mirror of
https://github.com/lightningdevkit/rust-lightning.git
synced 2025-02-27 00:06:34 +01:00
1908 lines
82 KiB
Rust
1908 lines
82 KiB
Rust
use bitcoin::blockdata::block::BlockHeader;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::{TxIn,TxOut,SigHashType,Transaction};
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use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::OutPoint as BitcoinOutPoint;
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use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
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use bitcoin::network::serialize;
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use bitcoin::util::hash::Sha256dHash;
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use bitcoin::util::bip143;
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use crypto::digest::Digest;
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use secp256k1::{Secp256k1,Message,Signature};
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use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
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use secp256k1;
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use ln::msgs::HandleError;
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use ln::chan_utils;
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use ln::chan_utils::HTLCOutputInCommitment;
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use chain::chaininterface::{ChainListener, ChainWatchInterface, BroadcasterInterface};
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use chain::transaction::OutPoint;
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use util::sha2::Sha256;
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use util::byte_utils;
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use std::collections::HashMap;
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use std::sync::{Arc,Mutex};
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use std::{hash,cmp};
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pub enum ChannelMonitorUpdateErr {
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/// Used to indicate a temporary failure (eg connection to a watchtower failed, but is expected
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/// to succeed at some point in the future).
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/// Such a failure will "freeze" a channel, preventing us from revoking old states or
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/// submitting new commitment transactions to the remote party.
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/// ChannelManager::test_restore_channel_monitor can be used to retry the update(s) and restore
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/// the channel to an operational state.
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TemporaryFailure,
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/// Used to indicate no further channel monitor updates will be allowed (eg we've moved on to a
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/// different watchtower and cannot update with all watchtowers that were previously informed
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/// of this channel). This will force-close the channel in question.
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PermanentFailure,
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}
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/// Simple trait indicating ability to track a set of ChannelMonitors and multiplex events between
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/// them. Generally should be implemented by keeping a local SimpleManyChannelMonitor and passing
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/// events to it, while also taking any add_update_monitor events and passing them to some remote
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/// server(s).
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/// Note that any updates to a channel's monitor *must* be applied to each instance of the
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/// channel's monitor everywhere (including remote watchtowers) *before* this function returns. If
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/// an update occurs and a remote watchtower is left with old state, it may broadcast transactions
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/// which we have revoked, allowing our counterparty to claim all funds in the channel!
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pub trait ManyChannelMonitor: Send + Sync {
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/// Adds or updates a monitor for the given `funding_txo`.
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/// Implementor must also ensure that the funding_txo outpoint is registered with any relevant
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/// ChainWatchInterfaces such that the provided monitor receives block_connected callbacks with
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/// any spends of it.
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fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr>;
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}
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/// A simple implementation of a ManyChannelMonitor and ChainListener. Can be used to create a
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/// watchtower or watch our own channels.
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/// Note that you must provide your own key by which to refer to channels.
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/// If you're accepting remote monitors (ie are implementing a watchtower), you must verify that
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/// users cannot overwrite a given channel by providing a duplicate key. ie you should probably
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/// index by a PublicKey which is required to sign any updates.
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/// If you're using this for local monitoring of your own channels, you probably want to use
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/// `OutPoint` as the key, which will give you a ManyChannelMonitor implementation.
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pub struct SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
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#[cfg(test)] // Used in ChannelManager tests to manipulate channels directly
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pub monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
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#[cfg(not(test))]
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monitors: Mutex<HashMap<Key, ChannelMonitor>>,
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chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>,
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broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>
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}
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impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash> ChainListener for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
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fn block_connected(&self, _header: &BlockHeader, height: u32, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], _indexes_of_txn_matched: &[u32]) {
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let monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
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for monitor in monitors.values() {
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let txn_outputs = monitor.block_connected(txn_matched, height, &*self.broadcaster);
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for (ref txid, ref outputs) in txn_outputs {
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for (idx, output) in outputs.iter().enumerate() {
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self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((txid.clone(), idx as u32), &output.script_pubkey);
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}
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}
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}
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}
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fn block_disconnected(&self, _: &BlockHeader) { }
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}
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impl<Key : Send + cmp::Eq + hash::Hash + 'static> SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key> {
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pub fn new(chain_monitor: Arc<ChainWatchInterface>, broadcaster: Arc<BroadcasterInterface>) -> Arc<SimpleManyChannelMonitor<Key>> {
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let res = Arc::new(SimpleManyChannelMonitor {
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monitors: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
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chain_monitor,
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broadcaster
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});
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let weak_res = Arc::downgrade(&res);
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res.chain_monitor.register_listener(weak_res);
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res
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}
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pub fn add_update_monitor_by_key(&self, key: Key, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
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let mut monitors = self.monitors.lock().unwrap();
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match monitors.get_mut(&key) {
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Some(orig_monitor) => return orig_monitor.insert_combine(monitor),
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None => {}
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};
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match &monitor.funding_txo {
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&None => self.chain_monitor.watch_all_txn(),
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&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
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self.chain_monitor.install_watch_tx(&outpoint.txid, script);
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self.chain_monitor.install_watch_outpoint((outpoint.txid, outpoint.index as u32), script);
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},
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}
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monitors.insert(key, monitor);
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Ok(())
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}
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}
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impl ManyChannelMonitor for SimpleManyChannelMonitor<OutPoint> {
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fn add_update_monitor(&self, funding_txo: OutPoint, monitor: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), ChannelMonitorUpdateErr> {
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match self.add_update_monitor_by_key(funding_txo, monitor) {
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Ok(_) => Ok(()),
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Err(_) => Err(ChannelMonitorUpdateErr::PermanentFailure),
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}
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}
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}
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/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, don't try to claim it in a shared transaction,
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/// instead claiming it in its own individual transaction.
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const CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 12;
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/// If an HTLC expires within this many blocks, force-close the channel to broadcast the
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/// HTLC-Success transaction.
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const CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER: u32 = 6;
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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enum KeyStorage {
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PrivMode {
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revocation_base_key: SecretKey,
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htlc_base_key: SecretKey,
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},
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SigsMode {
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revocation_base_key: PublicKey,
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htlc_base_key: PublicKey,
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sigs: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Signature>,
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}
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}
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#[derive(Clone, PartialEq)]
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struct LocalSignedTx {
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/// txid of the transaction in tx, just used to make comparison faster
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txid: Sha256dHash,
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tx: Transaction,
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revocation_key: PublicKey,
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a_htlc_key: PublicKey,
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b_htlc_key: PublicKey,
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delayed_payment_key: PublicKey,
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feerate_per_kw: u64,
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htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>,
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}
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const SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
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const MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION: u8 = 1;
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pub struct ChannelMonitor {
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funding_txo: Option<(OutPoint, Script)>,
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commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64,
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key_storage: KeyStorage,
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delayed_payment_base_key: PublicKey,
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their_htlc_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
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their_delayed_payment_base_key: Option<PublicKey>,
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// first is the idx of the first of the two revocation points
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their_cur_revocation_points: Option<(u64, PublicKey, Option<PublicKey>)>,
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our_to_self_delay: u16,
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their_to_self_delay: Option<u16>,
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old_secrets: [([u8; 32], u64); 49],
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap<Sha256dHash, Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>>,
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/// We cannot identify HTLC-Success or HTLC-Timeout transactions by themselves on the chain.
