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut pending_funding_signatures = HashMap::new();
|
|
|
|
loop {
|
|
match get_slice!(1)[0] {
|
|
0 => {
|
|
let mut new_id = 0;
|
|
for i in 1..256 {
|
|
if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
|
|
new_id = i;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if new_id == 0 { return; }
|
|
loss_detector.handler.new_outbound_connection(get_pubkey!(), Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
|
|
peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
|
|
},
|
|
1 => {
|
|
let mut new_id = 0;
|
|
for i in 1..256 {
|
|
if !peers.borrow()[i-1] {
|
|
new_id = i;
|
|
break;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if new_id == 0 { return; }
|
|
loss_detector.handler.new_inbound_connection(Peer{id: (new_id - 1) as u8, peers_connected: &peers}, None).unwrap();
|
|
peers.borrow_mut()[new_id - 1] = true;
|
|
},
|
|
2 => {
|
|
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
|
|
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
|
|
loss_detector.handler.socket_disconnected(&Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers});
|
|
peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false;
|
|
},
|
|
3 => {
|
|
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
|
|
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
|
|
match loss_detector.handler.read_event(&mut Peer{id: peer_id, peers_connected: &peers}, get_slice!(get_slice!(1)[0])) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
|
|
Err(_) => { peers.borrow_mut()[peer_id as usize] = false; }
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
4 => {
|
|
let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
|
|
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
|
|
let params = RouteParameters {
|
|
payment_params,
|
|
final_value_msat,
|
|
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
|
|
};
|
|
let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
|
|
let route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
|
|
Ok(route) => route,
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
};
|
|
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
|
|
payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
|
|
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
|
|
sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
|
|
payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
|
|
payments_sent += 1;
|
|
match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &None, PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) {
|
|
Ok(_) => {},
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
15 => {
|
|
let final_value_msat = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
|
|
let payment_params = PaymentParameters::from_node_id(get_pubkey!(), 42);
|
|
let params = RouteParameters {
|
|
payment_params,
|
|
final_value_msat,
|
|
final_cltv_expiry_delta: 42,
|
|
};
|
|
let random_seed_bytes: [u8; 32] = keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes();
|
|
let mut route = match find_route(&our_id, ¶ms, &network_graph, None, Arc::clone(&logger), &scorer, &random_seed_bytes) {
|
|
Ok(route) => route,
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
};
|
|
route.paths.push(route.paths[0].clone());
|
|
let mut payment_hash = PaymentHash([0; 32]);
|
|
payment_hash.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
|
|
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
|
|
sha.input(&payment_hash.0[..]);
|
|
payment_hash.0 = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
|
|
payments_sent += 1;
|
|
let mut payment_secret = PaymentSecret([0; 32]);
|
|
payment_secret.0[0..8].copy_from_slice(&be64_to_array(payments_sent));
|
|
payments_sent += 1;
|
|
match channelmanager.send_payment(&route, payment_hash, &Some(payment_secret), PaymentId(payment_hash.0)) {
|
|
Ok(_) => {},
|
|
Err(_) => return,
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
5 => {
|
|
let peer_id = get_slice!(1)[0];
|
|
if !peers.borrow()[peer_id as usize] { return; }
|
|
let their_key = get_pubkey!();
|
|
let chan_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
|
|
let push_msat_value = slice_to_be24(get_slice!(3)) as u64;
|
|
if channelmanager.create_channel(their_key, chan_value, push_msat_value, 0, None).is_err() { return; }
|
|
},
|
|
6 => {
|
|
let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
|
|
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
|
|
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
|
|
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
|
|
if channelmanager.close_channel(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).is_err() { return; }
|
|
},
|
|
7 => {
|
|
if should_forward {
|
|
channelmanager.process_pending_htlc_forwards();
|
|
should_forward = false;
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
8 => {
|
|
for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
|
|
// SHA256 is defined as XOR of all input bytes placed in the first byte, and 0s
|
|
// for the remaining bytes. Thus, if not all remaining bytes are 0s we cannot
|
|
// fulfill this HTLC, but if they are, we can just take the first byte and
|
|
// place that anywhere in our preimage.
|
|
if &payment.0[1..] != &[0; 31] {
|
|
channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
|
|
} else {
|
|
let mut payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage([0; 32]);
|
|
payment_preimage.0[0] = payment.0[0];
|
|
channelmanager.claim_funds(payment_preimage);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
16 => {
|
|
let payment_preimage = PaymentPreimage(keys_manager.get_secure_random_bytes());
|
|
let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
|
|
sha.input(&payment_preimage.0[..]);
|
|
let payment_hash = PaymentHash(Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner());
|
|
// Note that this may fail - our hashes may collide and we'll end up trying to
|
|
// double-register the same payment_hash.
