mirror of
https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
synced 2025-02-26 07:32:48 +01:00
87126b391b
This caused a bunch of cascading changes, including passing loggers down to Channels in function calls rather than having each Channel have a pointer to the ChannelManager's Logger (which was a circular reference). Other structs that the Channel had passed its Logger to also had their loggers removed. Other newly unused Loggers were also removed, especially when keeping them would've caused a bunch of extra test changes to be necessary, e.g. with the ChainWatchInterfaceUtil's Logger.
1661 lines
62 KiB
Rust
1661 lines
62 KiB
Rust
//! The top-level network map tracking logic lives here.
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::PublicKey;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1::Secp256k1;
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use bitcoin::secp256k1;
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use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
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use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
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use chain::chaininterface::{ChainError, ChainWatchInterface};
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use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
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use ln::msgs::{DecodeError,ErrorAction,LightningError,RoutingMessageHandler,NetAddress};
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use ln::msgs;
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use util::ser::{Writeable, Readable, Writer};
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use util::logger::Logger;
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use std::cmp;
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use std::sync::RwLock;
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use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicUsize, Ordering};
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use std::collections::BTreeMap;
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use std::collections::btree_map::Entry as BtreeEntry;
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use std;
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use std::ops::Deref;
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/// Receives and validates network updates from peers,
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/// stores authentic and relevant data as a network graph.
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/// This network graph is then used for routing payments.
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/// Provides interface to help with initial routing sync by
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/// serving historical announcements.
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pub struct NetGraphMsgHandler<C: Deref, L: Deref> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
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secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>,
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/// Representation of the payment channel network
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pub network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>,
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chain_monitor: C,
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full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize,
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logger: L,
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}
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impl<C: Deref, L: Deref> NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
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/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
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/// assuming a fresh network graph.
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/// Chain monitor is used to make sure announced channels exist on-chain,
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/// channel data is correct, and that the announcement is signed with
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/// channel owners' keys.
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pub fn new(chain_monitor: C, logger: L) -> Self {
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NetGraphMsgHandler {
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secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
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network_graph: RwLock::new(NetworkGraph {
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channels: BTreeMap::new(),
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nodes: BTreeMap::new(),
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}),
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full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
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chain_monitor,
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logger,
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}
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}
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/// Creates a new tracker of the actual state of the network of channels and nodes,
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/// assuming an existing Network Graph.
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pub fn from_net_graph(chain_monitor: C, logger: L, network_graph: RwLock<NetworkGraph>) -> Self {
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NetGraphMsgHandler {
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secp_ctx: Secp256k1::verification_only(),
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network_graph,
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full_syncs_requested: AtomicUsize::new(0),
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chain_monitor,
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logger,
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}
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}
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}
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macro_rules! secp_verify_sig {
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( $secp_ctx: expr, $msg: expr, $sig: expr, $pubkey: expr ) => {
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match $secp_ctx.verify($msg, $sig, $pubkey) {
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Ok(_) => {},
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Err(_) => return Err(LightningError{err: "Invalid signature from remote node", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
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}
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};
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}
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impl<C: Deref + Sync + Send, L: Deref + Sync + Send> RoutingMessageHandler for NetGraphMsgHandler<C, L> where C::Target: ChainWatchInterface, L::Target: Logger {
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fn handle_node_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
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self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_node_from_announcement(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
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}
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fn handle_channel_announcement(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
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if msg.contents.node_id_1 == msg.contents.node_id_2 || msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1 == msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2 {
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return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
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}
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let checked_utxo = match self.chain_monitor.get_chain_utxo(msg.contents.chain_hash, msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
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Ok((script_pubkey, _value)) => {
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let expected_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
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.push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1.serialize())
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.push_slice(&msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2.serialize())
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
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.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
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if script_pubkey != expected_script {
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return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announcement keys didn't match on-chain script", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
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}
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//TODO: Check if value is worth storing, use it to inform routing, and compare it
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//to the new HTLC max field in channel_update
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true
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},
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Err(ChainError::NotSupported) => {
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// Tentatively accept, potentially exposing us to DoS attacks
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false
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},
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Err(ChainError::NotWatched) => {
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return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced on an unknown chain", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
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},
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Err(ChainError::UnknownTx) => {
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return Err(LightningError{err: "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
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},
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};
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let result = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel_from_announcement(msg, checked_utxo, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
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log_trace!(self.logger, "Added channel_announcement for {}{}", msg.contents.short_channel_id, if !msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() { " with excess uninterpreted data!" } else { "" });
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result
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}
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fn handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&self, update: &msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate) {
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match update {
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&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelUpdateMessage { ref msg } => {
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let _ = self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx));
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},
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&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed { ref short_channel_id, ref is_permanent } => {
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self.network_graph.write().unwrap().close_channel_from_update(short_channel_id, &is_permanent);
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},
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&msgs::HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure { ref node_id, ref is_permanent } => {
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self.network_graph.write().unwrap().fail_node(node_id, &is_permanent);
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},
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}
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}
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fn handle_channel_update(&self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
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self.network_graph.write().unwrap().update_channel(msg, Some(&self.secp_ctx))
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}
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fn get_next_channel_announcements(&self, starting_point: u64, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<(msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>, Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>)> {
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let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
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let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
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let mut iter = network_graph.get_channels().range(starting_point..);
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while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
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if let Some((_, ref chan)) = iter.next() {
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if chan.announcement_message.is_some() {
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let chan_announcement = chan.announcement_message.clone().unwrap();
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let mut one_to_two_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
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let mut two_to_one_announcement: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate> = None;
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if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_ref() {
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one_to_two_announcement = one_to_two.last_update_message.clone();
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}
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if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_ref() {
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two_to_one_announcement = two_to_one.last_update_message.clone();
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}
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result.push((chan_announcement, one_to_two_announcement, two_to_one_announcement));
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} else {
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// TODO: We may end up sending un-announced channel_updates if we are sending
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// initial sync data while receiving announce/updates for this channel.