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/// Nor can we figure out their commitment numbers without the commitment transaction they are
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/// spending. Thus, in order to claim them via revocation key, we track all the remote
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/// commitment transactions which we find on-chain, mapping them to the commitment number which
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/// can be used to derive the revocation key and claim the transactions.
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex<HashMap<Sha256dHash, u64>>,
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/// Cache used to make pruning of payment_preimages faster.
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/// Maps payment_hash values to commitment numbers for remote transactions for non-revoked
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/// remote transactions (ie should remain pretty small).
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/// Serialized to disk but should generally not be sent to Watchtowers.
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap<[u8; 32], u64>,
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// We store two local commitment transactions to avoid any race conditions where we may update
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// some monitors (potentially on watchtowers) but then fail to update others, resulting in the
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// various monitors for one channel being out of sync, and us broadcasting a local
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// transaction for which we have deleted claim information on some watchtowers.
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
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current_local_signed_commitment_tx: Option<LocalSignedTx>,
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payment_preimages: HashMap<[u8; 32], [u8; 32]>,
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destination_script: Script,
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secp_ctx: Secp256k1<secp256k1::All>, //TODO: dedup this a bit...
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}
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impl Clone for ChannelMonitor {
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fn clone(&self) -> Self {
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ChannelMonitor {
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funding_txo: self.funding_txo.clone(),
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commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor.clone(),
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key_storage: self.key_storage.clone(),
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delayed_payment_base_key: self.delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
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their_htlc_base_key: self.their_htlc_base_key.clone(),
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their_delayed_payment_base_key: self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
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their_cur_revocation_points: self.their_cur_revocation_points.clone(),
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our_to_self_delay: self.our_to_self_delay,
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their_to_self_delay: self.their_to_self_delay,
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old_secrets: self.old_secrets.clone(),
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remote_claimable_outpoints: self.remote_claimable_outpoints.clone(),
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new((*self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap()).clone()),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: self.remote_hash_commitment_number.clone(),
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
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current_local_signed_commitment_tx: self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.clone(),
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payment_preimages: self.payment_preimages.clone(),
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destination_script: self.destination_script.clone(),
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secp_ctx: self.secp_ctx.clone(),
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}
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}
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}
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#[cfg(any(test, feature = "fuzztarget"))]
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/// Used only in testing and fuzztarget to check serialization roundtrips don't change the
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/// underlying object
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impl PartialEq for ChannelMonitor {
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fn eq(&self, other: &Self) -> bool {
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if self.funding_txo != other.funding_txo ||
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self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor != other.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor ||
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self.key_storage != other.key_storage ||
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self.delayed_payment_base_key != other.delayed_payment_base_key ||
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self.their_htlc_base_key != other.their_htlc_base_key ||
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self.their_delayed_payment_base_key != other.their_delayed_payment_base_key ||
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self.their_cur_revocation_points != other.their_cur_revocation_points ||
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self.our_to_self_delay != other.our_to_self_delay ||
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self.their_to_self_delay != other.their_to_self_delay ||
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self.remote_claimable_outpoints != other.remote_claimable_outpoints ||
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self.remote_hash_commitment_number != other.remote_hash_commitment_number ||
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self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
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self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx != other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx ||
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self.payment_preimages != other.payment_preimages ||
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self.destination_script != other.destination_script
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{
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false
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} else {
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for (&(ref secret, ref idx), &(ref o_secret, ref o_idx)) in self.old_secrets.iter().zip(other.old_secrets.iter()) {
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if secret != o_secret || idx != o_idx {
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return false
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}
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}
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let us = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
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let them = other.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
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*us == *them
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}
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}
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}
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impl ChannelMonitor {
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pub fn new(revocation_base_key: &SecretKey, delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey, htlc_base_key: &SecretKey, our_to_self_delay: u16, destination_script: Script) -> ChannelMonitor {
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ChannelMonitor {
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funding_txo: None,
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commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: 0,
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key_storage: KeyStorage::PrivMode {
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revocation_base_key: revocation_base_key.clone(),
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htlc_base_key: htlc_base_key.clone(),
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},
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delayed_payment_base_key: delayed_payment_base_key.clone(),
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their_htlc_base_key: None,
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their_delayed_payment_base_key: None,
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their_cur_revocation_points: None,
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our_to_self_delay: our_to_self_delay,
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their_to_self_delay: None,
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old_secrets: [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49],
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remote_claimable_outpoints: HashMap::new(),
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remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
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remote_hash_commitment_number: HashMap::new(),
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prev_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
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current_local_signed_commitment_tx: None,
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payment_preimages: HashMap::new(),
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destination_script: destination_script,
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secp_ctx: Secp256k1::new(),
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}
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}
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#[inline]
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fn place_secret(idx: u64) -> u8 {
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for i in 0..48 {
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if idx & (1 << i) == (1 << i) {
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return i
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}
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}
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48
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}
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#[inline]
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fn derive_secret(secret: [u8; 32], bits: u8, idx: u64) -> [u8; 32] {
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let mut res: [u8; 32] = secret;
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for i in 0..bits {
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let bitpos = bits - 1 - i;
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if idx & (1 << bitpos) == (1 << bitpos) {
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res[(bitpos / 8) as usize] ^= 1 << (bitpos & 7);
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let mut sha = Sha256::new();
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sha.input(&res);
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sha.result(&mut res);
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}
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}
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res
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}
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/// Inserts a revocation secret into this channel monitor. Also optionally tracks the next
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/// revocation point which may be required to claim HTLC outputs which we know the preimage of
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/// in case the remote end force-closes using their latest state. Prunes old preimages if neither
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/// needed by local commitment transactions HTCLs nor by remote ones. Unless we haven't already seen remote
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/// commitment transaction's secret, they are de facto pruned (we can use revocation key).