|
|
let _ = channelmanager.create_inbound_payment_for_hash(payment_hash, None, 1, None);
|
|
},
|
|
9 => {
|
|
for payment in payments_received.drain(..) {
|
|
channelmanager.fail_htlc_backwards(&payment);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
10 => {
|
|
'outer_loop: for funding_generation in pending_funding_generation.drain(..) {
|
|
let mut tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: PackedLockTime::ZERO, input: Vec::new(), output: vec![TxOut {
|
|
value: funding_generation.2, script_pubkey: funding_generation.3,
|
|
}] };
|
|
let funding_output = 'search_loop: loop {
|
|
let funding_txid = tx.txid();
|
|
if let None = loss_detector.txids_confirmed.get(&funding_txid) {
|
|
let outpoint = OutPoint { txid: funding_txid, index: 0 };
|
|
for chan in channelmanager.list_channels() {
|
|
if chan.channel_id == outpoint.to_channel_id() {
|
|
tx.version += 1;
|
|
continue 'search_loop;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
break outpoint;
|
|
}
|
|
tx.version += 1;
|
|
if tx.version > 0xff {
|
|
continue 'outer_loop;
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
if let Err(e) = channelmanager.funding_transaction_generated(&funding_generation.0, &funding_generation.1, tx.clone()) {
|
|
// It's possible the channel has been closed in the mean time, but any other
|
|
// failure may be a bug.
|
|
if let APIError::ChannelUnavailable { err } = e {
|
|
if !err.starts_with("Can't find a peer matching the passed counterparty node_id ") {
|
|
assert_eq!(err, "No such channel");
|
|
}
|
|
} else { panic!(); }
|
|
}
|
|
pending_funding_signatures.insert(funding_output, tx);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
11 => {
|
|
let mut txn = broadcast.txn_broadcasted.lock().unwrap().split_off(0);
|
|
if !txn.is_empty() {
|
|
loss_detector.connect_block(&txn[..]);
|
|
for _ in 2..100 {
|
|
loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for tx in txn.drain(..) {
|
|
loss_detector.funding_txn.push(tx);
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
12 => {
|
|
let txlen = slice_to_be16(get_slice!(2));
|
|
if txlen == 0 {
|
|
loss_detector.connect_block(&[]);
|
|
} else {
|
|
let txres: Result<Transaction, _> = deserialize(get_slice!(txlen));
|
|
if let Ok(tx) = txres {
|
|
let mut output_val = 0;
|
|
for out in tx.output.iter() {
|
|
if out.value > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
|
|
output_val += out.value;
|
|
if output_val > 21_000_000_0000_0000 { return; }
|
|
}
|
|
loss_detector.connect_block(&[tx]);
|
|
} else {
|
|
return;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
13 => {
|
|
loss_detector.disconnect_block();
|
|
},
|
|
14 => {
|
|
let mut channels = channelmanager.list_channels();
|
|
let channel_id = get_slice!(1)[0] as usize;
|
|
if channel_id >= channels.len() { return; }
|
|
channels.sort_by(|a, b| { a.channel_id.cmp(&b.channel_id) });
|
|
channelmanager.force_close_broadcasting_latest_txn(&channels[channel_id].channel_id, &channels[channel_id].counterparty.node_id).unwrap();
|
|
},
|
|
// 15 is above
|
|
_ => return,
|
|
}
|
|
loss_detector.handler.process_events();
|
|
for event in loss_detector.manager.get_and_clear_pending_events() {
|
|
match event {
|
|
Event::FundingGenerationReady { temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script, .. } => {
|
|
pending_funding_generation.push((temporary_channel_id, counterparty_node_id, channel_value_satoshis, output_script));
|
|
},
|
|
Event::PaymentClaimable { payment_hash, .. } => {
|
|
//TODO: enhance by fetching random amounts from fuzz input?