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}
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} else {
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return result;
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}
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}
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result
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}
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fn get_next_node_announcements(&self, starting_point: Option<&PublicKey>, batch_amount: u8) -> Vec<msgs::NodeAnnouncement> {
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let network_graph = self.network_graph.read().unwrap();
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let mut result = Vec::with_capacity(batch_amount as usize);
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let mut iter = if let Some(pubkey) = starting_point {
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let mut iter = network_graph.get_nodes().range((*pubkey)..);
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iter.next();
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iter
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} else {
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network_graph.get_nodes().range(..)
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};
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while result.len() < batch_amount as usize {
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if let Some((_, ref node)) = iter.next() {
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if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
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if node_info.announcement_message.is_some() {
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result.push(node_info.announcement_message.clone().unwrap());
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}
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}
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} else {
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return result;
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}
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}
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result
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}
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fn should_request_full_sync(&self, _node_id: &PublicKey) -> bool {
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//TODO: Determine whether to request a full sync based on the network map.
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const FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST: usize = 5;
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if self.full_syncs_requested.load(Ordering::Acquire) < FULL_SYNCS_TO_REQUEST {
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self.full_syncs_requested.fetch_add(1, Ordering::AcqRel);
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true
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} else {
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false
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}
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}
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}
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#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
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/// Details about one direction of a channel. Received
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/// within a channel update.
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pub struct DirectionalChannelInfo {
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/// When the last update to the channel direction was issued.
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/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
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pub last_update: u32,
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/// Whether the channel can be currently used for payments (in this one direction).
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pub enabled: bool,
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/// The difference in CLTV values that you must have when routing through this channel.
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pub cltv_expiry_delta: u16,
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/// The minimum value, which must be relayed to the next hop via the channel
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pub htlc_minimum_msat: u64,
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/// Fees charged when the channel is used for routing
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pub fees: RoutingFees,
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/// Most recent update for the channel received from the network
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/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
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/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
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/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
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pub last_update_message: Option<msgs::ChannelUpdate>,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for DirectionalChannelInfo {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
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write!(f, "last_update {}, enabled {}, cltv_expiry_delta {}, htlc_minimum_msat {}, fees {:?}", self.last_update, self.enabled, self.cltv_expiry_delta, self.htlc_minimum_msat, self.fees)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl_writeable!(DirectionalChannelInfo, 0, {
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last_update,
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enabled,
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cltv_expiry_delta,
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htlc_minimum_msat,
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fees,
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last_update_message
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});
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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/// Details about a channel (both directions).
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/// Received within a channel announcement.
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pub struct ChannelInfo {
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/// Protocol features of a channel communicated during its announcement
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pub features: ChannelFeatures,
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/// Source node of the first direction of a channel
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pub node_one: PublicKey,
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/// Details about the first direction of a channel
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pub one_to_two: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
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/// Source node of the second direction of a channel
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pub node_two: PublicKey,
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/// Details about the second direction of a channel
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pub two_to_one: Option<DirectionalChannelInfo>,
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/// An initial announcement of the channel
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/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
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/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
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/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
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pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::ChannelAnnouncement>,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for ChannelInfo {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
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write!(f, "features: {}, node_one: {}, one_to_two: {:?}, node_two: {}, two_to_one: {:?}",
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log_bytes!(self.features.encode()), log_pubkey!(self.node_one), self.one_to_two, log_pubkey!(self.node_two), self.two_to_one)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl_writeable!(ChannelInfo, 0, {
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features,
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node_one,
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one_to_two,
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node_two,
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two_to_one,
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announcement_message
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});
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/// Fees for routing via a given channel or a node
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#[derive(Eq, PartialEq, Copy, Clone, Debug)]
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pub struct RoutingFees {
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/// Flat routing fee in satoshis
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pub base_msat: u32,
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/// Liquidity-based routing fee in millionths of a routed amount.