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pub(super) fn provide_secret(&mut self, idx: u64, secret: [u8; 32], their_next_revocation_point: Option<(u64, PublicKey)>) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
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let pos = ChannelMonitor::place_secret(idx);
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for i in 0..pos {
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let (old_secret, old_idx) = self.old_secrets[i as usize];
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if ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(secret, pos, old_idx) != old_secret {
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return Err(HandleError{err: "Previous secret did not match new one", action: None})
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}
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}
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self.old_secrets[pos as usize] = (secret, idx);
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if let Some(new_revocation_point) = their_next_revocation_point {
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match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
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Some(old_points) => {
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if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 1 {
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self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0, old_points.1, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
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} else if old_points.0 == new_revocation_point.0 + 2 {
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if let Some(old_second_point) = old_points.2 {
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self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((old_points.0 - 1, old_second_point, Some(new_revocation_point.1)));
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} else {
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self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
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}
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} else {
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self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
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}
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},
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None => {
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self.their_cur_revocation_points = Some((new_revocation_point.0, new_revocation_point.1, None));
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}
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}
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}
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if !self.payment_preimages.is_empty() {
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let local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref().expect("Channel needs at least an initial commitment tx !");
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let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx.as_ref();
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let min_idx = self.get_min_seen_secret();
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let remote_hash_commitment_number = &mut self.remote_hash_commitment_number;
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self.payment_preimages.retain(|&k, _| {
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for &(ref htlc, _, _) in &local_signed_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs {
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if k == htlc.payment_hash {
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return true
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}
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}
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if let Some(prev_local_commitment_tx) = prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
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for &(ref htlc, _, _) in prev_local_commitment_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
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if k == htlc.payment_hash {
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return true
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}
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}
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}
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let contains = if let Some(cn) = remote_hash_commitment_number.get(&k) {
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if *cn < min_idx {
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return true
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}
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true
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} else { false };
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if contains {
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remote_hash_commitment_number.remove(&k);
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}
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false
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});
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}
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Ok(())
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}
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/// Informs this monitor of the latest remote (ie non-broadcastable) commitment transaction.
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/// The monitor watches for it to be broadcasted and then uses the HTLC information (and
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/// possibly future revocation/preimage information) to claim outputs where possible.
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/// We cache also the mapping hash:commitment number to lighten pruning of old preimages by watchtowers.
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pub(super) fn provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, unsigned_commitment_tx: &Transaction, htlc_outputs: Vec<HTLCOutputInCommitment>, commitment_number: u64) {
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// TODO: Encrypt the htlc_outputs data with the single-hash of the commitment transaction
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// so that a remote monitor doesn't learn anything unless there is a malicious close.
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// (only maybe, sadly we cant do the same for local info, as we need to be aware of
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// timeouts)
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for htlc in &htlc_outputs {
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self.remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(htlc.payment_hash, commitment_number);
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}
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self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(unsigned_commitment_tx.txid(), htlc_outputs);
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}
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/// Informs this monitor of the latest local (ie broadcastable) commitment transaction. The
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/// monitor watches for timeouts and may broadcast it if we approach such a timeout. Thus, it
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/// is important that any clones of this channel monitor (including remote clones) by kept
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|
/// up-to-date as our local commitment transaction is updated.
|
|
/// Panics if set_their_to_self_delay has never been called.
|
|
pub(super) fn provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(&mut self, signed_commitment_tx: Transaction, local_keys: chan_utils::TxCreationKeys, feerate_per_kw: u64, htlc_outputs: Vec<(HTLCOutputInCommitment, Signature, Signature)>) {
|
|
assert!(self.their_to_self_delay.is_some());
|
|
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx.take();
|
|
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(LocalSignedTx {
|
|
txid: signed_commitment_tx.txid(),
|
|
tx: signed_commitment_tx,
|
|
revocation_key: local_keys.revocation_key,
|
|
a_htlc_key: local_keys.a_htlc_key,
|
|
b_htlc_key: local_keys.b_htlc_key,
|
|
delayed_payment_key: local_keys.a_delayed_payment_key,
|
|
feerate_per_kw,
|
|
htlc_outputs,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Provides a payment_hash->payment_preimage mapping. Will be automatically pruned when all
|
|
/// commitment_tx_infos which contain the payment hash have been revoked.
|
|
pub(super) fn provide_payment_preimage(&mut self, payment_hash: &[u8; 32], payment_preimage: &[u8; 32]) {
|
|
self.payment_preimages.insert(payment_hash.clone(), payment_preimage.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn insert_combine(&mut self, mut other: ChannelMonitor) -> Result<(), HandleError> {
|
|
if self.funding_txo.is_some() {
|
|
// We should be able to compare the entire funding_txo, but in fuzztarget its trivially
|
|
// easy to collide the funding_txo hash and have a different scriptPubKey.
|
|
if other.funding_txo.is_some() && other.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 != self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0 {
|
|
return Err(HandleError{err: "Funding transaction outputs are not identical!", action: None});
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
self.funding_txo = other.funding_txo.take();
|
|
}
|
|
let other_min_secret = other.get_min_seen_secret();
|
|
let our_min_secret = self.get_min_seen_secret();
|
|
if our_min_secret > other_min_secret {
|
|
self.provide_secret(other_min_secret, other.get_secret(other_min_secret).unwrap(), None)?;
|
|
}
|
|
if our_min_secret >= other_min_secret {
|
|
self.their_cur_revocation_points = other.their_cur_revocation_points;
|
|
for (txid, htlcs) in other.remote_claimable_outpoints.drain() {
|
|
self.remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, htlcs);
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(local_tx) = other.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(local_tx) = other.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx = Some(local_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
self.payment_preimages = other.payment_preimages;
|
|
}
|
|
Ok(())
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Panics if commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor doesn't fit in 48 bits
|
|
pub(super) fn set_commitment_obscure_factor(&mut self, commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor: u64) {
|
|
assert!(commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor < (1 << 48));
|
|
self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Allows this monitor to scan only for transactions which are applicable. Note that this is
|
|
/// optional, without it this monitor cannot be used in an SPV client, but you may wish to
|
|
/// avoid this (or call unset_funding_info) on a monitor you wish to send to a watchtower as it
|
|
/// provides slightly better privacy.
|
|
/// It's the responsibility of the caller to register outpoint and script with passing the former
|
|
/// value as key to add_update_monitor.
|
|
pub(super) fn set_funding_info(&mut self, funding_info: (OutPoint, Script)) {
|
|
self.funding_txo = Some(funding_info);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// We log these base keys at channel opening to being able to rebuild redeemscript in case of leaked revoked commit tx
|
|
pub(super) fn set_their_base_keys(&mut self, their_htlc_base_key: &PublicKey, their_delayed_payment_base_key: &PublicKey) {
|
|
self.their_htlc_base_key = Some(their_htlc_base_key.clone());
|
|
self.their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key.clone());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub(super) fn set_their_to_self_delay(&mut self, their_to_self_delay: u16) {
|
|
self.their_to_self_delay = Some(their_to_self_delay);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub(super) fn unset_funding_info(&mut self) {
|
|
self.funding_txo = None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn get_funding_txo(&self) -> Option<OutPoint> {
|
|
match self.funding_txo {
|
|
Some((outpoint, _)) => Some(outpoint),
|
|
None => None
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Serializes into a vec, with various modes for the exposed pub fns
|
|
fn serialize(&self, for_local_storage: bool) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
let mut res = Vec::new();
|
|
res.push(SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
|
|
res.push(MIN_SERIALIZATION_VERSION);
|
|
|
|
match &self.funding_txo {
|
|
&Some((ref outpoint, ref script)) => {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&outpoint.txid[..]);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(outpoint.index));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(script.len() as u64));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&script[..]);
|
|
},
|
|
&None => {
|
|
// We haven't even been initialized...not sure why anyone is serializing us, but
|
|
// not much to give them.