|
|
payments_received.push(payment_hash);
|
|
},
|
|
Event::PendingHTLCsForwardable {..} => {
|
|
should_forward = true;
|
|
},
|
|
_ => {},
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn full_stack_test<Out: test_logger::Output>(data: &[u8], out: Out) {
|
|
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), out));
|
|
do_test(data, &logger);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[no_mangle]
|
|
pub extern "C" fn full_stack_run(data: *const u8, datalen: usize) {
|
|
let logger: Arc<dyn Logger> = Arc::new(test_logger::TestLogger::new("".to_owned(), test_logger::DevNull {}));
|
|
do_test(unsafe { std::slice::from_raw_parts(data, datalen) }, &logger);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use lightning::util::logger::{Logger, Record};
|
|
use std::collections::HashMap;
|
|
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
|
|
|
|
struct TrackingLogger {
|
|
/// (module, message) -> count
|
|
pub lines: Mutex<HashMap<(String, String), usize>>,
|
|
}
|
|
impl Logger for TrackingLogger {
|
|
fn log(&self, record: &Record) {
|
|
*self.lines.lock().unwrap().entry((record.module_path.to_string(), format!("{}", record.args))).or_insert(0) += 1;
|
|
println!("{:<5} [{} : {}, {}] {}", record.level.to_string(), record.module_path, record.file, record.line, record.args);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_no_existing_test_breakage() {
|
|
// To avoid accidentally causing all existing fuzz test cases to be useless by making minor
|
|
// changes (such as requesting feerate info in a new place), we run a pretty full
|
|
// step-through with two peers and HTLC forwarding here. Obviously this is pretty finicky,
|
|
// so this should be updated pretty liberally, but at least we'll know when changes occur.
|
|
// If nothing else, this test serves as a pretty great initial full_stack_target seed.
|
|
|
|
// What each byte represents is broken down below, and then everything is concatenated into
|
|
// one large test at the end (you want %s/ -.*//g %s/\n\| \|\t\|\///g).
|
|
|
|
// Following BOLT 8, lightning message on the wire are: 2-byte encrypted message length +
|
|
// 16-byte MAC of the encrypted message length + encrypted Lightning message + 16-byte MAC
|
|
// of the Lightning message
|
|
// I.e 2nd inbound read, len 18 : 0006 (encrypted message length) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the encrypted message length)
|
|
// Len 22 : 0010 00000000 (encrypted lightning message) + 03000000000000000000000000000000 (MAC of the Lightning message)
|
|
|
|
// Writing new code generating transactions and see a new failure ? Don't forget to add input for the FuzzEstimator !
|
|
|
|
// 0100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - our network key
|
|
// 00000000 - fee_proportional_millionths
|
|
// 01 - announce_channels_publicly
|
|
//
|
|
// 00 - new outbound connection with id 0
|
|
// 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 - peer's pubkey
|
|
// 030032 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 50
|
|
// 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 03000000000000000000000000000000 - noise act two (0||pubkey||mac)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 000a 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
|
|
// 03001a - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 26
|
|
// 0010 00022000 00022000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0141 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 321
|
|
// 0300fe - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 254
|
|
// 0020 7500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 000000000000c350 0000000000000000 0000000000000162 ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000222 0000000000000000 000000fd 0006 01e3 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000003 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000004 - beginning of open_channel message
|
|
// 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
|
|
// 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000005 020900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01 03000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of open_channel and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 00fd00fd - Two feerate requests (all returning min feerate, which our open_channel also uses) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
|
|
// - client should now respond with accept_channel (CHECK 1: type 33 to peer 03000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0084 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 132
|
|
// 030094 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 148
|
|
// 0022 ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000210100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_created and mac
|
|
// - client should now respond with funding_signed (CHECK 2: type 35 to peer 03000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
|
|
// 020000000100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000ffffffff0150c3000000000000220020ae0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the funding transaction
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 3: SendChannelReady to 03000000 for chan 3d000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0043 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
|
|
// 030053 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 83
|
|
// 0024 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 01 - new inbound connection with id 1
|
|
// 030132 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 50
|
|
// 0003000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000703000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 1
|
|
// 030142 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 66
|
|
// 000302000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300000000000000000000000000000003000000000000000000000000000000 - inbound noise act 3
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 000a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 10
|
|
// 03011a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 26
|
|
// 0010 00022000 00022000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - init message (type 16) with static_remotekey (0x2000) and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 05 01 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00c350 0003e8 - create outbound channel to peer 1 for 50k sat
|
|
// 00fd - One feerate requests (all returning min feerate) (gonna be ingested by FuzzEstimator)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0110 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 272
|
|
// 0301ff - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 255
|
|
// 0021 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000e05 0000000000000162 00000000004c4b40 00000000000003e8 00000000000003e8 00000002 03f0 0005 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000200 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000400 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000500 02660000000000000000000000000000 - beginning of accept_channel
|
|
// 030121 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 33
|
|
// 0000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - rest of accept_channel and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 0a - create the funding transaction (client should send funding_created now)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0062 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 98
|
|
// 030172 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 114
|
|
// 0023 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000007c0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - funding_signed message and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 0b - broadcast funding transaction
|
|
// - by now client should have sent a channel_ready (CHECK 4: SendChannelReady to 03020000 for chan 3f000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0043 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 67
|
|
// 030153 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 83
|
|
// 0024 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - channel_ready and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000300100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6: types 133 and 132 to peer 03000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0900000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
|
|
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7: SendHTLCs event for node 03020000 with 1 HTLCs for channel 3f000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// - we respond with commitment_signed then revoke_and_ack (a weird, but valid, order)