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/// In other words, 10000 is 1%.
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pub proportional_millionths: u32,
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}
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impl Readable for RoutingFees{
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fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<RoutingFees, DecodeError> {
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let base_msat: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let proportional_millionths: u32 = Readable::read(reader)?;
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Ok(RoutingFees {
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base_msat,
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proportional_millionths,
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})
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}
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}
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impl Writeable for RoutingFees {
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fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
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self.base_msat.write(writer)?;
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self.proportional_millionths.write(writer)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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#[derive(PartialEq, Debug)]
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/// Information received in the latest node_announcement from this node.
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pub struct NodeAnnouncementInfo {
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/// Protocol features the node announced support for
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pub features: NodeFeatures,
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/// When the last known update to the node state was issued.
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/// Value is opaque, as set in the announcement.
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pub last_update: u32,
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/// Color assigned to the node
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pub rgb: [u8; 3],
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/// Moniker assigned to the node.
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/// May be invalid or malicious (eg control chars),
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/// should not be exposed to the user.
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pub alias: [u8; 32],
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/// Internet-level addresses via which one can connect to the node
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pub addresses: Vec<NetAddress>,
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/// An initial announcement of the node
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/// Mostly redundant with the data we store in fields explicitly.
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/// Everything else is useful only for sending out for initial routing sync.
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/// Not stored if contains excess data to prevent DoS.
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pub announcement_message: Option<msgs::NodeAnnouncement>
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}
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impl Writeable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
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fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
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self.features.write(writer)?;
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self.last_update.write(writer)?;
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self.rgb.write(writer)?;
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self.alias.write(writer)?;
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(self.addresses.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
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for ref addr in &self.addresses {
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addr.write(writer)?;
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}
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self.announcement_message.write(writer)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl Readable for NodeAnnouncementInfo {
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fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeAnnouncementInfo, DecodeError> {
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let features = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let last_update = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let rgb = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let alias = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let addresses_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let mut addresses = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(addresses_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 40) as usize);
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for _ in 0..addresses_count {
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match Readable::read(reader) {
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Ok(Ok(addr)) => { addresses.push(addr); },
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Ok(Err(_)) => return Err(DecodeError::InvalidValue),
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Err(DecodeError::ShortRead) => return Err(DecodeError::BadLengthDescriptor),
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_ => unreachable!(),
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}
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}
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let announcement_message = Readable::read(reader)?;
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Ok(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
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features,
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last_update,
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rgb,
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alias,
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addresses,
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announcement_message
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})
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}
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}
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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/// Details about a node in the network, known from the network announcement.
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pub struct NodeInfo {
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/// All valid channels a node has announced
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pub channels: Vec<u64>,
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/// Lowest fees enabling routing via any of the enabled, known channels to a node.
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/// The two fields (flat and proportional fee) are independent,
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/// meaning they don't have to refer to the same channel.
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pub lowest_inbound_channel_fees: Option<RoutingFees>,
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/// More information about a node from node_announcement.
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/// Optional because we store a Node entry after learning about it from
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/// a channel announcement, but before receiving a node announcement.
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pub announcement_info: Option<NodeAnnouncementInfo>
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for NodeInfo {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
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write!(f, "lowest_inbound_channel_fees: {:?}, channels: {:?}, announcement_info: {:?}",
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self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees, &self.channels[..], self.announcement_info)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl Writeable for NodeInfo {
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fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
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(self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
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for ref chan in self.channels.iter() {
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chan.write(writer)?;
