mirror of
https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
synced 2025-02-26 15:42:52 +01:00
bf74bb625f
This cleans up sign_local_commitment somewhat by returning a Result<Signaure, ()> over the local commitment transaction instead of modifying the struct which was passed in. This is the first step in making LocalCommitmentTransaction a completely pub struct, using it just to communicate enough information to the user to allow them to construct a signaure instead of having it contain a bunch of logic. This should make it much easier to implement a custom ChannelKeys by disconnecting the local commitment transaction signing from our own datastructures.
1067 lines
45 KiB
Rust
1067 lines
45 KiB
Rust
//! Various utilities for building scripts and deriving keys related to channels. These are
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//! largely of interest for those implementing chain::keysinterface::ChannelKeys message signing
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//! by hand.
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::{Script,Builder};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,OutPoint,Transaction, SigHashType};
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use bitcoin::consensus::encode::{self, Decodable, Encodable};
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use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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use bitcoin_hashes::{Hash, HashEngine};
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use bitcoin_hashes::sha256::Hash as Sha256;
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use bitcoin_hashes::ripemd160::Hash as Ripemd160;
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use bitcoin_hashes::hash160::Hash as Hash160;
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use bitcoin_hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
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use ln::channelmanager::{PaymentHash, PaymentPreimage};
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use ln::msgs::DecodeError;
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use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable, Writer, WriterWriteAdaptor};
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use util::byte_utils;
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use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey, PublicKey};
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use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
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use secp256k1;
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use std::{cmp, mem};
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const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: usize = 64*1024;
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pub(super) const HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 703;
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pub(super) const HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT: u64 = 663;
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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pub(crate) enum HTLCType {
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AcceptedHTLC,
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OfferedHTLC
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}
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impl HTLCType {
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/// Check if a given tx witnessScript len matchs one of a pre-signed HTLC
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pub(crate) fn scriptlen_to_htlctype(witness_script_len: usize) -> Option<HTLCType> {
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if witness_script_len == 133 {
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Some(HTLCType::OfferedHTLC)
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} else if witness_script_len >= 136 && witness_script_len <= 139 {
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Some(HTLCType::AcceptedHTLC)
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} else {
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None
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}
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}
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}
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// Various functions for key derivation and transaction creation for use within channels. Primarily
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// used in Channel and ChannelMonitor.
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pub(super) fn build_commitment_secret(commitment_seed: &[u8; 32], idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
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let mut res: [u8; 32] = commitment_seed.clone();
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for i in 0..48 {
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let bitpos = 47 - i;
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if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
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res[bitpos / 8] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
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res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
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}
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}
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res
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}
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/// Implements the per-commitment secret storage scheme from
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/// [BOLT 3](https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lightning-rfc/blob/dcbf8583976df087c79c3ce0b535311212e6812d/03-transactions.md#efficient-per-commitment-secret-storage).
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///
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/// Allows us to keep track of all of the revocation secrets of counterarties in just 50*32 bytes
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/// or so.
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#[derive(Clone)]
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pub(super) struct CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
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old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
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}
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impl PartialEq for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
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fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
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for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
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if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
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return false
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}
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}
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true
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}
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}
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impl CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
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pub(super) fn new() -> Self {
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Self { old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49], }
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}
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#[inline]
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fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
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for i in 0..48 {
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if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
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return i
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}
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}
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48
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}
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pub(super) fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
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//TODO This can be optimized?