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006a0001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6600000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 004a 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 74
|
|
// 03015a - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 90
|
|
// 0082 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000000 ff00888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888888 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fulfill_htlc and mac
|
|
// - client should immediately claim the pending HTLC from peer 0 (CHECK 8: SendFulfillHTLCs for node 03000000 with preimage ff00888888 for channel 3d000000)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000100001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6700000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 026500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// - before responding to the commitment_signed generated above, send a new HTLC
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000000000003e80 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 11 020203e8 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff ab00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// - now respond to the update_fulfill_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0800000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000c30100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0b00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
|
|
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
|
|
// - we respond with revoke_and_ack, then commitment_signed, then update_fail_htlc
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6400000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 002c 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 44
|
|
// 03013c - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 60
|
|
// 0083 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000001 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - update_fail_htlc and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030174 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000390001000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030112 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 01000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030173 - inbound read from peer id 1 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 6500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 027100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 01000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
|
|
// - client now sends id 0 update_fail_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 9)
|
|
// - now respond to the update_fail_htlc+commitment_signed messages the client sent to peer 0
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020c00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0064 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 100
|
|
// 030074 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 116
|
|
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000320100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack (CHECK 5 duplicate)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 05ac 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 1452
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// 0080 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0000000000000002 00000000000b0838 ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 000003f0 00 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000555 12 02030927c0 0401a0 060800000e0000010000 0a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff - beginning of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300ff - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 255
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff
|
|
// 0300c1 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 193
|
|
// ffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffff 5300000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - end of update_add_htlc from 0 to 1 via client and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 00a4 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 164
|
|
// 0300b4 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 180
|
|
// 0084 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000750100000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0001 00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000670500000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000006 03000000000000000000000000000000 - commitment_signed and mac
|
|
// - client should now respond with revoke_and_ack and commitment_signed (CHECK 5/6 duplicates)
|
|
//
|
|
// 030012 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 18
|
|
// 0063 03000000000000000000000000000000 - message header indicating message length 99
|
|
// 030073 - inbound read from peer id 0 of len 115
|
|
// 0085 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 0d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 020f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 03000000000000000000000000000000 - revoke_and_ack and mac
|
|
//
|
|
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
|
|
// - client now sends id 1 update_add_htlc and commitment_signed (CHECK 7 duplicate)
|
|
//
|
|
// 0c007d - connect a block with one transaction of len 125
|
|
// 02000000013a000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000800258020000000000002200204b0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000014c0000000000000160014280000000000000000000000000000000000000005000020 - the commitment transaction for channel 3f00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000
|
|
//
|
|
// 0c005e - connect a block with one transaction of len 94
|
|
// 0200000001730000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000001a701000000000000220020b20000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 - the HTLC timeout transaction
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
// 0c0000 - connect a block with no transactions
|
|
//
|
|
// 07 - process the now-pending HTLC forward
|
|
// - client now fails the HTLC backwards as it was unable to extract the payment preimage (CHECK 9 duplicate and CHECK 10)
|
|
|
|
let logger = Arc::new(TrackingLogger { lines: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()) });
|
|
super::do_test(&::hex::decode("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&(Arc::clone(&logger) as Arc<dyn Logger>));
|
|
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|
let log_entries = logger.lines.lock().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendAcceptChannel event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel ff4f00f805273c1b203bb5ebf8436bfde57b3be8c2f5e95d9491dbb181909679".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 1
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendFundingSigned event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 2
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 3
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendChannelReady event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 4
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling SendRevokeAndACK event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&4)); // 5
|
|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 6
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030200000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with 1 adds, 0 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3a00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&3)); // 7
|
|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 1 fulfills, 0 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 8
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|
assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::ln::peer_handler".to_string(), "Handling UpdateHTLCs event in peer_handler for node 030000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000002 with 0 adds, 0 fulfills, 1 fails for channel 3d00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000".to_string())), Some(&2)); // 9
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assert_eq!(log_entries.get(&("lightning::chain::channelmonitor".to_string(), "Input spending counterparty commitment tx (0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000073:0) in 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000067 resolves outbound HTLC with payment hash ff00000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000000 with timeout".to_string())), Some(&1)); // 10
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}
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}
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