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}
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self.lowest_inbound_channel_fees.write(writer)?;
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self.announcement_info.write(writer)?;
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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const MAX_ALLOC_SIZE: u64 = 64*1024;
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impl Readable for NodeInfo {
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fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NodeInfo, DecodeError> {
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let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let mut channels = Vec::with_capacity(cmp::min(channels_count, MAX_ALLOC_SIZE / 8) as usize);
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for _ in 0..channels_count {
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channels.push(Readable::read(reader)?);
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}
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let lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Readable::read(reader)?;
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let announcement_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
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Ok(NodeInfo {
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channels,
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lowest_inbound_channel_fees,
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announcement_info,
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})
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}
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}
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|
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/// Represents the network as nodes and channels between them
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#[derive(PartialEq)]
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pub struct NetworkGraph {
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channels: BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo>,
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nodes: BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>,
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Writeable for NetworkGraph {
|
|
fn write<W: Writer>(&self, writer: &mut W) -> Result<(), ::std::io::Error> {
|
|
(self.channels.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
|
|
for (ref chan_id, ref chan_info) in self.channels.iter() {
|
|
(*chan_id).write(writer)?;
|
|
chan_info.write(writer)?;
|
|
}
|
|
(self.nodes.len() as u64).write(writer)?;
|
|
for (ref node_id, ref node_info) in self.nodes.iter() {
|
|
node_id.write(writer)?;
|
|
node_info.write(writer)?;
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl Readable for NetworkGraph {
|
|
fn read<R: ::std::io::Read>(reader: &mut R) -> Result<NetworkGraph, DecodeError> {
|
|
let channels_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let mut channels = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
for _ in 0..channels_count {
|
|
let chan_id: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let chan_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
channels.insert(chan_id, chan_info);
|
|
}
|
|
let nodes_count: u64 = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let mut nodes = BTreeMap::new();
|
|
for _ in 0..nodes_count {
|
|
let node_id = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
let node_info = Readable::read(reader)?;
|
|
nodes.insert(node_id, node_info);
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(NetworkGraph {
|
|
channels,
|
|
nodes,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl std::fmt::Display for NetworkGraph {
|
|
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter) -> Result<(), std::fmt::Error> {
|
|
write!(f, "Network map\n[Channels]\n")?;
|
|
for (key, val) in self.channels.iter() {
|
|
write!(f, " {}: {}\n", key, val)?;
|
|
}
|
|
write!(f, "[Nodes]\n")?;
|
|
for (key, val) in self.nodes.iter() {
|
|
write!(f, " {}: {}\n", log_pubkey!(key), val)?;
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
impl NetworkGraph {
|
|
/// Returns all known valid channels' short ids along with announced channel info.
|
|
pub fn get_channels<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<u64, ChannelInfo> { &self.channels }
|
|
/// Returns all known nodes' public keys along with announced node info.
|
|
pub fn get_nodes<'a>(&'a self) -> &'a BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo> { &self.nodes }
|
|
|
|
/// Get network addresses by node id.
|
|
/// Returns None if the requested node is completely unknown,
|
|
/// or if node announcement for the node was never received.
|
|
pub fn get_addresses<'a>(&'a self, pubkey: &PublicKey) -> Option<&'a Vec<NetAddress>> {
|
|
if let Some(node) = self.nodes.get(pubkey) {
|
|
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
|
|
return Some(&node_info.addresses)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
None
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// For an already known node (from channel announcements), update its stored properties from a given node announcement
|
|
/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
|
|
fn update_node_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::NodeAnnouncement, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
|
|
if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
|
|
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &msg.contents.node_id);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
match self.nodes.get_mut(&msg.contents.node_id) {
|
|
None => Err(LightningError{err: "No existing channels for node_announcement", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
|
|
Some(node) => {
|
|
if let Some(node_info) = node.announcement_info.as_ref() {
|
|
if node_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
|
|
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() && msg.contents.excess_address_data.is_empty();
|
|
node.announcement_info = Some(NodeAnnouncementInfo {
|
|
features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
|
|
last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
|
|
rgb: msg.contents.rgb,
|
|
alias: msg.contents.alias,
|
|
addresses: msg.contents.addresses.clone(),
|
|
announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
Ok(should_relay)
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// For a new or already known (from previous announcement) channel, store or update channel info.
|
|
/// Also store nodes (if not stored yet) the channel is between, and make node aware of this channel.
|
|
/// Checking utxo on-chain is useful if we receive an update for already known channel id,
|
|
/// which is probably result of a reorg. In that case, we update channel info only if the
|
|
/// utxo was checked, otherwise stick to the existing update, to prevent DoS risks.
|
|
/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
|
|
fn update_channel_from_announcement(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelAnnouncement, checked_utxo: bool, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
|
|
if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
|
|
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_1, &msg.contents.node_id_1);
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.node_signature_2, &msg.contents.node_id_2);
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_1, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_1);
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.bitcoin_signature_2, &msg.contents.bitcoin_key_2);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let should_relay = msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty();
|
|
|
|
let chan_info = ChannelInfo {
|
|
features: msg.contents.features.clone(),
|
|
node_one: msg.contents.node_id_1.clone(),
|
|
one_to_two: None,
|
|
node_two: msg.contents.node_id_2.clone(),
|
|
two_to_one: None,
|
|
announcement_message: if should_relay { Some(msg.clone()) } else { None },
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match self.channels.entry(msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
|
|
BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) => {
|
|
//TODO: because asking the blockchain if short_channel_id is valid is only optional
|
|
//in the blockchain API, we need to handle it smartly here, though it's unclear
|
|
//exactly how...
|
|
if checked_utxo {
|
|
// Either our UTXO provider is busted, there was a reorg, or the UTXO provider
|
|
// only sometimes returns results. In any case remove the previous entry. Note
|
|
// that the spec expects us to "blacklist" the node_ids involved, but we can't
|
|
// do that because
|
|
// a) we don't *require* a UTXO provider that always returns results.
|
|
// b) we don't track UTXOs of channels we know about and remove them if they
|
|
// get reorg'd out.