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let mut min = 1 << 48;
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for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
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if idx < min {
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min = idx;
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}
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}
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min
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}
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#[inline]
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pub(super) fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
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let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
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for i in 0..bits {
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let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
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if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
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res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
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res = Sha256::hash(&res).into_inner();
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}
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}
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res
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}
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pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32]) -> Result<(), ()> {
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let pos = Self::place_secret(idx);
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for i in 0..pos {
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let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
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if Self::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
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return Err(());
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}
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}
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if self.get_min_seen_secret() <= idx {
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return Ok(());
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}
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self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
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pub(super) fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Option<[u8; 32]> {
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for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
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if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
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return Some(Self::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
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}
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}
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assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
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None
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}
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}
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impl Writeable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
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fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
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for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
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writer.write_all(secret)?;
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writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx))?;
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl Readable for CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets {
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fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
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let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
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for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
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*secret = Readable::read(reader)?;
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*idx = Readable::read(reader)?;
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}
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Ok(Self { old_secrets })
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}
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}
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/// Derives a per-commitment-transaction private key (eg an htlc key or payment key) from the base
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/// private key for that type of key and the per_commitment_point (available in TxCreationKeys)
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pub fn derive_private_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &base_secret).serialize());
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let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
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let mut key = base_secret.clone();
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key.add_assign(&res)?;
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Ok(key)
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}
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pub(super) fn derive_public_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&base_point.serialize());
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let res = Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner();
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let hashkey = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&res)?);
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base_point.combine(&hashkey)
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}
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/// Derives a revocation key from its constituent parts.
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/// Note that this is infallible iff we trust that at least one of the two input keys are randomly
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/// generated (ie our own).
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pub(super) fn derive_private_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Signing>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_secret: &SecretKey, revocation_base_secret: &SecretKey) -> Result<SecretKey, secp256k1::Error> {
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let revocation_base_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &revocation_base_secret);
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let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_secret);
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let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
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};
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let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
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Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
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};
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let mut part_a = revocation_base_secret.clone();
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part_a.mul_assign(&rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
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let mut part_b = per_commitment_secret.clone();
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part_b.mul_assign(&commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
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part_a.add_assign(&part_b[..])?;
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Ok(part_a)
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}
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pub(super) fn derive_public_revocation_key<T: secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, revocation_base_point: &PublicKey) -> Result<PublicKey, secp256k1::Error> {
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let rev_append_commit_hash_key = {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
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};
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let commit_append_rev_hash_key = {
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let mut sha = Sha256::engine();
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sha.input(&per_commitment_point.serialize());
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sha.input(&revocation_base_point.serialize());
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Sha256::from_engine(sha).into_inner()
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};
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let mut part_a = revocation_base_point.clone();
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part_a.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &rev_append_commit_hash_key)?;
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let mut part_b = per_commitment_point.clone();
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part_b.mul_assign(&secp_ctx, &commit_append_rev_hash_key)?;
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part_a.combine(&part_b)
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}
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/// The set of public keys which are used in the creation of one commitment transaction.
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/// These are derived from the channel base keys and per-commitment data.
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#[derive(PartialEq, Clone)]
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pub struct TxCreationKeys {
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/// The per-commitment public key which was used to derive the other keys.
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pub per_commitment_point: PublicKey,
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/// The revocation key which is used to allow the owner of the commitment transaction to
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/// provide their counterparty the ability to punish them if they broadcast an old state.
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pub(crate) revocation_key: PublicKey,
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/// A's HTLC Key
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pub(crate) a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
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/// B's HTLC Key
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pub(crate) b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
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/// A's Payment Key (which isn't allowed to be spent from for some delay)
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pub(crate) a_delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
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/// B's Payment Key
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pub(crate) b_payment_key: PublicKey,
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}
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impl_writeable!(TxCreationKeys, 33*6,
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{ per_commitment_point, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, a_delayed_payment_key, b_payment_key });
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/// One counterparty's public keys which do not change over the life of a channel.
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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pub struct ChannelPublicKeys {
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/// The public key which is used to sign all commitment transactions, as it appears in the
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/// on-chain channel lock-in 2-of-2 multisig output.
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pub funding_pubkey: PublicKey,
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/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_revocation_key) to derive per-commitment
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/// revocation keys. The per-commitment revocation private key is then revealed by the owner of
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/// a commitment transaction so that their counterparty can claim all available funds if they
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/// broadcast an old state.
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pub revocation_basepoint: PublicKey,
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/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
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/// public key which receives immediately-spendable non-HTLC-encumbered funds.