|
|
return res;
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Set in initial Channel-object creation, so should always be set by now:
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor));
|
|
|
|
match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
|
|
res.push(0);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&revocation_base_key[..]);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&htlc_base_key[..]);
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => unimplemented!(),
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.delayed_payment_base_key.serialize());
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_htlc_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.their_delayed_payment_base_key.as_ref().unwrap().serialize());
|
|
|
|
match self.their_cur_revocation_points {
|
|
Some((idx, pubkey, second_option)) => {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(idx));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&pubkey.serialize());
|
|
match second_option {
|
|
Some(second_pubkey) => {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&second_pubkey.serialize());
|
|
},
|
|
None => {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&[0; 33]);
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
None => {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(0));
|
|
},
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.our_to_self_delay));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be16_to_array(self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap()));
|
|
|
|
for &(ref secret, ref idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(secret);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(*idx));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! serialize_htlc_in_commitment {
|
|
($htlc_output: expr) => {
|
|
res.push($htlc_output.offered as u8);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($htlc_output.amount_msat));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.cltv_expiry));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$htlc_output.payment_hash);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be32_to_array($htlc_output.transaction_output_index));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_claimable_outpoints.len() as u64));
|
|
for (txid, htlc_outputs) in self.remote_claimable_outpoints.iter() {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
|
|
for htlc_output in htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
|
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.len() as u64));
|
|
for (txid, commitment_number) in remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.iter() {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&txid[..]);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if for_local_storage {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.remote_hash_commitment_number.len() as u64));
|
|
for (payment_hash, commitment_number) in self.remote_hash_commitment_number.iter() {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(payment_hash);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be48_to_array(*commitment_number));
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(0));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! serialize_local_tx {
|
|
($local_tx: expr) => {
|
|
let tx_ser = serialize::serialize(&$local_tx.tx).unwrap();
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(tx_ser.len() as u64));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&tx_ser);
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.revocation_key.serialize());
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.a_htlc_key.serialize());
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.b_htlc_key.serialize());
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&$local_tx.delayed_payment_key.serialize());
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.feerate_per_kw));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array($local_tx.htlc_outputs.len() as u64));
|
|
for &(ref htlc_output, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in $local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
|
serialize_htlc_in_commitment!(htlc_output);
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&their_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&our_sig.serialize_compact(&self.secp_ctx));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(ref prev_local_tx) = self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
res.push(1);
|
|
serialize_local_tx!(prev_local_tx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
res.push(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
res.push(1);
|
|
serialize_local_tx!(cur_local_tx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
res.push(0);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.payment_preimages.len() as u64));
|
|
for payment_preimage in self.payment_preimages.values() {
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(payment_preimage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&byte_utils::be64_to_array(self.destination_script.len() as u64));
|
|
res.extend_from_slice(&self.destination_script[..]);
|
|
|
|
res
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for writing to disk.
|
|
pub fn serialize_for_disk(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
self.serialize(true)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Encodes this monitor into a byte array, suitable for sending to a remote watchtower
|
|
pub fn serialize_for_watchtower(&self) -> Vec<u8> {
|
|
self.serialize(false)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Attempts to decode a serialized monitor
|
|
pub fn deserialize(data: &[u8]) -> Option<Self> {
|
|
let mut read_pos = 0;
|
|
macro_rules! read_bytes {
|
|
($byte_count: expr) => {
|
|
{
|
|
if ($byte_count as usize) > data.len() - read_pos {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
read_pos += $byte_count as usize;
|
|
&data[read_pos - $byte_count as usize..read_pos]
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
|
macro_rules! unwrap_obj {
|
|
($key: expr) => {
|
|
match $key {
|
|
Ok(res) => res,
|
|
Err(_) => return None,
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let _ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
|
|
let min_ver = read_bytes!(1)[0];
|
|
if min_ver > SERIALIZATION_VERSION {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Technically this can fail and serialize fail a round-trip, but only for serialization of
|
|
// barely-init'd ChannelMonitors that we can't do anything with.
|
|
let outpoint = OutPoint {
|
|
txid: Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32)),
|
|
index: byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)),
|
|
};
|
|
let script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
let funding_txo = Some((outpoint, Script::from(read_bytes!(script_len).to_vec())));
|
|
let commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
|
|
|
let key_storage = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
|
0 => {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode {
|
|
revocation_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
|
|
htlc_base_key: unwrap_obj!(SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(32))),
|
|
}
|
|
},
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let delayed_payment_base_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let their_htlc_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
|
|
let their_delayed_payment_base_key = Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33))));
|
|
|
|
let their_cur_revocation_points = {
|
|
let first_idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
|
if first_idx == 0 {
|
|
None
|
|
} else {
|
|
let first_point = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let second_point_slice = read_bytes!(33);
|
|
if second_point_slice[0..32] == [0; 32] && second_point_slice[32] == 0 {
|
|
Some((first_idx, first_point, None))
|
|
} else {
|
|
Some((first_idx, first_point, Some(unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, second_point_slice)))))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let our_to_self_delay = byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2));
|
|
let their_to_self_delay = Some(byte_utils::slice_to_be16(read_bytes!(2)));
|
|
|
|
let mut old_secrets = [([0; 32], 1 << 48); 49];
|
|
for &mut (ref mut secret, ref mut idx) in old_secrets.iter_mut() {
|
|
secret.copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
*idx = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! read_htlc_in_commitment {
|
|
() => {
|
|
{
|
|
let offered = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
|
0 => false, 1 => true,
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
let amount_msat = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
let cltv_expiry = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
|
|
let mut payment_hash = [0; 32];
|
|
payment_hash[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
let transaction_output_index = byte_utils::slice_to_be32(read_bytes!(4));
|
|
|
|
HTLCOutputInCommitment {
|
|
offered, amount_msat, cltv_expiry, payment_hash, transaction_output_index
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let remote_claimable_outpoints_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if remote_claimable_outpoints_len > data.len() as u64 / 64 { return None; }
|
|
let mut remote_claimable_outpoints = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_claimable_outpoints_len as usize);
|
|
for _ in 0..remote_claimable_outpoints_len {
|
|
let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
let outputs_count = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if outputs_count > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
|
let mut outputs = Vec::with_capacity(outputs_count as usize);
|
|
for _ in 0..outputs_count {
|
|
outputs.push(read_htlc_in_commitment!());
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(_) = remote_claimable_outpoints.insert(txid, outputs) {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
|
let mut remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len as usize);
|
|
for _ in 0..remote_commitment_txn_on_chain_len {
|
|
let txid = Sha256dHash::from(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
|
if let Some(_) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let remote_hash_commitment_number_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if remote_hash_commitment_number_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
|
let mut remote_hash_commitment_number = HashMap::with_capacity(remote_hash_commitment_number_len as usize);
|
|
for _ in 0..remote_hash_commitment_number_len {
|
|
let mut txid = [0; 32];
|
|
txid[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
let commitment_number = byte_utils::slice_to_be48(read_bytes!(6));
|
|
if let Some(_) = remote_hash_commitment_number.insert(txid, commitment_number) {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! read_local_tx {
|
|
() => {
|
|
{
|
|
let tx_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
let tx_ser = read_bytes!(tx_len);
|
|
let tx: Transaction = unwrap_obj!(serialize::deserialize(tx_ser));
|
|
if serialize::serialize(&tx).unwrap() != tx_ser {
|
|
// We check that the tx re-serializes to the same form to ensure there is
|
|
// no extra data, and as rust-bitcoin doesn't handle the 0-input ambiguity
|
|
// all that well.