|
|
// c) it's unclear how to do so without exposing ourselves to massive DoS risk.
|
|
Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &entry.get(), msg.contents.short_channel_id);
|
|
*entry.get_mut() = chan_info;
|
|
} else {
|
|
return Err(LightningError{err: "Already have knowledge of channel", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError})
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
BtreeEntry::Vacant(entry) => {
|
|
entry.insert(chan_info);
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! add_channel_to_node {
|
|
( $node_id: expr ) => {
|
|
match self.nodes.entry($node_id) {
|
|
BtreeEntry::Occupied(node_entry) => {
|
|
node_entry.into_mut().channels.push(msg.contents.short_channel_id);
|
|
},
|
|
BtreeEntry::Vacant(node_entry) => {
|
|
node_entry.insert(NodeInfo {
|
|
channels: vec!(msg.contents.short_channel_id),
|
|
lowest_inbound_channel_fees: None,
|
|
announcement_info: None,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_1);
|
|
add_channel_to_node!(msg.contents.node_id_2);
|
|
|
|
Ok(should_relay)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Close a channel if a corresponding HTLC fail was sent.
|
|
/// If permanent, removes a channel from the local storage.
|
|
/// May cause the removal of nodes too, if this was their last channel.
|
|
/// If not permanent, makes channels unavailable for routing.
|
|
pub fn close_channel_from_update(&mut self, short_channel_id: &u64, is_permanent: &bool) {
|
|
if *is_permanent {
|
|
if let Some(chan) = self.channels.remove(short_channel_id) {
|
|
Self::remove_channel_in_nodes(&mut self.nodes, &chan, *short_channel_id);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
if let Some(chan) = self.channels.get_mut(&short_channel_id) {
|
|
if let Some(one_to_two) = chan.one_to_two.as_mut() {
|
|
one_to_two.enabled = false;
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(two_to_one) = chan.two_to_one.as_mut() {
|
|
two_to_one.enabled = false;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn fail_node(&mut self, _node_id: &PublicKey, is_permanent: &bool) {
|
|
if *is_permanent {
|
|
// TODO: Wholly remove the node
|
|
} else {
|
|
// TODO: downgrade the node
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// For an already known (from announcement) channel, update info about one of the directions of a channel.
|
|
/// Announcement signatures are checked here only if Secp256k1 object is provided.
|
|
fn update_channel(&mut self, msg: &msgs::ChannelUpdate, secp_ctx: Option<&Secp256k1<secp256k1::VerifyOnly>>) -> Result<bool, LightningError> {
|
|
let dest_node_id;
|
|
let chan_enabled = msg.contents.flags & (1 << 1) != (1 << 1);
|
|
let chan_was_enabled;
|
|
|
|
match self.channels.get_mut(&msg.contents.short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => return Err(LightningError{err: "Couldn't find channel for update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError}),
|
|
Some(channel) => {
|
|
macro_rules! maybe_update_channel_info {
|
|
( $target: expr, $src_node: expr) => {
|
|
if let Some(existing_chan_info) = $target.as_ref() {
|
|
if existing_chan_info.last_update >= msg.contents.timestamp {
|
|
return Err(LightningError{err: "Update older than last processed update", action: ErrorAction::IgnoreError});
|
|
}
|
|
chan_was_enabled = existing_chan_info.enabled;
|
|
} else {
|
|
chan_was_enabled = false;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let last_update_message = if msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty() {
|
|
Some(msg.clone())
|
|
} else {
|
|
None
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let updated_channel_dir_info = DirectionalChannelInfo {
|
|
enabled: chan_enabled,
|
|
last_update: msg.contents.timestamp,
|
|
cltv_expiry_delta: msg.contents.cltv_expiry_delta,
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat: msg.contents.htlc_minimum_msat,
|
|
fees: RoutingFees {
|
|
base_msat: msg.contents.fee_base_msat,
|
|
proportional_millionths: msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths,
|
|
},
|
|
last_update_message
|
|
};
|
|
$target = Some(updated_channel_dir_info);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let msg_hash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&msg.contents.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
if msg.contents.flags & 1 == 1 {
|
|
dest_node_id = channel.node_one.clone();
|
|
if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_two);
|
|
}
|
|
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.two_to_one, channel.node_two);
|
|
} else {
|
|
dest_node_id = channel.node_two.clone();
|
|
if let Some(sig_verifier) = secp_ctx {
|
|
secp_verify_sig!(sig_verifier, &msg_hash, &msg.signature, &channel.node_one);
|
|
}
|
|
maybe_update_channel_info!(channel.one_to_two, channel.node_one);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if chan_enabled {
|
|
let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
|
|
let mut base_msat = msg.contents.fee_base_msat;
|
|
let mut proportional_millionths = msg.contents.fee_proportional_millionths;
|
|
if let Some(fees) = node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees {