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pub payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
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/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment payment
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/// public key which receives non-HTLC-encumbered funds which are only available for spending
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/// after some delay (or can be claimed via the revocation path).
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pub delayed_payment_basepoint: PublicKey,
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/// The base point which is used (with derive_public_key) to derive a per-commitment public key
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/// which is used to encumber HTLC-in-flight outputs.
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pub htlc_basepoint: PublicKey,
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}
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impl_writeable!(ChannelPublicKeys, 33*5, {
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funding_pubkey,
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revocation_basepoint,
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payment_basepoint,
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delayed_payment_basepoint,
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htlc_basepoint
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});
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impl TxCreationKeys {
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pub(crate) fn new<T: secp256k1::Signing + secp256k1::Verification>(secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>, per_commitment_point: &PublicKey, a_delayed_payment_base: &PublicKey, a_htlc_base: &PublicKey, b_revocation_base: &PublicKey, b_payment_base: &PublicKey, b_htlc_base: &PublicKey) -> Result<TxCreationKeys, secp256k1::Error> {
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Ok(TxCreationKeys {
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per_commitment_point: per_commitment_point.clone(),
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revocation_key: derive_public_revocation_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_revocation_base)?,
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a_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_htlc_base)?,
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b_htlc_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_htlc_base)?,
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a_delayed_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &a_delayed_payment_base)?,
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b_payment_key: derive_public_key(&secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &b_payment_base)?,
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})
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}
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}
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/// Gets the "to_local" output redeemscript, ie the script which is time-locked or spendable by
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/// the revocation key
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pub(super) fn get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key: &PublicKey, to_self_delay: u16, delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
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Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
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.push_slice(&revocation_key.serialize())
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
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.push_int(to_self_delay as i64)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CSV)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
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.push_slice(&delayed_payment_key.serialize())
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
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.into_script()
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}
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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/// Information about an HTLC as it appears in a commitment transaction
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pub struct HTLCOutputInCommitment {
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/// Whether the HTLC was "offered" (ie outbound in relation to this commitment transaction).
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/// Note that this is not the same as whether it is ountbound *from us*. To determine that you
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/// need to compare this value to whether the commitment transaction in question is that of
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/// the remote party or our own.
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pub offered: bool,
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/// The value, in msat, of the HTLC. The value as it appears in the commitment transaction is
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/// this divided by 1000.
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pub amount_msat: u64,
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/// The CLTV lock-time at which this HTLC expires.
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pub cltv_expiry: u32,
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/// The hash of the preimage which unlocks this HTLC.
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pub payment_hash: PaymentHash,
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/// The position within the commitment transactions' outputs. This may be None if the value is
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/// below the dust limit (in which case no output appears in the commitment transaction and the
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/// value is spent to additional transaction fees).
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pub transaction_output_index: Option<u32>,
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}
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impl_writeable!(HTLCOutputInCommitment, 1 + 8 + 4 + 32 + 5, {
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offered,
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amount_msat,
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cltv_expiry,
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payment_hash,
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transaction_output_index
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});
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#[inline]
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pub(crate) fn get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_htlc_key: &PublicKey, b_htlc_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Script {
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let payment_hash160 = Ripemd160::hash(&htlc.payment_hash.0[..]).into_inner();
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if htlc.offered {
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Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
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.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
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.push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
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.push_int(32)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_NOTIF)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
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.push_int(2)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
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.push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
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.push_int(2)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
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.push_slice(&payment_hash160)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
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.into_script()
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} else {
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Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DUP)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
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.push_slice(&Hash160::hash(&revocation_key.serialize())[..])