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let revocation_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let a_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let b_htlc_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let delayed_payment_key = unwrap_obj!(PublicKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(33)));
|
|
let feerate_per_kw = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
|
|
let htlc_outputs_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if htlc_outputs_len > data.len() as u64 / 128 { return None; }
|
|
let mut htlc_outputs = Vec::with_capacity(htlc_outputs_len as usize);
|
|
for _ in 0..htlc_outputs_len {
|
|
htlc_outputs.push((read_htlc_in_commitment!(),
|
|
unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64))),
|
|
unwrap_obj!(Signature::from_compact(&secp_ctx, read_bytes!(64)))));
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
LocalSignedTx {
|
|
txid: tx.txid(),
|
|
tx, revocation_key, a_htlc_key, b_htlc_key, delayed_payment_key, feerate_per_kw, htlc_outputs
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let prev_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
|
0 => None,
|
|
1 => {
|
|
Some(read_local_tx!())
|
|
},
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let current_local_signed_commitment_tx = match read_bytes!(1)[0] {
|
|
0 => None,
|
|
1 => {
|
|
Some(read_local_tx!())
|
|
},
|
|
_ => return None,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let payment_preimages_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
if payment_preimages_len > data.len() as u64 / 32 { return None; }
|
|
let mut payment_preimages = HashMap::with_capacity(payment_preimages_len as usize);
|
|
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
|
|
for _ in 0..payment_preimages_len {
|
|
let mut preimage = [0; 32];
|
|
preimage[..].copy_from_slice(read_bytes!(32));
|
|
sha.reset();
|
|
sha.input(&preimage);
|
|
let mut hash = [0; 32];
|
|
sha.result(&mut hash);
|
|
if let Some(_) = payment_preimages.insert(hash, preimage) {
|
|
return None;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let destination_script_len = byte_utils::slice_to_be64(read_bytes!(8));
|
|
let destination_script = Script::from(read_bytes!(destination_script_len).to_vec());
|
|
|
|
Some(ChannelMonitor {
|
|
funding_txo,
|
|
commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor,
|
|
|
|
key_storage,
|
|
delayed_payment_base_key,
|
|
their_htlc_base_key,
|
|
their_delayed_payment_base_key,
|
|
their_cur_revocation_points,
|
|
|
|
our_to_self_delay,
|
|
their_to_self_delay,
|
|
|
|
old_secrets,
|
|
remote_claimable_outpoints,
|
|
remote_commitment_txn_on_chain: Mutex::new(remote_commitment_txn_on_chain),
|
|
remote_hash_commitment_number,
|
|
|
|
prev_local_signed_commitment_tx,
|
|
current_local_signed_commitment_tx,
|
|
|
|
payment_preimages,
|
|
|
|
destination_script,
|
|
secp_ctx,
|
|
})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
//TODO: Functions to serialize/deserialize (with different forms depending on which information
|
|
//we want to leave out (eg funding_txo, etc).
|
|
|
|
/// Can only fail if idx is < get_min_seen_secret
|
|
pub fn get_secret(&self, idx: u64) -> Result<[u8; 32], HandleError> {
|
|
for i in 0..self.old_secrets.len() {
|
|
if (idx & (!((1 << i) - 1))) == self.old_secrets[i].1 {
|
|
return Ok(ChannelMonitor::derive_secret(self.old_secrets[i].0, i as u8, idx))
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
assert!(idx < self.get_min_seen_secret());
|
|
Err(HandleError{err: "idx too low", action: None})
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn get_min_seen_secret(&self) -> u64 {
|
|
//TODO This can be optimized?
|
|
let mut min = 1 << 48;
|
|
for &(_, idx) in self.old_secrets.iter() {
|
|
if idx < min {
|
|
min = idx;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
min
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Attempts to claim a remote commitment transaction's outputs using the revocation key and
|
|
/// data in remote_claimable_outpoints. Will directly claim any HTLC outputs which expire at a
|
|
/// height > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER. In any case, will install monitoring for
|
|
/// HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout transactions.
|
|
fn check_spend_remote_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, height: u32) -> (Vec<Transaction>, (Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)) {
|
|
// Most secp and related errors trying to create keys means we have no hope of constructing
|
|
// a spend transaction...so we return no transactions to broadcast
|
|
let mut txn_to_broadcast = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
let commitment_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
|
|
let per_commitment_option = self.remote_claimable_outpoints.get(&commitment_txid);
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! ignore_error {
|
|
( $thing : expr ) => {
|
|
match $thing {
|
|
Ok(a) => a,
|
|
Err(_) => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let commitment_number = 0xffffffffffff - ((((tx.input[0].sequence as u64 & 0xffffff) << 3*8) | (tx.lock_time as u64 & 0xffffff)) ^ self.commitment_transaction_number_obscure_factor);
|
|
if commitment_number >= self.get_min_seen_secret() {
|
|
let secret = self.get_secret(commitment_number).unwrap();
|
|
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
|
|
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
|
|
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
|
|
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
|
|
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key)),
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &htlc_base_key)))
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
let delayed_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &self.delayed_payment_base_key));
|
|
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
|
|
None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
|
|
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key), &their_htlc_base_key)),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let revokeable_redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.our_to_self_delay, &delayed_key);
|
|
let revokeable_p2wsh = revokeable_redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
|
|
|
|
let mut total_value = 0;
|
|
let mut values = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut htlc_idxs = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
for (idx, outp) in tx.output.iter().enumerate() {
|
|
if outp.script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh {
|
|
inputs.push(TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
|
|
txid: commitment_txid,
|
|
vout: idx as u32,
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Script::new(),
|
|
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
|
|
witness: Vec::new(),
|
|
});
|
|
htlc_idxs.push(None);
|
|
values.push(outp.value);
|
|
total_value += outp.value;
|
|
break; // There can only be one of these
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! sign_input {
|
|
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $htlc_idx: expr, $amount: expr) => {
|
|
{
|
|
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
let redeemscript = if $htlc_idx.is_none() { revokeable_redeemscript.clone() } else {
|
|
let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$htlc_idx.unwrap()];
|
|
chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey)
|
|
};
|
|
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
|
|
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
|
|
(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key), redeemscript)
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
|
|
unimplemented!();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
if $htlc_idx.is_none() {
|
|
$input.witness.push(vec!(1));
|
|
} else {
|
|
$input.witness.push(revocation_pubkey.serialize().to_vec());
|
|
}
|
|
$input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
|
|
inputs.reserve_exact(per_commitment_data.len());
|
|
|
|
for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
|
|
let expected_script = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(&htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
|
|
if htlc.transaction_output_index as usize >= tx.output.len() ||
|
|
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value != htlc.amount_msat / 1000 ||
|
|
tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].script_pubkey != expected_script.to_v0_p2wsh() {
|
|
return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); // Corrupted per_commitment_data, fuck this user
|
|
}
|
|
let input = TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
|
|
txid: commitment_txid,
|
|
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Script::new(),
|
|
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
|
|
witness: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
|
|
inputs.push(input);
|
|
htlc_idxs.push(Some(idx));
|
|
values.push(tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value);
|
|
total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
|
|
} else {
|
|
let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
input: vec![input],
|
|
output: vec!(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
|
|
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
|
|
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], Some(idx), htlc.amount_msat / 1000);
|
|
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx); // TODO: This is not yet tested in ChannelManager!