|
|
base_msat = cmp::min(base_msat, fees.base_msat);
|
|
proportional_millionths = cmp::min(proportional_millionths, fees.proportional_millionths);
|
|
}
|
|
node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = Some(RoutingFees {
|
|
base_msat,
|
|
proportional_millionths
|
|
});
|
|
} else if chan_was_enabled {
|
|
let node = self.nodes.get_mut(&dest_node_id).unwrap();
|
|
let mut lowest_inbound_channel_fees = None;
|
|
|
|
for chan_id in node.channels.iter() {
|
|
let chan = self.channels.get(chan_id).unwrap();
|
|
let chan_info_opt;
|
|
if chan.node_one == dest_node_id {
|
|
chan_info_opt = chan.two_to_one.as_ref();
|
|
} else {
|
|
chan_info_opt = chan.one_to_two.as_ref();
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(chan_info) = chan_info_opt {
|
|
if chan_info.enabled {
|
|
let fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees.get_or_insert(RoutingFees {
|
|
base_msat: u32::max_value(), proportional_millionths: u32::max_value() });
|
|
fees.base_msat = cmp::min(fees.base_msat, chan_info.fees.base_msat);
|
|
fees.proportional_millionths = cmp::min(fees.proportional_millionths, chan_info.fees.proportional_millionths);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
node.lowest_inbound_channel_fees = lowest_inbound_channel_fees;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
Ok(msg.contents.excess_data.is_empty())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn remove_channel_in_nodes(nodes: &mut BTreeMap<PublicKey, NodeInfo>, chan: &ChannelInfo, short_channel_id: u64) {
|
|
macro_rules! remove_from_node {
|
|
($node_id: expr) => {
|
|
if let BtreeEntry::Occupied(mut entry) = nodes.entry($node_id) {
|
|
entry.get_mut().channels.retain(|chan_id| {
|
|
short_channel_id != *chan_id
|
|
});
|
|
if entry.get().channels.is_empty() {
|
|
entry.remove_entry();
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!("Had channel that pointed to unknown node (ie inconsistent network map)!");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
remove_from_node!(chan.node_one);
|
|
remove_from_node!(chan.node_two);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use chain::chaininterface;
|
|
use ln::features::{ChannelFeatures, NodeFeatures};
|
|
use routing::network_graph::{NetGraphMsgHandler, NetworkGraph};
|
|
use ln::msgs::{RoutingMessageHandler, UnsignedNodeAnnouncement, NodeAnnouncement,
|
|
UnsignedChannelAnnouncement, ChannelAnnouncement, UnsignedChannelUpdate, ChannelUpdate, HTLCFailChannelUpdate};
|
|
use util::test_utils;
|
|
use util::logger::Logger;
|
|
use util::ser::{Readable, Writeable};
|
|
|
|
use bitcoin::hashes::sha256d::Hash as Sha256dHash;
|
|
use bitcoin::hashes::Hash;
|
|
use bitcoin::network::constants::Network;
|
|
use bitcoin::blockdata::constants::genesis_block;
|
|
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Builder;
|
|
use bitcoin::blockdata::opcodes;
|
|
use bitcoin::util::hash::BitcoinHash;
|
|
|
|
use hex;
|
|
|
|
use bitcoin::secp256k1::key::{PublicKey, SecretKey};
|
|
use bitcoin::secp256k1::{All, Secp256k1};
|
|
|
|
use std::sync::Arc;
|
|
|
|
fn create_net_graph_msg_handler() -> (Secp256k1<All>, NetGraphMsgHandler<Arc<chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil>, Arc<test_utils::TestLogger>>) {
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
|
let logger = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
|
|
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(chaininterface::ChainWatchInterfaceUtil::new(Network::Testnet));
|
|
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor, Arc::clone(&logger));
|
|
(secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn request_full_sync_finite_times() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&hex::decode("0202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202020202").unwrap()[..]).unwrap());
|
|
|
|
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
assert!(net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
assert!(!net_graph_msg_handler.should_request_full_sync(&node_id));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn handling_node_announcements() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
|
|
let first_announcement_time = 500;
|
|
|
|
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
|
|
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
|
|
timestamp: first_announcement_time,
|
|
node_id: node_id_1,
|
|
rgb: [0; 3],
|
|
alias: [0; 32],
|
|
addresses: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!("No existing channels for node_announcement", e.err)
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
|
|
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
|
|
short_channel_id: 0,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(
|
|
&NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
}) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
unsigned_announcement.timestamp += 1000;
|
|
unsigned_announcement.excess_data.push(1);
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let announcement_with_data = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
// Return false because contains excess data.