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
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.push_slice(&b_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SIZE)
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.push_int(32)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUAL)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_IF)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_HASH160)
|
|
.push_slice(&payment_hash160)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_EQUALVERIFY)
|
|
.push_int(2)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_SWAP)
|
|
.push_slice(&a_htlc_key.serialize()[..])
|
|
.push_int(2)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ELSE)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
|
|
.push_int(htlc.cltv_expiry as i64)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CLTV)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_DROP)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKSIG)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_ENDIF)
|
|
.into_script()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// note here that 'a_revocation_key' is generated using b_revocation_basepoint and a's
|
|
/// commitment secret. 'htlc' does *not* need to have its previous_output_index filled.
|
|
#[inline]
|
|
pub fn get_htlc_redeemscript(htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, keys: &TxCreationKeys) -> Script {
|
|
get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &keys.a_htlc_key, &keys.b_htlc_key, &keys.revocation_key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Gets the redeemscript for a funding output from the two funding public keys.
|
|
/// Note that the order of funding public keys does not matter.
|
|
pub fn make_funding_redeemscript(a: &PublicKey, b: &PublicKey) -> Script {
|
|
let our_funding_key = a.serialize();
|
|
let their_funding_key = b.serialize();
|
|
|
|
let builder = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2);
|
|
if our_funding_key[..] < their_funding_key[..] {
|
|
builder.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
|
|
.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
|
|
} else {
|
|
builder.push_slice(&their_funding_key)
|
|
.push_slice(&our_funding_key)
|
|
}.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2).push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// panics if htlc.transaction_output_index.is_none()!
|
|
pub fn build_htlc_transaction(prev_hash: &Sha256dHash, feerate_per_kw: u64, to_self_delay: u16, htlc: &HTLCOutputInCommitment, a_delayed_payment_key: &PublicKey, revocation_key: &PublicKey) -> Transaction {
|
|
let mut txins: Vec<TxIn> = Vec::new();
|
|
txins.push(TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: OutPoint {
|
|
txid: prev_hash.clone(),
|
|
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index.expect("Can't build an HTLC transaction for a dust output"),
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Script::new(),
|
|
sequence: 0,
|
|
witness: Vec::new(),
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let total_fee = if htlc.offered {
|
|
feerate_per_kw * HTLC_TIMEOUT_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
|
|
} else {
|
|
feerate_per_kw * HTLC_SUCCESS_TX_WEIGHT / 1000
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut txouts: Vec<TxOut> = Vec::new();
|
|
txouts.push(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: get_revokeable_redeemscript(revocation_key, to_self_delay, a_delayed_payment_key).to_v0_p2wsh(),
|
|
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000 - total_fee //TODO: BOLT 3 does not specify if we should add amount_msat before dividing or if we should divide by 1000 before subtracting (as we do here)
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: if htlc.offered { htlc.cltv_expiry } else { 0 },
|
|
input: txins,
|
|
output: txouts,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[derive(Clone)]
|
|
/// We use this to track local commitment transactions and put off signing them until we are ready
|
|
/// to broadcast. Eventually this will require a signer which is possibly external, but for now we
|
|
/// just pass in the SecretKeys required.
|
|
pub struct LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
tx: Transaction,
|
|
pub(crate) local_keys: TxCreationKeys,
|
|
pub(crate) feerate_per_kw: u64,
|
|
per_htlc: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<Transaction>)>
|
|
}
|
|
impl LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
pub fn dummy() -> Self {
|
|
let dummy_input = TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: OutPoint {
|
|
txid: Default::default(),
|
|
vout: 0,
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Default::default(),
|
|
sequence: 0,
|
|
witness: vec![vec![], vec![], vec![]]
|
|
};
|
|
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&Secp256k1::new(), &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap());
|
|
Self {
|
|
tx: Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
input: vec![dummy_input],
|
|
output: Vec::new(),
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
},
|
|
local_keys: TxCreationKeys {
|
|
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
},
|
|
feerate_per_kw: 0,
|
|
per_htlc: Vec::new()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Generate a new LocalCommitmentTransaction based on a raw commitment transaction,