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !inputs.is_empty() || !txn_to_broadcast.is_empty() { // ie we're confident this is actually ours
|
|
// We're definitely a remote commitment transaction!
|
|
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
|
|
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
|
|
}
|
|
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
|
|
|
|
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
|
|
value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
|
|
});
|
|
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
input: inputs,
|
|
output: outputs,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
|
|
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
|
|
|
|
for (input, htlc_idx) in spend_tx.input.iter_mut().zip(htlc_idxs.iter()) {
|
|
let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
|
|
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, htlc_idx, value);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
|
|
} else if let Some(per_commitment_data) = per_commitment_option {
|
|
// While this isn't useful yet, there is a potential race where if a counterparty
|
|
// revokes a state at the same time as the commitment transaction for that state is
|
|
// confirmed, and the watchtower receives the block before the user, the user could
|
|
// upload a new ChannelMonitor with the revocation secret but the watchtower has
|
|
// already processed the block, resulting in the remote_commitment_txn_on_chain entry
|
|
// not being generated by the above conditional. Thus, to be safe, we go ahead and
|
|
// insert it here.
|
|
watch_outputs.append(&mut tx.output.clone());
|
|
self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap().insert(commitment_txid, commitment_number);
|
|
|
|
if let Some(revocation_points) = self.their_cur_revocation_points {
|
|
let revocation_point_option =
|
|
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number { Some(&revocation_points.1) }
|
|
else if let Some(point) = revocation_points.2.as_ref() {
|
|
if revocation_points.0 == commitment_number + 1 { Some(point) } else { None }
|
|
} else { None };
|
|
if let Some(revocation_point) = revocation_point_option {
|
|
let (revocation_pubkey, b_htlc_key) = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key } => {
|
|
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key))),
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &htlc_base_key))))
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
(ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &revocation_base_key)),
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key)))
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
let a_htlc_key = match self.their_htlc_base_key {
|
|
None => return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)),
|
|
Some(their_htlc_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &their_htlc_base_key)),
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut total_value = 0;
|
|
let mut values = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! sign_input {
|
|
($sighash_parts: expr, $input: expr, $amount: expr, $preimage: expr) => {
|
|
{
|
|
let (sig, redeemscript) = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref htlc_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
let htlc = &per_commitment_option.unwrap()[$input.sequence as usize];
|
|
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &a_htlc_key, &b_htlc_key, &revocation_pubkey);
|
|
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&$sighash_parts.sighash_all(&$input, &redeemscript, $amount)[..]));
|
|
let htlc_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_key(&self.secp_ctx, revocation_point, &htlc_base_key));
|
|
(self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &htlc_key), redeemscript)
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
|
|
unimplemented!();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
$input.witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
$input.witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
$input.witness.push($preimage);
|
|
$input.witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for (idx, htlc) in per_commitment_data.iter().enumerate() {
|
|
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
|
|
let input = TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
|
|
txid: commitment_txid,
|
|
vout: htlc.transaction_output_index,
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Script::new(),
|
|
sequence: idx as u32, // reset to 0xfffffffd in sign_input
|
|
witness: Vec::new(),
|
|
};
|
|
if htlc.cltv_expiry > height + CLTV_SHARED_CLAIM_BUFFER {
|
|
inputs.push(input);
|
|
values.push((tx.output[htlc.transaction_output_index as usize].value, payment_preimage));
|
|
total_value += htlc.amount_msat / 1000;
|
|
} else {
|
|
let mut single_htlc_tx = Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
input: vec![input],
|
|
output: vec!(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
|
|
value: htlc.amount_msat / 1000, //TODO: - fee
|
|
}),
|
|
};
|
|
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&single_htlc_tx);
|
|
sign_input!(sighash_parts, single_htlc_tx.input[0], htlc.amount_msat / 1000, payment_preimage.to_vec());
|
|
txn_to_broadcast.push(single_htlc_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if inputs.is_empty() { return (txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs)); } // Nothing to be done...probably a false positive/local tx
|
|
|
|
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
|
|
value: total_value, //TODO: - fee
|
|
});
|
|
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
input: inputs,
|
|
output: outputs,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let mut values_drain = values.drain(..);
|
|
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
|
|
|
|
for input in spend_tx.input.iter_mut() {
|
|
let value = values_drain.next().unwrap();
|
|
sign_input!(sighash_parts, input, value.0, value.1.to_vec());
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
txn_to_broadcast.push(spend_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
(txn_to_broadcast, (commitment_txid, watch_outputs))
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Attempst to claim a remote HTLC-Success/HTLC-Timeout s outputs using the revocation key
|
|
fn check_spend_remote_htlc(&self, tx: &Transaction, commitment_number: u64) -> Option<Transaction> {
|
|
let htlc_txid = tx.txid(); //TODO: This is gonna be a performance bottleneck for watchtowers!