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&announcement_with_data) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
// Even though previous announcement was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
|
|
// so we now won't accept announcements before the previous one.
|
|
unsigned_announcement.timestamp -= 10;
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let outdated_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&outdated_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn handling_channel_announcements() {
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
|
let logger: Arc<Logger> = Arc::new(test_utils::TestLogger::new());
|
|
let chain_monitor = Arc::new(test_utils::TestChainWatcher::new());
|
|
let net_graph_msg_handler = NetGraphMsgHandler::new(chain_monitor.clone(), Arc::clone(&logger));
|
|
|
|
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let good_script = Builder::new().push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
|
|
.push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey).serialize())
|
|
.push_slice(&PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey).serialize())
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_PUSHNUM_2)
|
|
.push_opcode(opcodes::all::OP_CHECKMULTISIG).into_script().to_v0_p2wsh();
|
|
|
|
|
|
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
|
|
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
|
|
short_channel_id: 0,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// Test if the UTXO lookups were not supported
|
|
*chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::NotSupported);
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => panic!(),
|
|
Some(_) => ()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (with UTXO lookups disabled),
|
|
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Already have knowledge of channel")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Test if an associated transaction were not on-chain (or not confirmed).
|
|
*chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
|
|
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
|
|
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Now test if the transaction is found in the UTXO set and the script is correct.
|
|
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
|
|
*chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script.clone(), 0));
|
|
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => panic!(),
|
|
Some(_) => ()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// If we receive announcement for the same channel (but TX is not confirmed),
|
|
// drop new one on the floor, since we can't see any changes.
|
|
*chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Err(chaininterface::ChainError::UnknownTx);
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announced without corresponding UTXO entry")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
// But if it is confirmed, replace the channel
|
|
*chain_monitor.utxo_ret.lock().unwrap() = Ok((good_script, 0));
|
|
unsigned_announcement.features = ChannelFeatures::empty();
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id) {
|
|
Some(channel_entry) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(channel_entry.features, ChannelFeatures::empty());
|
|
},
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Don't relay valid channels with excess data
|
|
unsigned_announcement.short_channel_id += 1;
|
|
unsigned_announcement.excess_data.push(1);
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
unsigned_announcement.excess_data = Vec::new();
|
|
let invalid_sig_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&invalid_sig_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
unsigned_announcement.node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let channel_to_itself_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&channel_to_itself_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Channel announcement node had a channel with itself")
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn handling_channel_update() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let zero_hash = Sha256dHash::hash(&[0; 32]);
|
|
let short_channel_id = 0;
|
|
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
|
|
{
|
|
// Announce a channel we will update
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let mut unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
timestamp: 100,
|
|
flags: 0,
|
|
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
|
|
fee_base_msat: 10000,
|
|
fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new()
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => panic!(),
|
|
Some(channel_info) => {
|
|
assert_eq!(channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().cltv_expiry_delta, 144);
|
|
assert!(channel_info.two_to_one.is_none());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 100;
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.excess_data.push(1);
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
// Return false because contains excess data
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id += 1;
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Couldn't find channel for update")
|
|
};
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.short_channel_id = short_channel_id;
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Even though previous update was not relayed further, we still accepted it,
|
|
// so we now won't accept update before the previous one.
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp -= 10;
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Update older than last processed update")
|
|
};
|
|
unsigned_channel_update.timestamp += 500;
|
|
|
|
let fake_msghash = hash_to_message!(&zero_hash);
|
|
let invalid_sig_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&fake_msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&invalid_sig_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(_) => panic!(),
|
|
Err(e) => assert_eq!(e.err, "Invalid signature from remote node")
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn handling_htlc_fail_channel_update() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let short_channel_id = 0;
|
|
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// There is no nodes in the table at the beginning.
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Announce a channel we will update
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
timestamp: 100,
|
|
flags: 0,
|
|
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
|
|
fee_base_msat: 10000,
|
|
fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new()
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => panic!(),
|
|
Some(channel_info) => {
|
|
assert!(channel_info.one_to_two.is_some());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
is_permanent: false
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
|
|
|
|
// Non-permanent closing just disables a channel
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
match network.get_channels().get(&short_channel_id) {
|
|
None => panic!(),
|
|
Some(channel_info) => {
|
|
assert!(!channel_info.one_to_two.as_ref().unwrap().enabled);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let channel_close_msg = HTLCFailChannelUpdate::ChannelClosed {
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
is_permanent: true
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
net_graph_msg_handler.handle_htlc_fail_channel_update(&channel_close_msg);
|
|
|
|
// Permanent closing deletes a channel
|
|
{
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.read().unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(network.get_channels().len(), 0);
|
|
// Nodes are also deleted because there are no associated channels anymore
|
|
assert_eq!(network.get_nodes().len(), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
// TODO: Test HTLCFailChannelUpdate::NodeFailure, which is not implemented yet.