|
|
/// remote signature and both parties keys
|
|
pub(crate) fn new_missing_local_sig(mut tx: Transaction, their_sig: &Signature, our_funding_key: &PublicKey, their_funding_key: &PublicKey, local_keys: TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, mut htlc_data: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>)>) -> LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
if tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Tried to store a commitment transaction that had input count != 1!"); }
|
|
if tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { panic!("Tried to store a signed commitment transaction?"); }
|
|
|
|
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
|
|
|
|
if our_funding_key.serialize()[..] < their_funding_key.serialize()[..] {
|
|
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
|
|
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
|
|
tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
|
|
tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Self { tx,
|
|
local_keys,
|
|
feerate_per_kw,
|
|
// TODO: Avoid the conversion of a Vec created likely just for this:
|
|
per_htlc: htlc_data.drain(..).map(|(a, b)| (a, b, None)).collect(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get the txid of the local commitment transaction contained in this
|
|
/// LocalCommitmentTransaction
|
|
pub fn txid(&self) -> Sha256dHash {
|
|
self.tx.txid()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Check if LocalCommitmentTransaction has already been signed by us
|
|
pub(crate) fn has_local_sig(&self) -> bool {
|
|
if self.tx.input.len() != 1 { panic!("Commitment transactions must have input count == 1!"); }
|
|
if self.tx.input[0].witness.len() == 4 {
|
|
assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty());
|
|
assert!(!self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
|
|
true
|
|
} else {
|
|
assert_eq!(self.tx.input[0].witness.len(), 3);
|
|
assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[0].is_empty());
|
|
assert!(self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() || self.tx.input[0].witness[2].is_empty());
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Gets our signature for the contained commitment transaction given our funding private key.
|
|
///
|
|
/// Funding key is your key included in the 2-2 funding_outpoint lock. Should be provided
|
|
/// by your ChannelKeys.
|
|
/// Funding redeemscript is script locking funding_outpoint. This is the mutlsig script
|
|
/// between your own funding key and your counterparty's. Currently, this is provided in
|
|
/// ChannelKeys::sign_local_commitment() calls directly.
|
|
/// Channel value is amount locked in funding_outpoint.
|
|
pub fn get_local_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&self, funding_key: &SecretKey, funding_redeemscript: &Script, channel_value_satoshis: u64, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) -> Signature {
|
|
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&self.tx)
|
|
.sighash_all(&self.tx.input[0], funding_redeemscript, channel_value_satoshis)[..]);
|
|
secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, funding_key)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
pub(crate) fn add_local_sig(&mut self, funding_redeemscript: &Script, our_sig: Signature) {
|
|
if self.has_local_sig() { return; }
|
|
|
|
if self.tx.input[0].witness[1].is_empty() {
|
|
self.tx.input[0].witness[1] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
|
|
self.tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
} else {
|
|
self.tx.input[0].witness[2] = our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec();
|
|
self.tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
self.tx.input[0].witness.push(funding_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Get raw transaction without asserting if witness is complete
|
|
pub(crate) fn without_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction { &self.tx }
|
|
/// Get raw transaction with panics if witness is incomplete
|
|
pub(crate) fn with_valid_witness(&self) -> &Transaction {
|
|
assert!(self.has_local_sig());
|
|
&self.tx
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Add local signature for a htlc transaction, do nothing if a cached signed transaction is
|
|
/// already present
|
|
pub fn add_htlc_sig<T: secp256k1::Signing>(&mut self, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, htlc_index: u32, preimage: Option<PaymentPreimage>, local_csv: u16, secp_ctx: &Secp256k1<T>) {
|
|
let txid = self.txid();
|
|
for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter_mut() {
|
|
if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index == Some(htlc_index) {
|
|
if this_htlc.2.is_some() { return; } // we already have a cached htlc transaction at provided index
|
|
let mut htlc_tx = build_htlc_transaction(&txid, self.feerate_per_kw, local_csv, &this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
|
|
if !this_htlc.0.offered && preimage.is_none() { return; } // if we don't have preimage for HTLC-Success, don't try to generate
|
|
let htlc_secret = if !this_htlc.0.offered { preimage } else { None }; // if we have a preimage for HTLC-Timeout, don't use it that's likely a duplicate HTLC hash