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! ignore_error {
|
|
( $thing : expr ) => {
|
|
match $thing {
|
|
Ok(a) => a,
|
|
Err(_) => return None
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let secret = ignore_error!(self.get_secret(commitment_number));
|
|
let per_commitment_key = ignore_error!(SecretKey::from_slice(&self.secp_ctx, &secret));
|
|
let per_commitment_point = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key);
|
|
let revocation_pubkey = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &PublicKey::from_secret_key(&self.secp_ctx, &revocation_base_key)))
|
|
},
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &revocation_base_key))
|
|
},
|
|
};
|
|
let delayed_key = match self.their_delayed_payment_base_key {
|
|
None => return None,
|
|
Some(their_delayed_payment_base_key) => ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_public_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_point, &their_delayed_payment_base_key)),
|
|
};
|
|
let redeemscript = chan_utils::get_revokeable_redeemscript(&revocation_pubkey, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), &delayed_key);
|
|
let revokeable_p2wsh = redeemscript.to_v0_p2wsh();
|
|
|
|
let mut inputs = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut amount = 0;
|
|
|
|
if tx.output[0].script_pubkey == revokeable_p2wsh { //HTLC transactions have one txin, one txout
|
|
inputs.push(TxIn {
|
|
previous_output: BitcoinOutPoint {
|
|
txid: htlc_txid,
|
|
vout: 0,
|
|
},
|
|
script_sig: Script::new(),
|
|
sequence: 0xfffffffd,
|
|
witness: Vec::new(),
|
|
});
|
|
amount = tx.output[0].value;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if !inputs.is_empty() {
|
|
let outputs = vec!(TxOut {
|
|
script_pubkey: self.destination_script.clone(),
|
|
value: amount, //TODO: - fee
|
|
});
|
|
|
|
let mut spend_tx = Transaction {
|
|
version: 2,
|
|
lock_time: 0,
|
|
input: inputs,
|
|
output: outputs,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
let sighash_parts = bip143::SighashComponents::new(&spend_tx);
|
|
|
|
let sig = match self.key_storage {
|
|
KeyStorage::PrivMode { ref revocation_base_key, .. } => {
|
|
let sighash = ignore_error!(Message::from_slice(&sighash_parts.sighash_all(&spend_tx.input[0], &redeemscript, amount)[..]));
|
|
let revocation_key = ignore_error!(chan_utils::derive_private_revocation_key(&self.secp_ctx, &per_commitment_key, &revocation_base_key));
|
|
self.secp_ctx.sign(&sighash, &revocation_key)
|
|
}
|
|
KeyStorage::SigsMode { .. } => {
|
|
unimplemented!();
|
|
}
|
|
};
|
|
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
spend_tx.input[0].witness[0].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(vec!(1));
|
|
spend_tx.input[0].witness.push(redeemscript.into_bytes());
|
|
|
|
Some(spend_tx)
|
|
} else { None }
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn broadcast_by_local_state(&self, local_tx: &LocalSignedTx) -> Vec<Transaction> {
|
|
let mut res = Vec::with_capacity(local_tx.htlc_outputs.len());
|
|
|
|
for &(ref htlc, ref their_sig, ref our_sig) in local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
|
if htlc.offered {
|
|
let mut htlc_timeout_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
|
|
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
|
|
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new());
|
|
htlc_timeout_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
|
|
|
|
res.push(htlc_timeout_tx);
|
|
} else {
|
|
if let Some(payment_preimage) = self.payment_preimages.get(&htlc.payment_hash) {
|
|
let mut htlc_success_tx = chan_utils::build_htlc_transaction(&local_tx.txid, local_tx.feerate_per_kw, self.their_to_self_delay.unwrap(), htlc, &local_tx.delayed_payment_key, &local_tx.revocation_key);
|
|
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(Vec::new()); // First is the multisig dummy
|
|
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(their_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[1].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(our_sig.serialize_der(&self.secp_ctx).to_vec());
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness[2].push(SigHashType::All as u8);
|
|
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(payment_preimage.to_vec());
|
|
htlc_success_tx.input[0].witness.push(chan_utils::get_htlc_redeemscript_with_explicit_keys(htlc, &local_tx.a_htlc_key, &local_tx.b_htlc_key, &local_tx.revocation_key).into_bytes());
|
|
|
|
res.push(htlc_success_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
res
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
/// Attempts to claim any claimable HTLCs in a commitment transaction which was not (yet)
|
|
/// revoked using data in local_claimable_outpoints.
|
|
/// Should not be used if check_spend_revoked_transaction succeeds.
|
|
fn check_spend_local_transaction(&self, tx: &Transaction, _height: u32) -> Vec<Transaction> {
|
|
let commitment_txid = tx.txid();
|
|
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
|
|
return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if let &Some(ref local_tx) = &self.prev_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
if local_tx.txid == commitment_txid {
|
|
return self.broadcast_by_local_state(local_tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
Vec::new()
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
fn block_connected(&self, txn_matched: &[&Transaction], height: u32, broadcaster: &BroadcasterInterface)-> Vec<(Sha256dHash, Vec<TxOut>)> {
|
|
let mut watch_outputs = Vec::new();
|
|
for tx in txn_matched {
|
|
if tx.input.len() == 1 {
|
|
// Assuming our keys were not leaked (in which case we're screwed no matter what),
|
|
// commitment transactions and HTLC transactions will all only ever have one input,
|
|
// which is an easy way to filter out any potential non-matching txn for lazy
|
|
// filters.
|
|
let prevout = &tx.input[0].previous_output;
|
|
let mut txn: Vec<Transaction> = Vec::new();
|
|
if self.funding_txo.is_none() || (prevout.txid == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.txid && prevout.vout == self.funding_txo.as_ref().unwrap().0.index as u32) {
|
|
let (remote_txn, new_outputs) = self.check_spend_remote_transaction(tx, height);
|
|
txn = remote_txn;
|
|
if !new_outputs.1.is_empty() {
|
|
watch_outputs.push(new_outputs);
|
|
}
|
|
if txn.is_empty() {
|
|
txn = self.check_spend_local_transaction(tx, height);
|
|
}
|
|
} else {
|
|
let remote_commitment_txn_on_chain = self.remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.lock().unwrap();
|
|
if let Some(commitment_number) = remote_commitment_txn_on_chain.get(&prevout.txid) {
|
|
if let Some(tx) = self.check_spend_remote_htlc(tx, *commitment_number) {
|
|
txn.push(tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
for tx in txn.iter() {
|
|
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
let mut needs_broadcast = false;
|
|
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
|
if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
|
|
if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
|
|
needs_broadcast = true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if needs_broadcast {
|
|
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&cur_local_tx.tx);
|
|
for tx in self.broadcast_by_local_state(&cur_local_tx) {
|
|
broadcaster.broadcast_transaction(&tx);
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
watch_outputs
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pub fn would_broadcast_at_height(&self, height: u32) -> bool {
|
|
if let Some(ref cur_local_tx) = self.current_local_signed_commitment_tx {
|
|
for &(ref htlc, _, _) in cur_local_tx.htlc_outputs.iter() {
|
|
if htlc.cltv_expiry <= height + CLTV_CLAIM_BUFFER {
|
|
if htlc.offered || self.payment_preimages.contains_key(&htlc.payment_hash) {
|
|
return true;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
false
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[cfg(test)]
|
|
mod tests {
|
|
use bitcoin::blockdata::script::Script;
|
|
use bitcoin::blockdata::transaction::Transaction;
|
|
use crypto::digest::Digest;
|
|
use hex;
|
|
use ln::channelmonitor::ChannelMonitor;
|
|
use ln::chan_utils::{HTLCOutputInCommitment, TxCreationKeys};
|
|
use util::sha2::Sha256;
|
|
use secp256k1::key::{SecretKey,PublicKey};
|
|
use secp256k1::{Secp256k1, Signature};
|
|
use rand::{thread_rng,Rng};
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_per_commitment_storage() {
|
|
// Test vectors from BOLT 3:
|
|
let mut secrets: Vec<[u8; 32]> = Vec::new();
|
|
let mut monitor: ChannelMonitor;
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! test_secrets {
|
|
() => {
|
|
let mut idx = 281474976710655;
|
|
for secret in secrets.iter() {
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.get_secret(idx).unwrap(), *secret);
|
|
idx -= 1;
|
|
}