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn getting_next_channel_announcements() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let short_channel_id = 1;
|
|
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
|
|
|
|
// Channels were not announced yet.
|
|
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(0, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Announce a channel we will update
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Contains initial channel announcement now.
|
|
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
|
|
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
|
|
let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
|
|
assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
|
|
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Valid channel update
|
|
let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
timestamp: 101,
|
|
flags: 0,
|
|
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
|
|
fee_base_msat: 10000,
|
|
fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new()
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now contains an initial announcement and an update.
|
|
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
|
|
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
|
|
let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
|
|
assert_ne!(update_1, &None);
|
|
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Channel update with excess data.
|
|
let unsigned_channel_update = UnsignedChannelUpdate {
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
timestamp: 102,
|
|
flags: 0,
|
|
cltv_expiry_delta: 144,
|
|
htlc_minimum_msat: 1000000,
|
|
fee_base_msat: 10000,
|
|
fee_proportional_millionths: 20,
|
|
excess_data: [1; 3].to_vec()
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_channel_update.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_update = ChannelUpdate {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_channel_update.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_update(&valid_channel_update) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Test that announcements with excess data won't be returned
|
|
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 1);
|
|
if let Some(channel_announcements) = channels_with_announcements.first() {
|
|
let &(_, ref update_1, ref update_2) = channel_announcements;
|
|
assert_eq!(update_1, &None);
|
|
assert_eq!(update_2, &None);
|
|
} else {
|
|
panic!();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Further starting point have no channels after it
|
|
let channels_with_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_channel_announcements(short_channel_id + 1000, 1);
|
|
assert_eq!(channels_with_announcements.len(), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn getting_next_node_announcements() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
let short_channel_id = 1;
|
|
let chain_hash = genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash();
|
|
|
|
// No nodes yet.
|
|
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 10);
|
|
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Announce a channel to add 2 nodes
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::empty(),
|
|
chain_hash,
|
|
short_channel_id,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_channel_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_channel_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
|
|
// Nodes were never announced
|
|
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
|
|
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
let mut unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
|
|
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
|
|
timestamp: 1000,
|
|
node_id: node_id_1,
|
|
rgb: [0; 3],
|
|
alias: [0; 32],
|
|
addresses: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
unsigned_announcement.node_id = node_id_2;
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(None, 3);
|
|
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 2);
|
|
|
|
// Skip the first node.
|
|
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
|
|
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 1);
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// Later announcement which should not be relayed (excess data) prevent us from sharing a node
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
|
|
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
|
|
timestamp: 1010,
|
|
node_id: node_id_2,
|
|
rgb: [0; 3],
|
|
alias: [0; 32],
|
|
addresses: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_data: [1; 3].to_vec(),
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(!res),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let next_announcements = net_graph_msg_handler.get_next_node_announcements(Some(&node_id_1), 2);
|
|
assert_eq!(next_announcements.len(), 0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn network_graph_serialization() {
|
|
let (secp_ctx, net_graph_msg_handler) = create_net_graph_msg_handler();
|
|
|
|
let node_1_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[42; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_privkey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[41; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_1_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[40; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
let node_2_btckey = &SecretKey::from_slice(&[39; 32]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
// Announce a channel to add a corresponding node.
|
|
let node_id_1 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let node_id_2 = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_privkey);
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
features: ChannelFeatures::known(),
|
|
chain_hash: genesis_block(Network::Testnet).header.bitcoin_hash(),
|
|
short_channel_id: 0,
|
|
node_id_1,
|
|
node_id_2,
|
|
bitcoin_key_1: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_key_2: PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_2_btckey),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = ChannelAnnouncement {
|
|
node_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
node_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_privkey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_1: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_btckey),
|
|
bitcoin_signature_2: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_2_btckey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone(),
|
|
};
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_channel_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(res) => assert!(res),
|
|
_ => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
|
|
let node_id = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, node_1_privkey);
|
|
let unsigned_announcement = UnsignedNodeAnnouncement {
|
|
features: NodeFeatures::known(),
|
|
timestamp: 100,
|
|
node_id,
|
|
rgb: [0; 3],
|
|
alias: [0; 32],
|
|
addresses: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_address_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
excess_data: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
let msghash = hash_to_message!(&Sha256dHash::hash(&unsigned_announcement.encode()[..])[..]);
|
|
let valid_announcement = NodeAnnouncement {
|
|
signature: secp_ctx.sign(&msghash, node_1_privkey),
|
|
contents: unsigned_announcement.clone()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
match net_graph_msg_handler.handle_node_announcement(&valid_announcement) {
|
|
Ok(_) => (),
|
|
Err(_) => panic!()
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let network = net_graph_msg_handler.network_graph.write().unwrap();
|
|
let mut w = test_utils::TestVecWriter(Vec::new());
|
|
assert!(!network.get_nodes().is_empty());
|
|
assert!(!network.get_channels().is_empty());
|
|
network.write(&mut w).unwrap();
|
|
assert!(<NetworkGraph>::read(&mut ::std::io::Cursor::new(&w.0)).unwrap() == *network);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|