|
|
if this_htlc.1.is_none() { return; } // we don't have any remote signature for this htlc
|
|
if htlc_tx.input.len() != 1 { return; }
|
|
if htlc_tx.input[0].witness.len() != 0 { return; }
|
|
|
|
let htlc_redeemscript = get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&this_htlc.0, &self.local_keys.a_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.b_htlc_key, &self.local_keys.revocation_key);
|
|
|
|
if let Ok(our_htlc_key) = derive_private_key(secp_ctx, &self.local_keys.per_commitment_point, htlc_base_key) {
|
|
let sighash = hash_to_message!(&bip143::SighashComponents::new(&htlc_tx).sighash_all(&htlc_tx.input[0], &htlc_redeemscript, this_htlc.0.amount_msat / 1000)[..]);
|
|
let our_sig = secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &our_htlc_key);
|
|
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
|
|
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(this_htlc.1.unwrap().serialize_der().to_vec());
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der().to_vec());
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
|
|
if this_htlc.0.offered {
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
|
|
assert!(htlc_secret.is_none());
|
|
} else {
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_secret.unwrap().0.to_vec());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
htlc_tx.input[0].witness.push(htlc_redeemscript.as_bytes().to_vec());
|
|
|
|
this_htlc.2 = Some(htlc_tx);
|
|
} else { return; }
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
/// Expose raw htlc transaction, guarante witness is complete if non-empty
|
|
pub fn htlc_with_valid_witness(&self, htlc_index: u32) -> &Option<Transaction> {
|
|
for this_htlc in self.per_htlc.iter() {
|
|
if this_htlc.0.transaction_output_index.unwrap() == htlc_index {
|
|
return &this_htlc.2;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
&None
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
impl PartialEq for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
// We dont care whether we are signed in equality comparison
|
|
fn eq(&self, o: &Self) -> bool {
|
|
self.txid() == o.txid()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
impl Writeable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
|
|
if let Err(e) = self.tx.consensus_encode(&mut WriterWriteAdaptor(writer)) {
|
|
match e {
|
|
encode::Error::Io(e) => return Err(e),
|
|
_ => panic!("local tx must have been well-formed!"),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
self.local_keys.write(writer)?;
|
|
self.feerate_per_kw.write(writer)?;
|
|
writer.write_all(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.per_htlc.len() as u64))?;
|
|
for &(ref htlc, ref sig, ref htlc_tx) in self.per_htlc.iter() {
|
|
htlc.write(writer)?;
|
|
sig.write(writer)?;
|
|
htlc_tx.write(writer)?;
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
impl Readable for LocalCommitmentTransaction {
|
|
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<Self, DecodeError> {
|
|
let tx = match Transaction::consensus_decode(reader.by_ref()) {
|
|
Ok(tx) => tx,
|
|
Err(e) => match e {
|
|
encode::Error::Io(ioe) => return Err(DecodeError::Io(ioe)),
|
|
_ => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
let local_keys = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let feerate_per_kw = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let htlcs_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let mut per_htlc = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(htlcs_count as usize, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / mem::size_of::<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Option<Signature>, Option<Transaction>)>()));
|
|
for _ in 0..htlcs_count {
|
|
let htlc: HTLCOutputInCommitment = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let sigs = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let htlc_tx = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
per_htlc.push((htlc, sigs, htlc_tx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if tx.input.len() != 1 {
|
|
// Ensure tx didn't hit the 0-input ambiguity case.
|
|
return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue);
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(Self {
|
|
tx,
|
|
local_keys,
|
|
feerate_per_kw,
|
|
per_htlc,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use super::CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets;
|
|
use hex;
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
|
|
// Test vectors from BOLT 3:
|
|
let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut monitor;
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! test_secrets {
|
|
() => {
|
|
let mut idx = 281474976710655;
|
|
for secret in secrets.iter() {
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
|
|
idx -= 1;
|
|
}
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
|
|
assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_none());
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret correct sequence
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
|
|
monitor = CounterpartyCommitmentSecrets::new();
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
|
|
assert!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone()).is_err());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|