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.get_min_seen_secret(), idx + 1);
|
|
assert!(monitor.get_secret(idx).is_err());
|
|
};
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret correct sequence
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #1 incorrect
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #2 incorrect (#1 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #3 incorrect
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #4 incorrect (1,2,3 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("02a40c85b6f28da08dfdbe0926c53fab2de6d28c10301f8f7c4073d5e42e3148").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("dddc3a8d14fddf2b68fa8c7fbad2748274937479dd0f8930d5ebb4ab6bd866a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c51a18b13e8527e579ec56365482c62f180b7d5760b46e9477dae59e87ed423a").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("ba65d7b0ef55a3ba300d4e87af29868f394f8f138d78a7011669c79b37b936f4").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #5 incorrect
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #6 incorrect (5 derived from incorrect)
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("631373ad5f9ef654bb3dade742d09504c567edd24320d2fcd68e3cc47e2ff6a6").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("b7e76a83668bde38b373970155c868a653304308f9896692f904a23731224bb1").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #7 incorrect
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("e7971de736e01da8ed58b94c2fc216cb1dca9e326f3a96e7194fe8ea8af6c0a3").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("05cde6323d949933f7f7b78776bcc1ea6d9b31447732e3802e1f7ac44b650e17").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
{
|
|
// insert_secret #8 incorrect
|
|
monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
secrets.clear();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c65716add7aa98ba7acb236352d665cab17345fe45b55fb879ff80e6bd0c41dd").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710651, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("969660042a28f32d9be17344e09374b379962d03db1574df5a8a5a47e19ce3f2").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710650, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a5a64476122ca0925fb344bdc1854c1c0a59fc614298e50a33e331980a220f32").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710649, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
test_secrets!();
|
|
|
|
secrets.push([0; 32]);
|
|
secrets.last_mut().unwrap()[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("a7efbc61aac46d34f77778bac22c8a20c6a46ca460addc49009bda875ec88fa4").unwrap());
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.provide_secret(281474976710648, secrets.last().unwrap().clone(), None).unwrap_err().err,
|
|
"Previous secret did not match new one");
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
#[test]
|
|
fn test_prune_preimages() {
|
|
let secp_ctx = Secp256k1::new();
|
|
let dummy_sig = Signature::from_der(&secp_ctx, &hex::decode("3045022100fa86fa9a36a8cd6a7bb8f06a541787d51371d067951a9461d5404de6b928782e02201c8b7c334c10aed8976a3a465be9a28abff4cb23acbf00022295b378ce1fa3cd").unwrap()[..]).unwrap();
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! dummy_keys {
|
|
() => {
|
|
{
|
|
let dummy_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
|
|
TxCreationKeys {
|
|
per_commitment_point: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
revocation_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
a_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
b_htlc_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
a_delayed_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
b_payment_key: dummy_key.clone(),
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
let dummy_tx = Transaction { version: 0, lock_time: 0, input: Vec::new(), output: Vec::new() };
|
|
|
|
let mut preimages = Vec::new();
|
|
{
|
|
let mut rng = thread_rng();
|
|
for _ in 0..20 {
|
|
let mut preimage = [0; 32];
|
|
rng.fill_bytes(&mut preimage);
|
|
let mut sha = Sha256::new();
|
|
sha.input(&preimage);
|
|
let mut hash = [0; 32];
|
|
sha.result(&mut hash);
|
|
preimages.push((preimage, hash));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs {
|
|
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
|
|
{
|
|
let mut res = Vec::new();
|
|
for (idx, preimage) in $preimages_slice.iter().enumerate() {
|
|
res.push(HTLCOutputInCommitment {
|
|
offered: true,
|
|
amount_msat: 0,
|
|
cltv_expiry: 0,
|
|
payment_hash: preimage.1.clone(),
|
|
transaction_output_index: idx as u32,
|
|
});
|
|
}
|
|
res
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
macro_rules! preimages_to_local_htlcs {
|
|
($preimages_slice: expr) => {
|
|
{
|
|
let mut inp = preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!($preimages_slice);
|
|
let res: Vec<_> = inp.drain(..).map(|e| { (e, dummy_sig.clone(), dummy_sig.clone()) }).collect();
|
|
res
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
macro_rules! test_preimages_exist {
|
|
($preimages_slice: expr, $monitor: expr) => {
|
|
for preimage in $preimages_slice {
|
|
assert!($monitor.payment_preimages.contains_key(&preimage.1));
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Prune with one old state and a local commitment tx holding a few overlaps with the
|
|
// old state.
|
|
let delayed_payment_base_key = PublicKey::from_secret_key(&secp_ctx, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap());
|
|
let mut monitor = ChannelMonitor::new(&SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[42; 32]).unwrap(), &delayed_payment_base_key, &SecretKey::from_slice(&secp_ctx, &[43; 32]).unwrap(), 0, Script::new());
|
|
monitor.set_their_to_self_delay(10);
|
|
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..10]));
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[5..15]), 281474976710655);
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[15..20]), 281474976710654);
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[17..20]), 281474976710653);
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_remote_commitment_tx_info(&dummy_tx, preimages_slice_to_htlc_outputs!(preimages[18..20]), 281474976710652);
|
|
for &(ref preimage, ref hash) in preimages.iter() {
|
|
monitor.provide_payment_preimage(hash, preimage);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// Now provide a secret, pruning preimages 10-15
|
|
let mut secret = [0; 32];
|
|
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("7cc854b54e3e0dcdb010d7a3fee464a9687be6e8db3be6854c475621e007a5dc").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710655, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 15);
|
|
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
|
|
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[15..20], monitor);
|
|
|
|
// Now provide a further secret, pruning preimages 15-17
|
|
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("c7518c8ae4660ed02894df8976fa1a3659c1a8b4b5bec0c4b872abeba4cb8964").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710654, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 13);
|
|
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
|
|
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[17..20], monitor);
|
|
|
|
// Now update local commitment tx info, pruning only element 18 as we still care about the
|
|
// previous commitment tx's preimages too
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..5]));
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secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("2273e227a5b7449b6e70f1fb4652864038b1cbf9cd7c043a7d6456b7fc275ad8").unwrap());
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monitor.provide_secret(281474976710653, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 12);
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test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..10], monitor);
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test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[18..20], monitor);
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|
|
|
// But if we do it again, we'll prune 5-10
|
|
monitor.provide_latest_local_commitment_tx_info(dummy_tx.clone(), dummy_keys!(), 0, preimages_to_local_htlcs!(preimages[0..3]));
|
|
secret[0..32].clone_from_slice(&hex::decode("27cddaa5624534cb6cb9d7da077cf2b22ab21e9b506fd4998a51d54502e99116").unwrap());
|
|
monitor.provide_secret(281474976710652, secret.clone(), None).unwrap();
|
|
assert_eq!(monitor.payment_preimages.len(), 5);
|
|
test_preimages_exist!(&preimages[0..5], monitor);
|
|
}
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|
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// Further testing is done in the ChannelManager integration tests.
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|
}
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